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ABSTRACT 
In my first essay, using a novel dataset that merges the Dealscan database and 8-
Ks between 1994-2014, I find that on average, only about 31% of bank loans are 
announced by firms. Among those loans announced, about 60% are cleanly announced 
and 40% are announced together with other events. The three-day Cumulative Abnormal 
Stock Return (CAR) following a loan announcement is positive and both statistically and 
economically significant, which on average about +39 b.p., in line with the theory of 
bank loan specialness. This finding is mainly driven by bank-dependent firms. Next, I 
find significant evidence of sample selection bias in the loan announcements sample, 
which likely confounds the findings from the previous literature. Correcting for the bias, I 
find that a loan is more likely to be announced during a market crisis, relative to normal 
times, but not during a banking crisis. Moreover, a loan is more likely to be announced 
by small firms, firms with lower EBITDA, and when the loan has more financial 
covenants, is a revolver loan, has a longer maturity, secured, and when the firm has a 
previous lending relationship. Then, CARs are significantly higher during a banking 
crisis, compared to normal times, but not in a market crisis, in line with both the 
asymmetric information hypothesis and the institutional memory hypothesis. Lastly, I 
find strong evidence that CARs are negatively associated with the market share of 




In my second essay, using a natural experiment of changes in deposit insurance 
deposit insurance coverage limit over 2002-2011 in Indonesia, I find a significant 
positive relation between explicit deposit insurance coverage and bank risk-taking, 
consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis. More specifically, controlling for various 
bank-specific and macroeconomic variables, as well as bank regulations, I find that 
Indonesian banks’ Z-Score, an inverse measure of bank risk taking, increases on average 
about 18% when the government switched from the blanket guarantee era to the limited 
guarantee era. Further, I find some evidence that the relation is non-monotonic at the low 
level of explicit deposit insurance coverage, in line with the safety net hypothesis. 
Finally, I find significant evidence that the impact of explicit deposit insurance coverage 
on bank risk is different across different kinds of ultimate owners. In particular, family 
banks and politically connected banks are those that are most affected when the 
government switched from the blanket guarantee era to the limited guarantee era, 
suggesting that the moral hazard problem in these banks are more prominent compared to 
foreign banks and nonpolitically connected banks.  
In my third essay (co-authored with Allen N. Berger, Sadok El Ghoul, and 
Omrane Guedhami), we examine the impact of geographic deregulation on bank risk. 
More specifically, we study all three types of geographic deregulation in last three 
decades in the U.S. banking industry—intrastate branching, interstate banking, and 
interstate branching. These deregulations provide unique empirical settings to test the 
impact of competition and diversification on bank risk. We find statistically and 
economically significant evidence that on average, interstate banking deregulation is 
associated with about 22% increase in Z-score, an inverse indicator of overall bank risk. 
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On the contrary, we find some evidence that intrastate branching is associated with a 
decrease in Z-score about 3%. Meanwhile, we find no evidence that interstate branching 
affects bank risk. These findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks, including 
those for endogeneity and sample selection bias, as well as alternative risk measures. 
Different than most of the previous studies that focus on large banks and Bank Holding 
Companies, our findings show that the favorable impact of interstate banking 
deregulation on bank risk are driven by small banks, which had opposed the deregulation 
with the fear that an increase in competition from large banks could reduce their survival 
probability. Meanwhile, intrastate branching is associated with higher risk for small and 
medium banks, but lower risk for large banks. These findings suggest that the 
competition-stability channel dominates for small and medium banks, while the 
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Banks are firms that collect deposits from the public and use the pool of funds 
collected to provide funding to borrowing firms. Prior to a lending decision, a bank 
screens each loan applications to gather private information about the borrowing firms, 
which are mainly from the previous banking relationship between the bank and the 
borrowing firms. Post a lending decision, the bank conduct continuous monitoring to the 
borrowing firms and gather more private information about their ability to repay the bank 
loans. This specialization in screening and monitoring the borrowing firms gives banks a 
comparative advantage in reducing asymmetric information problem between the 
borrowing firms and investors, compared to other arms’ length lenders (Leland and Pyle, 
1977), and thus, makes banks “special” institutions.  
The first essay in this dissertation, “Are Bank Loans Special? Evidence from 
Normal Times and Financial Crises”, provides empirical evidence of the certification 
value of bank loans from the U.S. market in the last two decades, which has experienced 
both market crisis and banking crisis. Using a novel dataset that merges 11,635 loan deals 
from the LPC Dealscan database and form 8-Ks from the SEC EDGAR between 1994-
2014, I find that on average, only about 31% of bank loans are announced by firms. 
Among those loans announced, about 60% are cleanly announced and 40% are 
announced together with other events.  
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Next, I find statistically and economically significant three-days Cumulative 
Abnormal Stock Return (CAR) following a loan announcement, which on average about 
+39 b.p., in line with the theory of bank loan specialness. The positive CARs are driven 
mainly by bank-dependent firms, which have never issued public bonds. Meanwhile, as a 
comparison, I show that three-days CARs following public bond announcements by firms 
in the sample are negative and statistically significant. Then, using the enactment of 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the SEC Rule ##33-8400 of 2004 as exogenous 
shocks to loan announcements by firms, I show significant evidence of sample selection 
bias in the loan announcements sample, which likely confounds the findings from the 
previous literature.  
Being the first study that corrects the sample selection bias, using the Heckman 
selection method, I find that a loan is more likely to be announced during a market crisis, 
relative to normal times, but not during a banking crisis, consistent with the asymmetric 
information hypothesis. Moreover, a loan is more likely to be announced by small firms, 
firms with lower EBITDA, and when the loan has more financial covenants, is a revolver 
loan, has a longer maturity, secured, as well as when the firm has a previous relationship 
with the same lender in the past 5 years. Then, I find that the CARs are significantly 
higher during a banking crisis, compared to normal times, but not in a market crisis, in 
line with both the asymmetric information hypothesis and the institutional memory 
hypothesis.  
In terms of loan, firm, and lender characteristics, CAR is statistically higher for a 
loan announced by a bank-dependent firm, and for a loan that has more financial 
covenants, and is a revolver. I also find some evidence CAR is statistically higher for a 
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loan that has a longer maturity as well as a loan made by the same lender that has lent the 
firm in the past 5 years. Finally, I find strong evidence that CAR is negatively associated 
with the market share of nonbank lenders, which aligns with the competition hypothesis 
that explains why CARs following loan announcements shown by the recent literature, 
including this paper, is not as high as the earlier studies have shown.  
My first essay provides us an explanation of the specialness of banks in private 
information gathering that can reduce information asymmetries between borrowing firms 
and investors. However, due to the nature of their business models, in which banks 
borrow short-term funding from depositors and then invest it on long-term assets in a 
form of bank lending, banks are prone to “bank runs” (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Due 
to their importance to the economy and the fragility nature, government provides 
protection to depositors in a form of deposit insurance, aside from implicit government 
guarantee in a form of bailouts. This deposit insurance system is increasingly popular in 
the last two decades. However, theory contends that deposit insurance can be a “double 
edged” sword. In particular, deposit insurance works like a put option to bank 
shareholders, which protects them from downside risks and therefore, provides them an 
incentive for a moral hazard problem. The second essay in this dissertation, “Deposit 
Insurance Coverage, Ownership, and Risk Taking: Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment”, aims to answer how deposit insurance affects bank risk-taking and how 
this relation works on banks with different types of ownership, by using a unique natural 
experiment data from Indonesia from 2002:Q1-2011:Q4. 
I find a significant positive relation between explicit Deposit Insurance (DI) 
coverage and bank risk-taking, consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis. More 
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specifically, controlling for various bank-specific and macroeconomic variables, as well 
as bank regulations, I find that Indonesian banks’ Z-score, an inverse measure of bank 
risk taking, increases on average about 18% when the government switched from the 
blanket guarantee era to the limited guarantee era administered by the Indonesian Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (IDIC). In terms of mechanisms in which explicit DI coverage 
influences bank risk taking, I find that a lower explicit DI coverage is associated with 
lower bank profitability, lower standard deviation of profitability, and higher 
capitalization. Furthermore, I find some evidence that the relation is non-monotonic at the 
low level of explicit DI coverage, in line with the safety net hypothesis. This finding 
suggests that there is an optimum range of explicit DI coverage that sufficiently protects 
the depositors while curbing the banks’ moral hazard problem. Finally, I find significant 
evidence that the impact of explicit DI coverage on bank risk is different across different 
kinds of ultimate owners. In particular, family banks and politically connected banks are 
those that are most affected when the government switched from the blanket guarantee 
era to the limited guarantee era, suggesting that the moral hazard problem in these banks 
are more prominent compared to foreign banks and nonpolitically connected banks. 
The second essay shows that the moral hazard problem persists in the banking 
industry. This is one of the main reasons why the banking industry is highly regulated. 
However, a too strict bank regulation might hinder competition, which can lead to 
inefficient banking operations. Accordingly, when the regulation is deemed to be too 
strict, the government may conduct deregulation in the banking industry. Nevertheless, 
politicians and scholars are still debating whether deregulation can instead increase bank 
risk. My third essay in this dissertation (co-authored with Allen N. Berger, Sadok El 
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Ghoul, and Omrane Guedhami), “Competition Does Not Kill Banks; It Makes Them 
Stronger: The Impact of Geographic Deregulation on Bank Risk,” provides answers 
to this debate by examining the staggered geographic deregulation in the US banking 
industry. More specifically, we study all three types of geographic deregulation in last 
three decades in the U.S. banking industry—intrastate branching, interstate banking, and 
interstate branching. These deregulations provide unique empirical settings to test the 
impact of competition and diversification on bank risk.  
We find statistically and economically significant evidence that on average, 
interstate banking deregulation is associated with about 22% increase in Z-score, an 
inverse indicator of overall bank risk. On the contrary, we find some evidence that 
intrastate branching is associated with a decrease in Z-score about 3%. Meanwhile, we 
find no evidence that interstate branching affects bank risk. These findings are robust to a 
variety of sensitivity checks, including those for endogeneity and sample selection bias, 
as well as alternative risk measures. Different than most of the previous studies that focus 
on large banks and Bank Holding Companies, our findings show that the favorable 
impact of interstate banking deregulation on bank risk are driven by small banks, which 
had opposed the deregulation with the fear that an increase in competition from large 
banks could reduce their survival probability. Meanwhile, intrastate branching is 
associated with higher risk for small and medium banks, but lower risk for large banks. 
These findings suggest that the competition-stability channel dominates for small and 
medium banks, while the diversification-stability channel dominates for large banks. 




ARE BANK LOANS STILL SPECIAL? 





Are bank loans special compared to other sources of financing? Early theoretical 
works such as Diamond (1984, 1991), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Fama (1985), 
and Berlin and Loeys (1988) in general contend that banks can attenuate lenders-
borrowers information asymmetry problem by gathering private information from their 
borrowing firms (screening) and actively conduct monitoring. In contrast, arm’s-length 
investors (e.g. bondholders) can only rely on publicly available information and have 
limited monitoring ability. The bank specialization on screening and monitoring gives 
bank loans comparative advantages in form of lower contracting and monitoring costs, 
relative to public debts. Furthermore, borrowing firms will benefit from the reputation 
built by the monitoring activities of their banks. More specifically, good track records 
during active monitoring period by banks may serve as a positive signal which mitigates 
the renowned overvaluation problem of borrowing firms seeking external financing as  
                                                 
1
 Herman Saheruddin. To be submitted to Journal of Finance. 
2
 I am deeply grateful to my dissertation chair, Allen Berger, and my committee members, Timothy Koch, 
Donghang Zhang, and Omrane Guedhami for their guidance, support, and valuable comments on this 
paper. I also thank Gregory Niehaus, Jean Helwege, Eric Powers, Steve Mann, Sergey Tsyplakov, 
Yongqiang Chu, Dasol Kim, Ozzie Ince, Chao Jin, Hugh Kim, John Hackney, Mark Cecchini, Pankaj 
Maskara, Chia-Chun Chiang, Ashleigh Poindexter, Xinming Li, Robert Viglione, Gerard Pinto, Eyad 




noted by the traditional pecking order theory ála Myers-Majluf (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). 
Beside a solid theoretical body of literature on the “specialness” of bank loans 
compared to public debts, empirical studies on this view seem to provide mixed results. 
On the one hand, there is a large strand of literature confirming the theory, which finds 
significant certification value of bank loans in terms of positive abnormal stock returns 
following bank loan announcements (e.g. Mikkelson and Partch (1986), James (1987), 
Lummer and McConnell (1989), Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992), Best and Zhang 
(1993), Hadlock and James (2002), Ross (2010), and Gande and Saunders (2012)). On 
the other hand, there is other strand of literature that contests this view by showing some 
empirical evidence that bank loans might not be special, or might be special but may 
depend on borrower and loan characteristics (e.g. Armitage (1995), Billet, Flannery, and 
Garfinkel (2006), Fields, Fraser, Berry, and Byers (2006), Bailey, Huang, and Yang 
(2011), Godlewski, Fungacova, and Weill (2011), Maskara and Mullineaux (2011), and 
Huang, Schwienbauer, and Zhao (2012)).  
Despite the contentious debate, there are a number of compelling questions. First, 
bank loan announcements are voluntary and non-random events (Fery, Gasbarro, 
Woodliff, and Zumwalt, 2003; Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011), and therefore are 
potentially suffer from a self-selection bias. Surprisingly, there is no paper yet that I am 
aware of has corrected this bias. Next, if bank loans are special, does the specialness exist 
all the time or only during a particular time, or are there times when it is more 
pronounced? A growing number of literature has started to investigate this question. For 
example, Li and Ongena (2015), using a sample of large loans in the U.S. market, find 
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that the certification value of bank loans is negligible prior the recent 2008 financial 
crisis, but then increases materially during the crisis. On the contrary, Godlewski (2014), 
using a sample of large loans to French borrowing firms, finds negative abnormal stock 
returns following bank loan announcements during the crisis. However, these studies do 
not examine other financial crises or differentiate between different kinds of financial 
crises.
3
 Another important question is how bank characteristics can affect the certification 
value of bank loans. A number of studies have shown significant relation between 
abnormal stocks returns following bank loans announcements and banks’ credit quality 
(Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995)), reputation (Johnson (1997), Ross (2010)), and 
origin (Ongena and Roscovan (2013)). Surprisingly, bank-borrower relationship in a 
context of bank loans certification value is still relatively sparsely studied, given that 
relationship are theorize to be a prime generator of private information (Sharpe (1990), 
Rajan (1992)). Moreover, recent studies have brought up the issues of competition 
between bank and nonbank lenders. However, the empirical evidence on how the 
intensity of this competition affects bank loans specialness is also still relatively scant. 
This paper aims to fill these gaps in the literature.  
Using a novel dataset that merges 11,635 loan deals from the LPC Dealscan 
database and form 8-Ks from the SEC EDGAR between 1994-2014, I find that on 
average, only about 31% of bank loans are announced by firms. Among those loans 
announced, about 60% are cleanly announced and 40% are announced together with 
                                                 
3
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other events. Next, I find statistically and economically significant three-days Cumulative 
Abnormal Stock Return (CAR) following a loan announcement, which on average about 
+39 b.p., in line with the theory of bank loan specialness. The positive CARs are driven 
mainly by bank-dependent firms, which have never issued public bonds. Meanwhile, as a 
comparison, I show that CARs following public bond announcements by firms in the 
sample are negative and statistically significant. Then, using the enactment of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the SEC Rule #33-8400 in 2004 as exogenous shocks to 
loan announcements by firms, I show significant evidence of sample selection bias in the 
loan announcements sample, which likely confounds the findings from the previous 
literature.  
Being the first study that corrects the sample selection bias, using the Heckman 
selection method, I find that a loan is more likely to be announced during a market crisis, 
relative to normal times, but not during a banking crisis. Moreover, a loan is more likely 
to be announced by small firms and those with lower EBITDA, and when the loan has 
more financial covenants, is a revolver loan, has a longer maturity, secured, as well as 
when the firm has a previous relationship with the same lender in the past 5 years. CARs 
are significantly higher during a banking crisis, compared to normal times, but not in a 
market crisis, in line with both the asymmetric information hypothesis and the 
institutional memory hypothesis. In terms of loan, firm, and lender characteristics, CAR 
is statistically higher for a loan announced by a bank-dependent firm, and for a loan that 
has more financial covenants, is a revolver, and has a longer maturity, as well as a loan 
made by the same lender that has lent the firm in the past 5 years. Finally, I find strong 
evidence that CAR is negatively associated with the market share of nonbank lenders, 
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which aligns with the competition hypothesis that explains why CARs following loan 
announcements shown by the recent literature, including this paper, is lower than the 
earlier studies have shown.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews relevant 
literatures and hypotheses development. Section 2.3 describes the data and methodology. 
Section 2.4 presents empirical results. Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Leland and Pyle (1977) contend that asymmetric information is the primary 
reason why financial intermediaries exist. Banks, as one form of financial intermediaries, 
collect funds by selling deposits and granting loans to borrowers. Specializing on this 
intermediation process, banks gain a cost advantage in producing and transferring 
information compared to arm’s-length lenders. If several individual lenders grant loans 
directly to a borrower, there will be a duplication of monitoring effort between the 
individual lenders which incur higher monitoring cost. The individual lenders can reduce 
this cost by putting their money in a bank and delegate the tasks of monitoring loan 
contracts to a bank (Diamond, 1984). This “delegated monitoring” function is the key 
difference of banks to arm’s-length lenders. In particular, banks are able to gather inside 
information about borrowers while arm’s-length lenders can only rely on publicly 
available information.  
According to the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), a firm’s 
decision to seek for external financing may signal investors that the firm is overvalued. 
An external financing source with higher degree of asymmetric information is associated 
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with higher perceived overvaluation by investors. In other words, the cost of external 
financing tends to increase with asymmetric information. Therefore, firms will prefer 
internal over external financing and when they really need external financing, they will 
prefer to issue debt securities over equities. Since banks specialize in information 
production and transmittal as well as conduct active monitoring to their borrowers, banks 
have less asymmetric information than other investors or lenders (Diamond, 1984, 1991). 
Therefore, bank loans are considered to be special and different from publicly place debt.  
Most empirical evidences of bank loans specialness come from event studies of 
bank loan announcements. Started with the seminal paper by James (1987), using a 
random sample of 300 US firms over the 1974-1983 period, he finds significant 
evidences that bank borrowers, instead of certificates of deposit (CD) holders, bear the 
cost of reserve requirements on CDs. This finding is in line with Fama (1985) which 
contends that bank loans are special and are different than other types of privately placed 
and publicly placed debt. More importantly, James shows significantly positive abnormal 
stock returns following bank loan announcements. Lummer and McConnell (1989) assert 
that significantly positive abnormal stock returns following bank loans announcement are 
mostly attributed to bank loans renewal instead of new bank loans. Slovin, Johnson, and 
Glasscock (1992) show more specific evidences of bank loans specialness. They find that 
only small firms which show significantly positive abnormal stock returns from bank 
loan announcements, indicating that these firms benefit from monitoring and screening 
functions of banks because these firms are associated with higher degree of asymmetric 
information. Best and Zhang (1993) find that bank loans provide valuable informational 
contents, especially when the analysts’ forecast errors are high. Altman, Gande, and 
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Saunders (2010) assert the monitoring advantage of bank loans over bonds, even when 
there is an active secondary market for bank loans. More specifically, they find that the 
secondary loan market tends to be informationally more efficient than the secondary bond 
market prior to a loan default.  
Despite the mainstream literatures which contend that bank loan is a special type 
of financing which provides certification value to borrowing firms’ shareholders, a strand 
of recent literatures attempts to challenge this view. Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel 
(2006) provide evidences that bank loan announcements are associated with significant 
negative abnormal stock returns in the long run, suggesting that bank loans seem to be 
similar to other forms of external financing in the long run. Fields, Fraser, Berry, and 
Byers (2006) show that loan announcement abnormal returns fade away over time which 
might be explained by the increasing role of market-based financial system. Other studies 
using sample outside the U.S. loan market, such as Armitage (1995), Bailey, Huang, and 
Yang (2011), Godlewski, Fungacova, and Weill (2011), and Huang, Schwienbauer, and 
Zhao (2012) either show insignificant or negative abnormal returns following bank loan 
announcements. Accordingly, whether bank loans are special due to their ability to 
extract private information from the borrowing firms and therefore, are able to reduce the 
information asymmetry problem, is still an empirical research question. This “asymmetric 
information” hypothesis of bank loan specialness is the first hypothesis to test in this 
paper. 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Bank loans are special due to their ability to extract private 
information from the borrowing firms and reduce the asymmetric information problem. 
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Maskara and Mullienaux (2011) shows that previous studies on bank loan 
announcements may not represent the loan universe since only about one-fourth of 
borrowing firms announce their bank loans to media. Furthermore, since the decision to 
announce bank loans is discretionary, the regressions of CARs following bank loan 
announcements will potentially suffer from self-selection bias. They show that borrowing 
firms with higher information asymmetry, higher prospects of cash flow problems, and 
material loans are more likely to announce their bank loans. Accordingly, the next 
hypothesis to test in this paper is: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: There is a serious problem of self-selection bias in loan 
announcements studies. 
In the model of reputation acquisition (Diamond, 1991), the monitoring function 
of banks benefits firms to build their reputation. More specifically, a firm with good track 
records on their bank loans will build a positive reputation which signals other outside 
investors that the firm has promising prospects. In normal times, high-rated firms do not 
need the benefit of bank monitoring since they already have a good reputation and 
revealing bad news when being caught when monitored by banks will harm their 
reputation. Meanwhile, very low-rated firms are rationed by banks. Therefore, during a 
normal time, firms with medium-rating category will benefit most from the bank 
monitoring function in order to build their reputation. In harsh times, such as financial 
crises, the need for bank monitoring will be higher since bank monitoring function is able 
to reduce information asymmetry. During these times, even high-rated firms will benefit 
from bank monitoring since it helps them to signal outside investors about their future 
growth opportunities. Further, bank loans may benefit borrowers due to their 
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renegotiation features which provide more flexibility during a harsh time (Gertner and 
Scharfstein, 1991; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Rajan and Winton, 1995; Cantillo 
and Wright, 2000; Haan and Hinloopen, 2003; Shirasu and Xu, 2007). This flexibility 
benefits include banks’ credit lines which serve as one of liquidity sources for bank 
borrowers.
4
 Using a sample on large-capitalization firms in Russia, Davydov and 
Vähämaa (2013) find that firms which rely entirely on bank debt significantly outperform 
firms with public debt during the recent subprime crisis. Meanwhile, Li and Ongena 
(2015) find significantly positive cumulative abnormal stock returns following syndicated 
bank loan announcements in the US market during 2005 to 2009 for both pre-crisis and 
crisis period. Moreover, Berger and Udell (2004) shows that in crisis times, loan officers 
are getting more experiences in screening loan applications, separating good and bad 
borrowers. On the contrary, in normal times, loan officers get less experience in doing so 
and therefore, this might erode their ability in screening loan applications (the 
institutional memory hypothesis).  Therefore, we may expect that the certification value 
of bank loans during a financial crisis is stronger. The third hypothesis to test in this 
paper is: 
HYPOTHESIS 3: During a period of banking crisis or market crisis, all else 
equal, borrowing firms are more likely to announce their bank loans compared to normal 
times. 
Although bank loans may benefit firms, especially during a harsh time, several 
studies show that dependency on bank loans can harm borrowing firms. Theoretically, 
                                                 
4
 Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show evidences that firms drew down their credit lines more extensive 
during the recent subprime crisis. Campello, Giambona, and Graham (2011) find similar findings which 
show that credit lines eased the impact of the financial crisis on firm spending. However, Sufi (2009) 
asserts that bank lines of credit or revolving credit facilities, are viable as a liquidity source only for those 
borrowers that maintain high cash flow. 
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adverse selection and moral hazard problems hinder a firm to be able to easily access 
external capital markets or switch between different sources of external financing 
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). Accordingly, a firm’s performance may be sensitive to the 
shocks occurred to its external financing sources. When there is a negative shock 
affecting banks’ performance which significantly reduces their ability to provide loans 
supply, this shock may propagate to bank-dependent borrowers. During this period, banks 
will tend to impose tighter covenants, reduce their new loans, and increase interest rate. 
Kang and Stulz (2000) provide evidences from the Japan’s financial crisis during 1990-
1993 and find that firms with higher fraction of bank loans perform worse and invest less. 
Chava and Purnanandam (2011) provide evidences from the 1998 Russian crisis that 
bank-dependent firms suffer from larger valuation losses as well as decline in capital 
expenditure and profitability, relative to firms which rely on public-debt market. Using a 
sample of large loans to French borrowing firms during the 2000’s boom and bust 
periods, Godlewski (2014) finds no significant stock market reactions to bank loan 
announcements during the boom period and significant negative reactions during the bust 
period. In summary, whether bank loans provide certification value during normal times 
and financial crises remains inconclusive. The fourth hypothesis to test is: 
HYPOTHESIS 4: During a period of banking crisis or market crisis, all else 





2.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1 LOAN POPULATION 
I start from the population of U.S. denominated loan deals from the Dealscan 
database from 1994-2014.
5
 This period includes two market crises and one banking crisis. 
Berger and Bouwman (2013) define a market crisis as a financial crisis that originates 
from the financial markets, while a banking crisis is a financial crisis that originates from 
the banking industry. The market crises are the Russian debt crisis and Long-Term 
Capital Management (LTCM) bailout (1998:Q3-1998:Q4), and the dotcom bubble and 
the September 11th terrorist attacks (2000:Q2-2002:Q3). While the banking crisis is the 
recent subprime crisis (2007:Q3-2009:Q4). All periods other than these crises are normal 
times.  
I filter the loans by including only the U.S. borrowing firms. Following the 
common practice in the literature, I start with excluding borrowers categorized as 
financial firms, utilities firms, and government institutions.
6
 Then, I exclude loans with 
the deal purpose of “Takeover”, "LBO", "Stock buyback", "Spinoff", "Dividend Recap", 
"ESOP", "IPO Relat. Finan.", "SBO", "Merger", "MBO" as if a borrowing firm 
announces any of these loans, it is unclear whether the subsequent firm’s shareholders 
reaction (if any) is due to the loan announcement itself or due to the information about 
the purpose of the loan. Further, events such as takeover, merger, and acquisition 
commonly have a long period of information leakage and further details revelation (e.g. 
                                                 
5
 I start from 1994 as this is the earliest coverage that is available in the directEDGAR, a software platform 
that I use to scrape 8-Ks from the SEC EDGAR website.  
6
 Financial firms are those with PrimarySICCode between 6000 and 6999. Utilities firms are those with 
PrimarySICCode between 4910 and 4940. Government institutions are those with PrimarySICCode 
between 9100 and 9999. To make sure that financial firms are excluded, I conduct a further filtering by 
dropping any loan deal having InstitutionType that contains at least one of the following terms: “bank”, 
“finance”, “financial”, “investment”, “insurance”, “thrift”, “S&L”, “fund”, “pension”, “mortgage”, 
“invest”, “hedge”, or “trust”.  
 
17 
Degryse, Kim, and Ongena, 2009). Therefore, the short run event study methodology, 
which has become the standard methodology to test bank loan specialness, is not suitable 
to apply to these events. I also exclude loans with the deal purpose of "Coll. Debt Oblig. 
(CDO)" and "Undisclosed". 
To get financial information on borrowing firms and lenders, I merge the loan 
deals dataset with Compustat.
7
 Following the standard approach in the literature, I drop 
firms having total assets less than $1 million or missing market value of equities. As 
loans from the Dealscan commonly have multiple lenders, following the common 
practice in the previous literature, I focus only on the lead lenders as they are the main 
repository of private information (e.g. Sufi, 2007; Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan, 2007; Balasubramanyan, Berger, and Koepke, 2017). A lender is defined as 
the lead lender if LeadArrangerCredit = "Yes" in the Dealscan database. Then, I 
complement this with the definition from Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2003), 
which defines lead lenders as those having lender role as “arranger”, “administrative 
agent”, “agent”, or “lead bank”. If there are multiple lead lenders, I choose the one with 
the highest lending relationship intensity in the past 5 years, following Bharath, Dahiya, 
Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011).  If there are still multiple lead lenders left after these 
filtering processes, I choose the one with the largest bank allocation and total assets. 
Finally, I merge the dataset with CRSP to get the stock prices information. So far, 
the filtering and merging processes result in 11,678 loan deals or 15,838 loan facilities. 
Then, following Brown and Warner (1985), a firm must have at least 30 daily returns in 
                                                 
7
 I start from the Dealscan-Compustat linktables provided by Michael Roberts (Chava and Roberts, 2008) 
and Michael Schwert (Schwert, JF forthcoming). Then, I update these links using the bigram fuzzy 
matching algorithm similar to Chodorow-Reich (2014) and retains all firm matches with matching score 
greater than 0.98. Finally, I inspect manually each of the firm match with matching score less than 1 but 
greater than 0.98, and keep the correct matches only.    
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the entire estimation period of the event study on loan announcement and no missing 
return in the last 20 days before the loan announcement event.
8
 This filter drops another 
43 deals, which results in a final 11,635 loan deals or 15,776 loan facilities. Figure 2.1 
plots the number and amount of loan deals included in this study for each year from 
1994-2014. From the figure, we can see that the greatest decline in number and amount 
of loan deals occurred during the subprime crisis. Post the subprime crisis, the number 
and amount of loan deals have been gradually increasing back with a peak in year 2011, 
which was driven by refinancing loans (Thomson Reuters, 2011). 
 
2.3.2 LOAN ANNOUNCEMENTS 
To provide investors with current information of material corporate events, the 
SEC mandates publicly listed firms to notify investors via the Form 8-K.
9
 However, the 
SEC does not specifically requires firms to inform investors about bank loans, different 
than the issuance of any arm’s length public debts or equities. Accordingly, a bank loan 
disclosure via the Form 8-K is mostly voluntary (Maskara and Mullineaux, 2011). This 
discretionary feature of bank loan announcements via 8-Ks is similar to the feature of 
loan announcements through the media, in which most of the previous literature on bank 
loan specialness relies on.  
However, there are at least three reasons why bank loan announcements through 
the 8-Ks are more superior to test bank loan specialness compared to those through the 
news media. First, a loan announcement in the media in most cases is short due to limited 
spaces, meanwhile, a loan announcement in 8-K in most cases is supplemented by the 
                                                 
8
 More detailed methodology of the event study following a loan announcement will be explained in 
Section 2.4.3 and 2.4.4. 
9
 SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99—Materiality.  
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complete loan contract, and therefore, provides more information about the loan. Second, 
there is some evidence that media self-select the loan announcements, in which the news 
editors make subjective judgments about what is newsworthy (Preece and Mullineaux, 
1994). There is also some evidence that news editors may push only positive news stories 
(Lummer and McConnel, 1989; Fery, Gasbarro, Woodliff, and Zumwalt, 2003). 
Accordingly, most of the previous studies that rely on bank loan announcement samples 
from the media not only faces the self-selection bias from the discretionary feature of 
loan announcements by the borrowing firms, but also the self-selection bias from the 
news editors. Third, from the 8-K loan announcements that I observed, borrowing firms 
also inform to the investors about any disclosure made in news media about the loans, 
which most cases are on the same date as the 8-Ks or after. Nevertheless, it is still 
possible that a loan is announced in the media before the 8-K date, and in this case, we 
might underestimate the abnormal stock returns following loan announcements. But, as 
more detail information about the loans are made in 8-Ks, not in the media, we might 
expect that the major portion of investors reaction occurs following the 8-K 
announcements.  
To search for loan announcements in 8-Ks, I scrape the SEC’s EDGAR website 
using the directEDGAR, a software platform that enables users to search, extract, and 
normalize contents from the SEC EDGAR filings.
10
 Since the 8-K library in the 
directEDGAR starts from 1994, the sample of loan announcements in this paper follows. 
For all 11,635 filtered loan deal observations explained in Section 4.1, I search their 
respective loan announcements in 8-Ks via the directEDGAR using the following search 
terms and booleans: line of credit OR credit line OR credit facility OR credit agreement 
                                                 
10
 http://directedgar.com/  
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OR credit extension OR new loan OR loan agreement OR loan renewal OR loan revision 
OR loan extension OR term loan OR revolver OR commercial loan OR bank loan OR 
syndicated loan. The search terms are based on Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995).  
On March 25, 2004, the SEC had released the Rule #33-8400, which would be 
effective starting on August 23, 2004. This rule is a follow up to the “real time issuer 
disclosure” mandate in Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002.
11
 The 
Rule #33-8400 makes two major changes in 8-K filings. First, it expands and reorganizes 
the Form 8-K, adding eight more new items. Under this new rule, disclosures about a 
bank loan financing (if the borrowing firm decides to do so) is classified as Item 1.01—
Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement. Prior to this rule, the voluntary bank loan 
disclosures were classified as Item 5—Other Events, which under the new rule is 
classified as Item 8.01—Other Events. Second, the SEC accelerates the Form 8-K filing 
deadline into a maximum of four business days following the occurrence of the event 
disclosed. Prior to this rule, the filing deadline was five to fifteen business days after the 
disclosed event’s occurrence date.  
Using the search terms and booleans as mentioned above, the directEDGAR 
produces a summary extraction table, which gives the number of word hits on each 
search term and from which 8-K Items the hits are found. As the directEDGAR has 
mapped the old Items classification to the new Items classification under the Rule #33-
8400, from hereafter, Form 8-K Items discussed refer to the new Items classification. To 
identify loan announcements in 8-Ks from the summary extraction table, I employ the 
following strategies. 
                                                 
11
 The SEC Rule #33-8400 can be accessed at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8400.htm.  
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First, as prior to the Rule #33-8400 voluntary loan announcements were classified 
as other events, for all loans with deal active dates before August 23, 2004, I identify a 
loan as announced in 8-K when there are positive word hits from any of the search terms 
that are from Item 8.01—Other Events. A loan is “cleanly” announced, without any other 
confounding events, when there are no hits from other 8-K Items other than the Item 
8.01. With the exception of Item 2.03—Creation of a Direct Financial Obligation or an 
Obligation under an Off-Balance Sheet Arrangement of a Registrant, Item 2.04—
Triggering Events that Accelerate or Increase a Direct Financial Obligation under an Off-
Balance Sheet Arrangement. Conditional on a loan is announced, these Items mostly 
contain additional information related to the loan. Other Items excepted are Item 3.03—
Material Modification to Rights of Security Holders, which conditional on a loan is 
announced mostly contains of information about financial covenants; Item 7.01—
Regulation FD, which contains the declaration of fair disclosure; and Item 9.01—
Exhibits, which  conditional on a loan is announced contains the complete loan contract. 
If a loan is identified as announced using the Item 8.01 filter but there are positive word 




Second, post the Rule #33-8400, for all loans with deal active dates on August 23, 
2004, and after, I identify a loan as announced in 8-K when there are positive word hits 
from any of the search terms that are from Item 1.01—Entry into a Material Definitive 
Agreement. A loan is “cleanly” announced, without any other confounding events, when 
there are no hits from other 8-K Items other than the Item 1.01 and excepted Items from 
                                                 
12
 The most frequent confounding events are from the Item 2.02—Results of Operations and Financial 
Condition, which are either quarterly or annual earnings announcements.  
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the first strategy. If the loan is identified as announced using the Item 1.01 filter but there 
are positive word hits from Items other than the Items in the exception, I classified the 
loan announcement as “contaminated”. It is important to note that after the Items 
reclassification mandated by the Rule #33-8400, any positive words hit that are from the 
Item 8.01 most of the time contains confounding events to the loan announcement, e.g. 
selling of subsidiaries, etc.  
These strategies result in 3,613 loan announcements, which consist of 2,172 clean 
loan announcements, and 1,441 contaminated loan announcements. Finally, I randomly 
choose 1,500 from the 3,613 loan announcements to inspect manually, and confirm the 
accuracy of the loan announcement filtering strategies. The rest 8,022 of the filtered loans 
from Dealscan that do not find match on 8-Ks are classified as “unannounced” loans. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the results. 
We can see from the table that in overall, about 31% of loans are announced, and 
among those announced, about 60% are cleanly announced. The SOX Act of 2002 aims 
to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures.
13
 
Prior to the SOX, the percentage of loans announced in 8-K was relatively low, which 
was about 5%. However, post the SOX, the relative percentage doubled to almost 12%. 
The more material increase in relative percentage of 8-K loan announcements occurred 
after the enactment of the Rule #33-8400, which climbed to about 56%. These suggest 
that both of the SOX and Rule #33-8400 seem to have successfully endorsed more loan 
announcements via 8-Ks, as a part of the increase in the firms’ disclosure to their 
investors. 
                                                 
13
 The SOX Act of 2002 can be accessed at https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf.  
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Figure 2.2 shows the trend of loan announcements over time from 1994-2014. 
From the figure, we can see sharp increases in relative loan announcement percentage 
post the SOX and Rule #33-8400. We can also see some positive trends in relative loan 
announcement percentage during the market and banking crisis periods. 
 
2.3.3 EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY 
Event studies have been extensively used in the literature to examine the 
information content of corporate events. The traditional event study methodology, 
developed by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), contends that if a corporate event 
has an information effect, we should observe a nonzero stock-return reaction on the event 
date. The use of the event study methodology to test the information effect following a 
bank loan announcement is started by James (1987), which then spawns the long-
standing empirical literature on bank loans specialness. The event study set up used in 
this paper is as follow. 
First, the event date used for each loan announced in 8-K is the filing date. In 
most cases, the filing date is the same as the deal active date. As the new 8-K filing 
deadline under the Rule #33-8400 is a maximum of four business days following the 
occurrence of the event disclosed, some loan announcements after 2004 are made around 
this range. Before 2004, the filing dates can range from the deal active date to fifteen 
days after. Next, for each “clean” loan announcement, I run a daily stock return 
benchmark model. Following most of the previous literature, I use the market model as 
the baseline. For robustness checks, I use the Fama-French 3 Factors (Fama and French, 
1993) and the Fama-French 5 Factors (Fama and French, 2015) as alternative benchmark 
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models. I follow Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) to use an estimation window over 
the period [-200, -51] and require a minimum of 30 daily non-missing stock returns for 
the entire estimation and no missing return in the last 20 days before the loan 
announcement event, following Brown and Warner (1985).  
Then, I compute the abnormal stock return around a loan announcement by firm 𝑗 
at event date 𝑡 using each of the benchmark models as follows. 
𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡 − (?̂?𝑗 + ?̂?𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡) (1) 
𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡 − (?̂?𝑗 + ?̂?𝑗(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝛾𝑗𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) (2) 
𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝑅𝑗𝑡 − (?̂?𝑗 + ?̂?𝑗(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡) + 𝛾𝑗𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡
∗ + 𝛿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜖?̂?𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + ?̂?𝑗𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡) (3) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the abnormal stock return at event date 𝑡, 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the stock return, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the 
market return proxied by the value-weighted CRSP index return, 𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the risk-free rate 
proxied by the one-month Treasury bill rate, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the average return on the three 
small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡
∗ is the average 
return on the nine small stock portfolios minus the average return on the nine big stock 
portfolios, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average 
return on the two growth portfolios, and 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is the average return on the two 
conservative investment portfolios minus the average return on the two aggressive 
investment portfolios. ?̂?𝑗, ?̂?𝑗, 𝛾𝑗, 𝛿, 𝜖?̂?, and ?̂?𝑗 are parameter estimates for each 
benchmark model over the estimation window.  
Next, the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for firm 𝑗 that announce loan 𝑖 
within an event window from time 𝑡1 to 𝑡2 is computed as follow. 
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To capture how abnormal returns behave around a loan announcement date, I 
calculate seven different event windows: [-2,+2], [-1,+1], [0,+2], [0,+1], [0,0], [-1,0], and 
[-2,0]. Further, we aggregate the CARs cross-sectionally among all loan announcements 
to compute the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for each event window 








where 𝑁 is the number of all loan announcements. Lastly, we test whether CAAR for 
each event window is statistically different than zero (𝐻0: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = 0) using three 
different statistics: Patell-Z statistic (Patell, 1976), the Cross-Sectional test statistic (CS-
t), and the Standardized Cross-Sectional test statistic (BMP-t) as in Boehmer, Musumeci, 
and Poulsen (1991).
14
 Following the concensus in the literature of bank loan specialness, 
if the null hypothesis is rejected statistically and CAAR is positive, we can conclude that 
bank loans are special. 
 
2.3.4 CORRECTION FOR SELF-SELECTION BIAS 
Event studies are commonly followed by a linear regression of the abnormal stock 
returns on a set of explanatory variables. However, announcement of bank loans by the 
borrowing firms, similar with many other corporate events, are discretionary non-random 
events. Fery, Gasbarro, Woodliff, and Zumwalt (2003) and Maskara and Mullineaux 
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(2011) are the first papers that brought up this issue. Using the data from publicly listed 
firms in Australia from 1983-1999, Fery, Gasbarro, Woodliff, and Zumwalt  find 
significant positive abnormal stock returns following loans published in the financial 
press, but find no significant reaction for those non-published loans. Maskara and 
Mullineaux examine the self-selection issue more comprehensively. Using the data of 
loans to U.S. borrowing firms from the Dealscan between 1987 and 2004, their findings 
suggest that the previous studies relying on loan announcements sample from the media 
likely suffer from a self-selection bias due to the rare nature of loan announcements by 
borrowing firms. Accordingly, any study that examines factors affecting abnormal stock 
returns post loan announcements should take into account this self-selection bias. 
Surprisingly, there is no paper yet that I am aware of has done such effort. Several latest 
papers such as Gande and Saunders (2012) and Li and Ongena (2015) instead advocate a 
strong assumption that all loans from the Dealscan are announced at their active date to 
avoid the potential self-selection bias. However, this might not be a realistic assumption 
as we can see from Table 2.1 that only about 31% of the Dealscan loans are announced in 
8-Ks.  
To address the self-selection bias in loan announcements by the borrowing firms, 
I use the conditional event study methodology, which applies the Heckman selection 
model (Heckman, 1979) in the context of an event study (e.g. Acharya, 1988, 1993; 
Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams, 1990; Nayak and Prabhala, 2001). Applying to the 
bank loan announcement study, we have the following CAR equation to be estimated:
15
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅∗ = 𝒙𝒋𝛃 + ν1j (6) 
                                                 
15
 Indexes are suppressed for brevity. 
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where 𝒙𝒋 is a vector of independent variables affecting CAR, including borrowing firms 
characteristics, loan characteristics, lender characteristics, market crisis and banking 
crisis indicators, and market share of nonbank lenders, 𝜷 is a vector of coefficient 
estimates, and 𝜈1𝑗 is the error term of the regression equation. Since we observe 𝐶𝐴𝑅
∗ 
only if a loan is cleanly announced in 8-K, we also have a selection equation as follow.  
𝐿∗ = 𝒛𝒋𝛄 + ν2j > 0 (7) 
where 𝒛𝒋 is a vector of instrument variables and controls affecting clean loan 
announcement (𝐿∗), and 𝜈2𝑗 is the error term of the selection equation. If the selection 
bias matters, the correlation between 𝜈1𝑗 and 𝜈2𝑗 (𝜌) would be statistically different than 
zero. The selection equation is estimated using a probit regression. Meanwhile, the CAR 
equation is estimated using the Heckman selection model, which are based on Heckman 
(1979) with applying a maximum-likelihood procedure (Maddala, 1983). Ross (2010) 
advocates this method instead of the traditional two-step procedure to address the 
heteroscedasticity in abnormal returns.  
The instrument variables for the selection equation are SOX_REG that equals 1 
for loans having deal active date post the Sarbanes-Oxley enactment (July 2002 onward) 
and 0 otherwise, and 8K_REG that equals to 1 for loans having deal active date post the 
effective date of the SEC Rule #33-8400 (August 2004 onward) and 0 otherwise. These 
government regulations provide exogenous shocks to the level of publicly listed firms’ 




2.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
2.4.1 LOAN, BORROWING FIRMS, AND LENDER CHARACTERISTICS 
As shown in Table 2.2, this paper covers 11,635 loan deals from the Dealscan 
from 1994-2014. The average loan deal size is $549 million with about 8 lenders 
participating on average. About 72 percent of the loans are revolvers, and about 7 percent 
are term loans. The rest of the loans are either combination between revolvers and term 
loans or other type of loans. The average maturity of the loans is 48 months, and about 46 
percent are secured. Moreover, some loans are without any type of financial covenants, 
and some others have financial covenants up to seven different types of financial 
covenants. 
In terms of borrowing firm characteristics, the average total size of the firms is 
about $6.9 billion. The smallest firm has total assets about $2 million, and the largest one 
has about $798 billion total assets. The firms have average Tobin Q of 1.75, market 
leverage of 41 percent, EBITDA-to-assets ratio of 12 percent, and information 
asymmetry index of 2.60. Moreover, about 58 percent of the firms have never issued 
public bonds during the sample period, and about 51 percent have no long-term or short-
term issuer credit ratings.  
The lead lenders have total assets about $898 billion on average. The smallest 
lead lender has total assets about $992 million, while the largest one has about $2,416 
billion. The average capitalization ratio of the lead lenders is about 8 percent, and about 
69 percent are the big three market leaders in the loan market. About 31 percent of lead 
lenders have previous lending relationship with the borrowing firms over the past 5 years. 
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Finally, nonbank lenders are only about 3 percent on average, and their average market 
share is about 2 percent. 
 
2.4.2 ARE BANK LOANS STILL SPECIAL? 
Table 2.3 shows the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) following 
8-K clean loan announcements. In Panel A, we can see that CAARs following loan 
announcements are positive and statistically significant in event window [0,+1], [0,+2], [-
1,+1], and [-2,+2]. The results are robust using three different benchmark models and 
different type of test statistics. Interestingly, none of the CAAR in event window [-1,0], 
and [-2,0] are statistically significant.
16
 This finding suggests that there is no information 
leakage for cleanly announced loans before the announcement dates in 8-Ks, suggesting 
that the announcement does have information content for the investors. If we observe 
statistically significant CAARs prior to date 0, this means that investors can somehow get 
early information about the loans from other sources other than the 8-Ks, and therefore, 
the information content in the 8-K is less valuable to the investors. This is in line with the 
asymmetric information hypothesis. The one-day CAAR at [0,0] is also not statistically 
significant. This lends a support to the notion that it takes more time for the investors to 
process the information in 8-K as it contains a more detailed information than 
announcements in news media. Maybe an investor reads the loan contract attached in the 
8-K thoroughly after it is announced, and then her reaction the next days will depend on 
                                                 
16
 Using the market model, BMP-t and Patell-Z are statistically significant for the event window [-2,0]. 
However, they are only marginally significant, and the significance disappear once we add other factors 
such as SMB and HML in the Fama-French 3 factors model and SMB, HML, RMW, and  CMA in the 
Fama-French 5 factors model.  
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whether she perceives the loan as bad or good news. Therefore, the evidence so far 
suggests that bank loans are still special.  
 Panel B of Table 2.3, which presents CAARs for contaminated loan 
announcements, shows a similar pattern with Panel A. In terms of magnitude, CAARs for 
these loans are relatively higher than cleanly announced loans. As these loans are 
announced together with other events, the total information contents of these loans will 
depend on the confounding events. However, some studies have shown that loan 
announcements are generally pushed as positive news (Lummer and McConnel, 1989; 
Fery, Gasbarro, Woodliff, and Zumwalt, 2003), and therefore, we may expect that if a 
loan is announced together with other events, those events are likely to be positive or at 
least neutral events.  
Panel C of Table 2.3 presents CAARs for unannounced loans. Using the loan 
active date as the event date, similar with Gande and Saunders (2012) and Li and Ongena 
(2015), we can see that CAARs for these loans are still positive and statistically 
significant, though the magnitudes are relatively lower compared to Panel A and B. 
Different than announced loans, Panel C shows some evidence of information leakage 
prior to the loan active date. This finding suggests that investors might be able to get 
some private information about the borrowing firms without having to rely on loan 
announcements in 8-K. In other words, the borrowing firms of these loans might not 
suffer serious information asymmetry problem, and therefore they do not need to 
announce their loans to convey positive signals about the firms’ conditions to their 
investors. This finding is also parallel with the asymmetric information hypothesis. 
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Panel D of Table 2.3 presents a further investigation on CAARs following the 
deal active date of unannounced loans. The panel shows that for deals that consist only 
revolver loans, there are no statistically significant CAARs following deal active date. 
Compared with the results on Panel C, this indicates that the positive and statistically 
significant CAARs following the deal active date of unannounced loans are mainly 
driven by the inclusion of term loans in the deals.
17
 Drucker and Puri (2009) show that 
term loans are more likely to be sold in the secondary markets compared to revolver 
loans (credit lines).
18
 Bruche, Malherbe, and Meisenzahl (2017) show that during a term 
loan syndication process prior to the secondary market, there is a period of primary 
market book-running before the loan active date in which potential institutional investors 
get information about the loan from the lead arranger. Accordingly, it could be that the 
positive CAARs around the deal active date for term loans that are unannounced in 8-Ks 
capture the institutional investors’ reaction to the information they get during the book-
running period. This is consistent with Gande and Saunders (2012), which find positive 
investor reactions on loans traded in the secondary market.  
In Table 2.4, I compute CAARs separately between bank-dependent and 
nonbank-dependent firms. I define bank-dependent firms as those that never issue public 
bonds during the sample period from 1994-2014.
19
 As these firms have never issue public 
bonds, they are more likely to suffer from material asymmetric information problem. If 
bank loans are special and convey positive signals from the banks’ certification values 
                                                 
17
 Other loans also show similar results with deals that include term loans. However, the number of other 
loans in the sample is much less than term loans. 
18
 Drucker and Puri show that term loans composing of 64% of the loans sold, compared to revolver loans 
that only comprise of 24% of the loans sold. 
19
 Technically, to identify these firms, I merge the filtered Dealscan data with FISD. Firms that are in the 
Dealscan but not in the FISD during the sample period are defined as bank-dependent firms.  
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due to their ability to reduce information asymmetry problem, we would expect that 
CAARs are positive and statistically significant on bank-dependent firms. On the 
contrary, CAARs would be less or not statistically significant for nonbank-dependent 
firms. These are exactly what I find in Panel A and B of Table 2.4. Again, this finding 
supports the asymmetric information hypothesis and aligns with the notion that bank 
loans are special because of the banks’ certification function that is able to reduce 
information asymmetry problem. 
Lastly, as comparison, I conduct an event study on public bonds issued by the 
borrowing firms from the filtered Dealscan database. As public issues of debt or equity 
must be disclosed through the registration process, I use the public bond offering dates in 
FISD database as the announcement dates. Similar with the early findings such as James 
(1987), I find negative CAARs following announcements of public bond issuances. The 
results are shown in Table 2.5. 
 
2.4.3 FACTORS AFFECTING LOAN ANNOUNCEMENTS 
The next analysis is to identify what factors affecting borrowing firms to 
announce their loans in 8-K. Before doing so, I check the Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIFs) of all regressors to make sure that there is no serious multicollinearity problem. 
As shown in Table 2.6, there is no evidence of excessive multicollinearity between the 
regressors (i.e. no VIFs greater than 20, the suggested threshold as in Greene, 2012). 
Table 2.7 presents the probit regression results of “clean” loan announcements on 
the instrument variables and other relevant regressors. The instruments, SOX_REG and 
8K_REG are statistically significant on all probit specifications from column (1) to (5), 
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controlling for borrowing firms, loans, and lender characteristics. The results are robust if 
we use logit instead of probit in column (6). In terms of marginal impacts, a loan is more 
likely to be cleanly announced by 23% post the SEC Rule #33-8400, and by 6% post the 
SOX. Compared to the relative percentage of clean loan announcement in overall 
(18.67%, Table 2.1), these marginal impacts are economically material. This suggests 
that both variables are relevant instruments for clean loan announcements. Next, I find 
that a clean loan announcement is more likely by 4% during a market crisis compared to 
normal times. This aligns with the asymmetric information hypothesis. However, there is 
no evidence that loans are more likely to be cleanly announced during a banking crisis 
compared to normal times. One plausible explanation is that during a banking crisis, the 
information asymmetry problem is more severe for banks (lenders) than for the 
borrowing firms. Meanwhile, during a market crisis, it is the other way around. 
In terms of borrowing firm characteristics, there is some evidence that small 
borrowing firms and those with lower EBITDA ratio are more likely to cleanly announce 
their loans, which lends a support to the asymmetric information hypothesis. Loan 
characteristics seem to be stronger determinants of clean loan announcements. In 
particular, a loan is more likely to be cleanly announced when it has more financial 
covenants, is a revolver, has longer maturity, and is secured. Lastly, a loan is more likely 
to be cleanly announced when the lender has a previous lending relationship with the 
borrowing firms in past 5 years, when the lender has higher capital, larger size, and is a 
nonbank lender.  
Table 2.8 presents the probit regression results of “contaminated” loan 
announcements on the instrument variables and other relevant regressors. REG_8K is still 
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relevant statistically to explain the likelihood of contaminated loan announcements, but 
SOX is not. There is no evidence that these loans are more likely to announce during a 
market crisis, and only weak evidence that these loans are less likely to announce during 
a banking crisis, relative to normal times. Next, a loan is more likely to be announced 
together with other events if the borrowing firm is a small borrower, as well as if the loan 
has more financial covenants and longer maturity. Revolvers and term loans are both less 
likely to be announced with other events. This suggests that contaminated loan 
announcements are driven by other loan types. Similar with clean loan announcements, a 
loan is more likely to be announced with other events if the lender has more capital and is 
a nonbank lender. Interestingly, a loan is more likely to be announced with other events if 
it is a new loan, i.e. the lender has no previous lending relationship with the borrowing 
firm. 
 
2.4.4 FACTORS AFFECTING CARS FOLLOWING LOAN ANNOUNCEMENT 
Table 2.9 presents the regression estimates of CARs following clean loan 
announcements on a variety of determinants, including market and banking crisis, as well 
as borrowing firm, loan, and lender characteristics. As we have seen from Table 2.3 that 
the information leakage prior to a clean announcement is less likely, I use CAR [0,+1] 
and CAR[0,+2] as the dependent variables in the second step of the conditional event 
study. Regression coefficients in column (1) are estimated using OLS without correcting 
for the sample selection bias. The rest of the columns are estimated using the Heckman 
selection model, which are based on Heckman (1979) using a maximum-likelihood 
procedure (Maddala, 1983). As we can see from Table 2.9, the Inverse Mills ratio from 
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the Heckman model is statistically significant at 99% confidence level in all 
specifications, controlling for stock price runup, market and banking crisis, and a variety 
of borrowing firm, loan, and lender characteristics, as well as industry and year fixed 
effects. This finding suggests a significant evidence of a serious self-selection bias, and 
therefore, a correction is needed to mitigate this bias using the Heckman models. 
Next, CARs are significantly higher during a banking crisis, compared to normal 
times, but not in a market crisis, in line with both the asymmetric information hypothesis 
and the institutional memory hypothesis. In terms of borrowing firm characteristics, I find 
strong evidence that positive CARs following loan announcements are driven by bank-
dependent firms, and some evidence of that positive CARs are attributed to borrowing 
firms with lower EBITDA ratio. Both findings are consistent with the asymmetric 
information hypothesis. Moreover, I find that a loan with more financial covenants is 
strongly and positively associated with CARs following a clean announcement. In the 
meantime, there is also some evidence that a loan that is a revolver, has longer maturity, 
and made by a lender with previous lending relationship is associated positively with 
CARs following a clean loan announcement. Lastly, I find strong evidence that CARs are 
negatively associated with the market share of nonbank lenders, which aligns with the 
competition hypothesis that explains why CARs following loan announcements are not as 
high as the earlier studies have shown. 
 
2.4.5 ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
As additional robustness checks, Table 2.10 provides the Heckman regression 
results using the Buy-Hold-Abnormal Returns (BHAR) and raw return as the dependent 
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This paper provides empirical evidence of the certification value of bank loans 
from the U.S. market in the last two decades, which has experienced both market crisis 
and banking crisis. Using a novel dataset that merges loan deals from the Dealscan 
database and form 8-Ks from the SEC EDGAR between 1994-2014, I find that on 
average, only about 31% of bank loans are announced by firms. Among those loans 
announced, about 60% are cleanly announced and 40% are announced together with 
other events. Next, I find statistically and economically significant three-days Cumulative 
Abnormal Stock Return (CAR) following a loan announcement, which on average about 
+39 b.p., in line with the theory of bank loan specialness. The positive CARs are driven 
mainly by bank-dependent firms, which have never issued public bonds. Meanwhile, as a 
comparison, I show that three-days CARs following public bond announcements by firms 
in the sample are negative and statistically significant.  
Then, using the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the SEC 
Rule #33-8400 in 2004 as exogenous shocks to loan announcements by firms, I show 
significant evidence of sample selection bias in the loan announcements sample, which 
likely confounds the findings from the previous literature. Being the first study that 
corrects the sample selection bias, using the Heckman selection method, I find that a loan 
is more likely to be announced during a market crisis, relative to normal times, consistent 
with the asymmetric information hypothesis. Moreover, a loan is more likely to be 
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announced by small firms, firms having lower EBITDA, and when the loan has more 
financial covenants, is a revolver loan, has a longer maturity, secured, as well as when the 
firm has a previous relationship with the same lead lender in the past 5 years and when 
the lead lender has higher capital, larger size, and is a nonbank.  
Then, I find that the CARs are significantly higher during a banking crisis, 
compared to normal times, but not in a market crisis, in line with both the asymmetric 
information hypothesis and the institutional memory hypothesis. In terms of loan, firm, 
and lender characteristics, CAR is statistically higher for a loan announced by a bank-
dependent firm, a firm with lower EBITDA ratio, and for a loan that has more financial 
covenants, is a revolver, and has a longer maturity, as well as a loan made by the same 
lender that has lent the firm in the past 5 years. Finally, I find strong evidence that CAR 
is negatively associated with the market share of nonbank lenders, which aligns with the 
competition hypothesis that explains why CARs following loan announcements shown by 





Figure 2.1: Number and Amount of Loan Deals from 1994-2014 
 
This figure plots the number and total amount of loan deals from the Dealscan from 1994-2014. The 
number of loans is shown in the left scale, while the dollar amount of loans (in million $) is shown in the 
right scale. The first shaded area shows a period when the Russian debt crisis and the LTCM bailout 
occurred. The next shaded area is a period when the dotcom bubble and the 9/11 crisis occurred. And the 







Figure 2.2: Loan Announcements from 1994-2014 
 
This figure plots the number and percentage of loans announced in 8-Ks from 1994-2014. The number of 
loan announcements is shown in the left scale, while the percentage of loans announced is shown in the 
right scale. The first grey shaded area shows a period when the Russian debt crisis and the LTCM bailout 
occurred. The next grey shaded area is a period when the dotcom bubble and the 9/11 crisis occurred. And 
the last grey shaded area is when the recent subprime mortgage crisis occurred. The two orange shaded 






Table 2.1: Loan Announcements Pre and Post the SOX and SEC Rule #33-8400 
 
This table shows the number and percentage of loans announced in 8-Ks from 1994-2014 pre and post the 





Pre SOX of 
2002 
Post SOX, 





#33-8400 of  
2004 
Number of Loans 11,635 4,587 1,298 5,750 
Number of Unannounced Loans 8,022 4,356 1,145 2,521 
Number of Loan Announcements 3,613 231 153 3,229 
Number of Clean Loan 
Announcements 
2,172 202 142 1,828 
Number of Contaminated Loan 
Announcements 
1,441 29 11 1,401 
          
% of Loan Announcements to All 
Loans 
31.05% 5.04% 11.79% 56.16% 
% of Clean Announcements to All 
Loans 
18.67% 4.40% 10.94% 31.79% 
% of Contaminated Announcements 
to All Loans 
12.39% 0.63% 0.85% 24.37% 
% of Clean Announcements to All 
Announced Loans 
60.12% 87.45% 92.81% 56.61% 
% of Contaminated Announcements 
to All Announced Loans 
39.88% 12.55% 7.19% 43.39% 







Table 2.2: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents the variable names, definitions, and summary statistics of loan deals from the Dealscan from 1994-2014. Panel A, B, and C provides the loan, 
borrowing firm, and lender characteristics respectively.  
 
Panel A: Loan Characteristics 
 
Variable Definition N Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max 
DSIZE_MIL Loan deal size (in million$). 11,635 549.58 1,071.49 1 200 26,000 
N_LOAN_FINCOV Number of financial covenants. 11,635 1.34 1.29 0 1 7 
REVOLVER_DEAL Equals 1 if the deal consists of revolver loans only, 
and 0 otherwise. 
11,635 0.72 0.45 0 1 1 
TERM_LOAN_DEAL Equals 1 if the deal consists of term loans only, and 
zero otherwise. 
11,635 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 
W_DEAL_MATURITY Maturity of the deal, calculated as the weighted 
average maturity of all loans included in the deal 
(months). 
11,635 47.54 29.68 1 48 377.14 
NLENDER Number of lenders involved in the deal. 11,635 7.77 8.21 1 5 290 
D_LOAN_SECURED Equals to 1 if the deal is secured, and 0 otherwise. 11,635 0.46 0.50 0 0 1 
MCRISIS The market crisis indicator variable. Equals to 1 if 
the deal active date is during the Russian debt crisis 
and the LTCM bailout (1998:Q3–1998:Q4), or 
during the dotcom bubble and the 9/11 crisis 
(2000:Q2–2002:Q3), and 0 otherwise. The crisis 
timeline follows Berger and Bouwman (2013). 
11,635 0.18 0.38 0 0 1 
BCRISIS The banking crisis indicator variable. Equals to 1 if 
the deal active date is during the recent subprime 
mortgage crisis (2007:Q3–2009:Q4). The crisis 
timeline follows Berger and Bouwman (2013). 










Table 2.2: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
 
Panel B: Borrowing Firm Characteristics 
 
Variable Definition N Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max 
NEVER_ISSUE_BOND Equals to 1 if the borrowing firm never issue public 
bonds during the sample period, and 0 otherwise. 
11,635 0.58 0.49 0 1 1 
NR Equals to 1 if the borrowing firm does not have a 
long-term or short-term issuer credit rating, and 0 
otherwise. 
11,635 0.51 0.50 0 1 1 
INDEX_IA The information asymmetry index, calculated as the 
average of the quintile ranking of a firm based on the 
six information asymmetry measures, following 
Maskara and Mullineaux (2011).  Larger value shows 
more information asymmetry. 
11,510 2.60 0.92 0.38 2.50 5 
AT The borrowing firm’s total assets  (in  
million $). 
11,635 6,859.71 27,973.87 1.92 971.96 797,769 
SMALL_BORROWER Equals to 1 if the borrowing firm’s total assets below 
the median. 
11,635 0.50 0.50 0 0 1 
TOBIN_Q The borrowing firm’s Tobin’s Q, calculated as the 
ratio of the borrowing firm’s book value of debt plus 
market value of equity to its total assets, following 
Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995). 
11,635 1.75 1.60 0.25 1.40 77.63 
LEVERAGE The borrowing firm’s market leverage, calculated as 
the book value of total debt divided by the sum of 
total debt plus the market value of equity, following 
Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995). 
11,635 0.41 0.22 0.00 0.39 0.99 
EBITDAR The ratio of operating income before depreciation to 
total assets, following Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel 
(1995).  










Table 2.2: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
 
Panel C: Lender Characteristics 
 
Variable Definition N Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max 
LENDER_AT The lead lender’s total assets  
(in million $). 
11,635 897,893.60 785,617.40 992.29 668,641 2,415,689 
BIG3_LENDER The dominant lead lender indicator. Equals 
to 1 if the lead lender is one of the big three 
lenders in the year of deal active date, and 0 
otherwise. 
11,635 0.69 0.46 0 1 1 
LENDER_EQTA The lead lender’s capitalization, calculated as 
the ratio of equity to total assets.  
11,635 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.15 
RL_IND An indicator variable of relationship lending, 
following Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011). Equals to 1 if the lead 
lender has a previous lending relationship 
with the borrowing firms in the last 5 years, 
and 0 otherwise.  
11,635 0.31 0.46 0 0 1 
RL_NUM A measure of relationship lending intensity, 
following Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011). Calculated as the ratio 
between number of loans made by the same 
lender to the borrowing firm in the last 5 
years and total number of loans received by 
the borrowing firm in the last 5 year. 











Table 2.2: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
 
Panel C: Lender Characteristics 
 
Variable Definition N Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max 
RL_AMT A measure of relationship lending intensity, 
following Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan (2011). Calculated as the ratio 
between dollar amount of loans made by the 
same lender to the borrowing firm in the last 
5 years and total dollar amount of loans 
received by the borrowing firm in the last 5 
year. 
11,635 0.27 0.43 0 0 1 
NONBANK_L Equals to 1 if the lead lender is nonbank 
financial institution, and 0 otherwise.  
11,635 0.03 0.17 0 0 1 
MS_NONBANK The market share of nonbank lead lenders, 
calculated as the total dollar amount of loans 
made by nonbank lead lenders in a particular 
year divided by the total dollar amount of 
loans made during the year by all lead 
lenders.  











Table 2.3: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Loan Announcements 
 
Panel A shows the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) following 8-K clean loan announcements. Panel B shows CAARs following 8-K loan 
announcements that are contaminated with other events. Panel C shows CAARs of unannounced loans around their active date. I use market model as the main 
estimation model, and Fama-French 3 Factors and 5 Factors models as robustness checks. CS-t is the Cross-Sectional test statistic, BMP-t is the Standardized 
Cross-Sectional test statistic as in Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991), and Patell-Z is the event study test statistic as in Patell (1976).  
 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following “Clean” Loan Announcements 
 
    CAAR Test Statistics 
 Estimation Model Event Window N CAAR CS-t BMP-t Patell-Z 
  [-2,+2] 2,161 0.456% 3.17*** 2.82*** 3.23*** 
  [-1,+1] 2,161 0.346% 2.93*** 2.34** 2.68*** 
  [0,+2] 2,161 0.395% 3.02*** 2.22** 2.61*** 
Market Model [0,+1] 2,161 0.376% 3.33*** 2.55** 3.11*** 
  [0,0] 2,161 0.071% 1.14 0.62 0.67 
  [-1,0] 2,161 0.042% 0.51 0.62 0.65 
  [-2,0] 2,161 0.131% 1.29 1.79* 1.92* 
  [-2,+2] 2,161 0.405% 2.80*** 2.47** 2.88*** 
  [-1,+1] 2,161 0.274% 2.31** 1.77* 2.07** 
  [0,+2] 2,161 0.343% 2.66*** 1.86* 2.20** 
Fama-French 3 Factors Model [0,+1] 2,161 0.325% 2.91*** 2.15** 2.66*** 
  [0,0] 2,161 0.034% 0.55 0.01 0.01 
  [-1,0] 2,161 -0.017% -0.21 -0.09 -0.10 












Table 2.3: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Loan Announcements 
 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following “Clean” Loan Announcements 
 
    CAAR Test Statistics 
 Estimation Model Event Window N CAAR CS-t BMP-t Patell-Z 
  [-2,+2] 2,161 0.425% 2.92*** 2.52** 2.99*** 
  [-1,+1] 2,161 0.292% 2.42** 1.86* 2.21** 
  [0,+2] 2,161 0.346% 2.65*** 1.80* 2.16** 
Fama-French 5 Factors Model [0,+1] 2,161 0.327% 2.88*** 2.08** 2.62*** 
  [0,0] 2,161 0.028% 0.43 0.11 0.13 
  [-1,0] 2,161 -0.007% -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 
  [-2,0] 2,161 0.097% 0.96 1.41 1.59 
              
 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following “Contaminated” Loan Announcements 
 
    CAAR Test Statistics 
  Event Window N CAAR CS-t BMP-t Patell-Z 
  [-2,+2] 1,413 0.510% 2.48** 2.39** 3.11*** 
  [-1,+1] 1,412 0.270% 1.60 1.56 2.13** 
  [0,+2] 1,414 0.531% 3.06*** 3.71*** 5.08*** 
Market Model [0,+1] 1,413 0.388% 2.55** 2.79*** 4.06*** 
  [0,0] 1,413 0.077% 0.84 1.60 2.06** 
  [-1,0] 1,412 -0.038% -0.31 -0.03 -0.04 
  [-2,0] 1,412 0.061% 0.42 0.15 0.19 









Table 2.3: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Loan Announcements 
 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following “Contaminated” Loan Announcements 
 
    CAAR Test Statistics 
  Event Window N CAAR CS-t BMP-t Patell-Z 
  [-2,+2] 1,413 0.525% 2.59*** 2.47** 3.25*** 
  [-1,+1] 1,412 0.253% 1.51 1.36 1.88* 
  [0,+2] 1,414 0.530% 3.10*** 3.72*** 5.11*** 
Fama-French 3 Factors Model [0,+1] 1,413 0.380% 2.53** 2.68*** 3.93*** 
  [0,0] 1,413 0.081% 0.89 1.64 2.14** 
  [-1,0] 1,412 -0.046% -0.37 -0.07 -0.09 
  [-2,0] 1,412 0.080% 0.54 0.30 0.38 
              
  [-2,+2] 1,413 0.495% 2.45** 2.11** 2.83*** 
  [-1,+1] 1,412 0.228% 1.39 1.15 1.60 
  [0,+2] 1,414 0.513% 3.02*** 3.43*** 4.79*** 
Fama-French 5 Factors Model [0,+1] 1,413 0.357% 2.41** 2.43** 3.58*** 
  [0,0] 1,413 0.085% 0.94 1.53 2.03** 
  [-1,0] 1,412 -0.043% -0.35 -0.13 -0.17 
  [-2,0] 1,412 0.071% 0.48 0.08 0.11 















Table 2.3: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Loan Announcements 
 
Panel C: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns of “Unannounced” Loans around Deal Active Date 
 
    CAAR Test Statistics 
  Event Window N CAAR CS-t BMP-t Patell-Z 
  [-2,+2] 7,796 0.400% 2.96*** 4.19*** 5.69*** 
  [-1,+1] 7,798 0.261% 2.05** 2.95*** 4.58*** 
  [0,+2] 7,799 0.414% 3.22*** 4.49*** 7.03*** 
Market Model [0,+1] 7,799 0.269% 2.22** 2.8*** 4.87*** 
  [0,0] 7,798 0.178% 1.55 1.78* 3.87*** 
  [-1,0] 7,798 0.170% 1.41 2.03** 3.49*** 
  [-2,0] 7,796 0.164% 1.34 1.76* 2.59*** 
  [-2,+2] 7,796 0.331% 2.46** 3.68*** 5.03*** 
  [-1,+1] 7,798 0.207% 1.62 2.46** 3.85*** 
  [0,+2] 7,799 0.362% 2.81*** 3.94*** 6.2*** 
Fama-French 3 Factors Model [0,+1] 7,799 0.236% 1.94* 2.38** 4.18*** 
  [0,0] 7,798 0.145% 1.26 1.37 3.01*** 
  [-1,0] 7,798 0.114% 0.94 1.54 2.65*** 
  [-2,0] 7,796 0.109% 0.90 1.35 2.01** 
  [-2,+2] 7,796 0.321% 2.37** 3.56*** 4.93*** 
  [-1,+1] 7,798 0.202% 1.59 2.48** 3.91*** 
  [0,+2] 7,799 0.342% 2.65*** 3.74*** 5.96*** 
Fama-French 5 Factors Model [0,+1] 7,799 0.225% 1.84* 2.32** 4.11*** 
  [0,0] 7,798 0.140% 1.22 1.38 3.05*** 
  [-1,0] 7,798 0.117% 0.97 1.63 2.84*** 
  [-2,0] 7,796 0.117% 0.95 1.45 2.17** 








Table 2.3: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Loan Announcements 
 
Panel D: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns of “Unannounced” Revolver Loans around Deal Active Date 
 
    CAAR Test Statistics 
 Estimation Model Event Window N CAAR CS-t BMP-t Patell-Z 
  [-2,+2] 5,656 0.107% 1.06 1.37 1.53 
  [-1,+1] 5,657 0.041% 0.99 1.51 1.55 
  [0,+2] 5,657 0.061% 1.07 1.59 1.61 
Market Model [0,+1] 5,657 0.047% 1.01 1.53 1.58 
  [0,0] 5,656 0.009% 0.19 0.64 0.74 
  [-1,0] 5,657 -0.029% -0.46 -0.81 -0.90 
  [-2,0] 5,656 -0.028% -0.38 -0.35 -0.37 
              
  [-2,+2] 5,656 0.106% 1.09 1.44 1.60 
  [-1,+1] 5,657 -0.027% -0.35 -1.10 -1.25 
  [0,+2] 5,657 0.060% 1.43 1.56 1.58 
FF 3 Factors [0,+1] 5,657 0.031% 0.46 1.12 1.32 
  [0,0] 5,656 -0.025% -0.51 -0.04 -0.05 
  [-1,0] 5,657 -0.083% -1.34 -0.15 -0.17 
  [-2,0] 5,656 -0.082% -1.12 -0.12 -0.13 
              
  [-2,+2] 5,656 0.106% 1.07 1.36 1.36 
  [-1,+1] 5,657 -0.028% -0.36 -1.15 -1.33 
  [0,+2] 5,657 0.059% 1.52 1.57 1.58 
FF 5 Factors [0,+1] 5,657 0.020% 0.29 1.01 1.20 
  [0,0] 5,656 0.076% 0.73 0.17 0.21 
  [-1,0] 5,657 -0.082% -1.32 -0.26 -0.29 
  [-2,0] 5,656 -0.076% -1.02 -0.01 -0.02 







Table 2.4: Bank-Dependent Firms’ Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Loan Announcements 
 
Panel A shows Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) following 8-K clean loan announcements for bank-dependent firms. I define bank-dependent 
firms as those that never issue public bonds during the sample period from 1994-2014. Panel B shows CAARs following 8-K clean loan announcements for non-
bank-dependent firms, which also issue public bonds during the sample period. The public bonds issuance data are from the Mergent FISD. I use market model 
as the main estimation model, and Fama-French 3 Factors and 5 Factors models as robustness checks. CS-t is the Cross-Sectional test statistic, BMP-t is the 
Standardized Cross-Sectional test statistic as in Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991), and Patell-Z is the event study test statistic as in Patell (1976).  
 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Clean Loan Announcements by Bank-Dependent Firms 
 
    CAAR Test Statistics 
  Event Window N CAAR CS-t BMP-t Patell-Z 
  [-2,+2] 1,254 0.779% 3.8*** 3.66*** 4.26*** 
  [-1,+1] 1,254 0.598% 3.49*** 3.32*** 3.78*** 
  [0,+2] 1,254 0.703% 3.63*** 3.38*** 4.02*** 
Market Model [0,+1] 1,254 0.629% 3.75*** 3.56*** 4.40*** 
  [0,0] 1,254 0.136% 1.62 1.54 1.57 
  [-1,0] 1,254 0.104% 0.96 1.35 1.34 
  [-2,0] 1,254 0.206% 1.51 2.24** 2.35** 
              
  [-2,+2] 1,254 0.735% 3.54*** 3.41*** 4.03*** 
  [-1,+1] 1,254 0.521% 3.00*** 2.87*** 3.36*** 
  [0,+2] 1,254 0.636% 3.32*** 3.01*** 3.57*** 
Fama-French 3 Factors Model [0,+1] 1,254 0.567% 3.39*** 3.17*** 3.98*** 
  [0,0] 1,254 0.110% 1.29 1.32 1.37 
  [-1,0] 1,254 0.064% 0.58 1.10 1.12 
  [-2,0] 1,254 0.194% 1.42 2.15** 2.33** 









Table 2.4: Bank-Dependent Firms’ Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Loan Announcements 
 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Clean Loan Announcements by Bank-Dependent Firms 
 
    CAAR Test Statistics 
  Event Window N CAAR CS-t BMP-t Patell-Z 
  [-2,+2] 1,254 0.735% 3.52*** 3.5*** 4.18*** 
  [-1,+1] 1,254 0.538% 3.07*** 2.98*** 3.54*** 
  [0,+2] 1,254 0.632% 3.27*** 3.01*** 3.61*** 
Fama-French 5 Factors Model [0,+1] 1,254 0.575% 3.41*** 3.18*** 4.04*** 
  [0,0] 1,254 0.100% 1.16 1.17 1.24 
  [-1,0] 1,254 0.062% 0.54 1.14 1.19 
  [-2,0] 1,254 0.180% 1.28 2.13** 2.37** 
              
 
 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Clean Loan Announcements by Non-Bank-Dependent Firms 
 
    CAAR Test Statistics 
  Event Window N CAAR CS-t BMP-t Patell-Z 
  [-2,+2] 907 0.010% 0.05 0.02 0.03 
  [-1,+1] 907 -0.002% -0.01 -0.27 -0.31 
  [0,+2] 907 -0.032% -0.20 -0.60 -0.69 
Market Model [0,+1] 907 0.024% 0.18 0.32 0.38 
  [0,0] 907 -0.019% -0.20 -0.70 -0.81 
  [-1,0] 907 -0.044% -0.36 -0.52 -0.57 
  [-2,0] 907 0.026% 0.18 0.18 0.20 









Table 2.4: Bank-Dependent Firms’ Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Loan Announcements 
 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Clean Loan Announcements by Non-Bank-Dependent Firms 
 
    CAAR Test Statistics 
  Event Window N CAAR CS-t BMP-t Patell-Z 
  [-2,+2] 907 -0.052% -0.28 -0.26 -0.30 
  [-1,+1] 907 -0.067% -0.45 -0.64 -0.75 
  [0,+2] 907 -0.061% -0.39 -0.68 -0.80 
Fama-French 3 Factors Model [0,+1] 907 -0.009% -0.07 -0.47 -0.57 
  [0,0] 907 -0.071% -0.78 -1.35 -1.59 
  [-1,0] 907 -0.128% -1.06 -1.32 -1.46 
  [-2,0] 907 -0.058% -0.41 -0.40 -0.45 
              
  [-2,+2] 907 -0.003% -0.01 -0.26 -0.30 
  [-1,+1] 907 -0.049% -0.32 -0.63 -0.75 
  [0,+2] 907 -0.050% -0.31 -0.75 -0.91 
Fama-French 5 Factors Model [0,+1] 907 -0.015% -0.11 -0.56 -0.70 
  [0,0] 907 -0.073% -0.80 -1.37 -1.65* 
  [-1,0] 907 -0.102% -0.84 -1.20 -1.35 
  [-2,0] 907 -0.016% -0.11 -0.30 -0.34 








Table 2.5: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Public Bond Announcements 
 
This table shows Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) following public bond announcements from 1994-2014. I use the public bond offering date as 
the announcement date. The public bonds issuance data are from the Mergent FISD. I use market model as the main estimation model, and Fama-French 3 
Factors and 5 Factors models as robustness checks. CS-t is the Cross-Sectional test statistic, BMP-t is the Standardized Cross-Sectional test statistic as in 
Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991), and Patell-Z is the event study test statistic as in Patell (1976).  
 
    CAAR Test Statistics 
  Event Window N CAAR CS-t BMP-t Patell-Z 
  [-2,+2] 2,934 -0.363% -3.15*** -2.71*** -3.05*** 
  [-1,+1] 2,934 -0.449% -5.08*** -4.2*** -4.86*** 
  [0,+2] 2,934 -0.336% -4.14*** -2.87*** -3.15*** 
Market Model [0,+1] 2,934 -0.317% -4.57*** -3.49*** -3.94*** 
  [0,0] 2,934 -0.250% -4.76*** -4.4*** -5.4*** 
  [-1,0] 2,934 -0.382% -4.97*** -4.79*** -5.82*** 
  [-2,0] 2,934 -0.277% -2.84*** -3.22*** -3.9*** 
              
  [-2,+2] 2,934 -0.388% -3.42*** -3.04*** -3.46*** 
  [-1,+1] 2,934 -0.476% -5.43*** -4.47*** -5.26*** 
  [0,+2] 2,934 -0.384% -4.78*** -3.57*** -3.94*** 
Fama-French 3 Factors Model [0,+1] 2,934 -0.348% -5.01*** -3.96*** -4.53*** 
  [0,0] 2,934 -0.269% -5.1*** -4.76*** -5.97*** 
  [-1,0] 2,934 -0.398% -5.19*** -4.94*** -6.13*** 
  [-2,0] 2,934 -0.275% -2.85*** -3.22*** -3.97*** 












Table 2.5: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns following Public Bond Announcements 
 
    CAAR Test Statistics 
  Event Window N CAAR CS-t BMP-t Patell-Z 
  [-2,+2] 2,934 -0.403% -3.55*** -3.24*** -3.79*** 
  [-1,+1] 2,934 -0.485% -5.54*** -4.59*** -5.52*** 
  [0,+2] 2,934 -0.393% -4.86*** -3.6*** -4.07*** 
Fama-French 5 Factors Model [0,+1] 2,934 -0.348% -4.95*** -3.89*** -4.54*** 
  [0,0] 2,934 -0.268% -5.08*** -4.68*** -5.95*** 
  [-1,0] 2,934 -0.407% -5.32*** -5.07*** -6.41*** 
  [-2,0] 2,934 -0.282% -2.9*** -3.37*** -4.26*** 




Table 2.6: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of Main Independent Variables  
 
This table shows the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) of main independent variables used in the 
multivariate analysis. The VIFs are generated using the estat vif command in Stata 12 following a linear 
probability model regression of clean loan announcement indicator variable (CLEAN_AN) on all of the 
main independent variables. The main independent variables include loan, borrowing firms, and lender 
characteristics, and two instrument variables. The instrument variables are SOX_REG that equals 1 for 
loans having deal active date post the Sarbanes-Oxley enactment (July 2002 onward) and 0 otherwise, and 
8K_REG that equals to 1 for loans having deal active date post the effective date of the SEC Rule #33-8400 
(August 2004 onward) and 0 otherwise.  
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
LN_LENDER_AT 4.24 0.24 
8K_REG 3.86 0.26 
SOX_REG 3.52 0.28 
LN_DSIZE_MIL 2.76 0.36 
BIG3_LENDER 2.68 0.37 
LEVERAGE 2.67 0.37 
LN_TOBIN_Q 2.43 0.41 
SMALL_BORROWER 2.23 0.45 
LENDER_EQTA 1.83 0.55 
D_LOAN_SECURED 1.52 0.66 
MCRISIS 1.48 0.68 
NONBANK_L 1.46 0.68 
REVOLVER_DEAL 1.41 0.71 
NEVER_ISSUE_BOND 1.32 0.76 
LN_ MATURITY 1.30 0.77 
TERM_LOAN_DEAL 1.27 0.78 
MS_NONBANK 1.26 0.79 
EBITDAR 1.24 0.81 
N_LOAN_FINCOV 1.23 0.81 
BCRISIS 1.18 0.84 
RL_IND 1.05 0.95 




Table 2.7: Factors Affecting Clean Loan Announcement 
 
This table presents the regression estimates of the probability a loan to be announced by the borrowing 
firm. CLEAN_AN equals to 1 if a loan is cleanly announced in 8-K, and 0 otherwise. Column (1)-(5) 
employs probit regression models, while column (6) uses a logit regression model for a robustness check. 
SOX_REG equals 1 for loans having deal active date post the Sarbanes-Oxley enactment (July 2002 
onward) and 0 otherwise, and 8K_REG equals to 1 for loans having deal active date post the effective date 
of the SEC Rule #33-8400 (August 2004 onward) and 0 otherwise. All coefficient estimates are the average 
marginal impacts to the probability of loan announcement. All borrowing firm and lender characteristics 
are lagged one fiscal year. Standard errors are clustered at the borrowing firm level. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
 
  Dependent Variable: CLEAN_AN 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SOX_REG 0.056*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.060*** 0.050*** 0.066*** 
  (4.111) (4.596) (4.876) (4.219) (3.281) (3.661) 
8K_REG 0.232*** 0.235*** 0.243*** 0.238*** 0.222*** 0.229*** 
  (19.142) (19.000) (19.721) (19.350) (15.651) (14.562) 
MCRISIS   0.033** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.031** 0.040** 
    (2.466) (2.688) (2.724) (2.259) (2.440) 
BCRISIS   0.010 0.005 0.010 0.014 0.013 
    (0.903) (0.498) (0.962) (1.290) (1.253) 
 
BORROWING FIRM CHARACTERISTICS: 
NEVER_ISSUE_BOND     0.012 0.010 0.010 0.012 
      (1.339) (1.054) (1.068) (1.295) 
SMALL_BORROWER     0.026*** 0.007 0.008 0.006 
      (2.858) (0.603) (0.692) (0.514) 
LN_TOBIN_Q     -0.015 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
      (-1.284) (-0.617) (-0.488) (-0.595) 
LEVERAGE     0.037 0.037 0.034 0.022 
      (1.410) (1.422) (1.298) (0.837) 
EBITDAR     -0.034 -0.049 -0.056* -0.058* 
      (-1.156) (-1.599) (-1.770) (-1.711) 
       
LOAN CHARACTERISTICS: 
LN_DSIZE_MIL       -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
        (-0.219) (-0.531) (-0.694) 
N_LOAN_FINCOV       0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
        (7.255) (7.459) (7.098) 
REVOLVER_DEAL       0.026*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 
        (2.775) (2.913) (3.226) 
TERM_LOAN_DEAL       -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
        (-0.160) (-0.132) (-0.119) 
LN_ MATURITY       0.028*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 





Table 2.7: Factors Affecting Clean Loan Announcement 
 
  Dependent Variable: CLEAN_AN 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
D_LOAN_SECURED       0.022** 0.022** 0.020** 
        (2.434) (2.478) (2.234) 
       
LENDER CHARACTERISTICS: 
RL_IND         0.015** 0.016** 
          (2.018) (2.166) 
LENDER_EQTA         0.514* 0.473* 
          (1.936) (1.773) 
LN_LENDER_AT         0.009* 0.009 
          (1.807) (1.613) 
BIG3_LENDER         -0.002 -0.002 
          (-0.119) (-0.153) 
MS_NONBANK         0.034 0.030 
          (0.164) (0.129) 
NONBANK_LENDER         0.066*** 0.060** 
          (2.606) (2.254) 
              
Observations 11,635 11,635 11,635 11,635 11,635 11,635 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.154 0.154 0.158 0.170 0.172 0.170 




Table 2.8: Factors Affecting Contaminated Loan Announcement 
 
This table presents the regression estimates of the probability a loan to be announced by the borrowing firm 
together with other events. CONT_AN equals to 1 if a loan is announced in 8-K together with other events, 
and 0 otherwise. Column (1)-(5) employs probit regression models, while column (6) uses a logit 
regression model for a robustness check. SOX_REG equals 1 for loans having deal active date post the 
Sarbanes-Oxley enactment (July 2002 onward) and 0 otherwise, and 8K_REG equals to 1 for loans having 
deal active date post the effective date of the SEC Rule #33-8400 (August 2004 onward) and 0 otherwise. 
All coefficient estimates are the average marginal impacts to the probability of loan announcement. All 
borrowing firm and lender characteristics are lagged one fiscal year. Standard errors are clustered at the 
borrowing firm level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Numbers 
in parentheses are t-statistics.  
 
  Dependent Variable: CONT_AN 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SOX_REG 0.001 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 -0.020 -0.025 
  (0.059) (-0.023) (0.221) (-0.053) (-0.859) (-0.677) 
REG_8K 0.295*** 0.296*** 0.299*** 0.298*** 0.283*** 0.348*** 
  (15.463) (15.392) (15.624) (15.113) (14.057) (11.439) 
MCRISIS   -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.011 -0.016 
    (-0.332) (-0.152) (-0.102) (-0.490) (-0.450) 
BCRISIS   -0.013* -0.014* -0.007 0.004 0.006 
    (-1.691) (-1.890) (-0.875) (0.481) (0.771) 
 
BORROWING FIRM CHARACTERISTICS: 
NEVER_ISSUE_BOND     -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 
      (-0.375) (-0.673) (-0.860) (-0.936) 
SMALL_BORROWER     0.024*** 0.019** 0.020** 0.018* 
      (3.270) (2.119) (2.207) (1.947) 
LN_TOBIN_Q     0.005 0.010 0.011 0.013 
      (0.524) (1.001) (1.089) (1.190) 
LEVERAGE     0.012 0.014 0.012 0.010 
      (0.528) (0.613) (0.507) (0.402) 
EBITDAR     0.027 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
      (0.872) (0.028) (0.034) (-0.066) 
       
LOAN CHARACTERISTICS: 
LN_DSIZE_MIL       0.001 0.002 0.002 
        (0.405) (0.562) (0.586) 
N_LOAN_FINCOV       0.019*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
        (7.543) (8.098) (8.113) 
REVOLVER_DEAL       -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
        (-3.770) (-3.425) (-3.450) 
TERM_LOAN_DEAL       -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.050*** 






Table 2.8: Factors Affecting Contaminated Loan Announcement 
 
  Dependent Variable: CONT_AN 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LN_ MATURITY       0.023*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 
        (3.849) (3.578) (3.712) 
D_LOAN_SECURED       -0.008 -0.010 -0.012 
        (-1.022) (-1.319) (-1.566) 
 
LENDER CHARACTERISTICS: 
RL_IND         -0.014** -0.015** 
          (-2.218) (-2.377) 
LENDER_EQTA         0.992*** 1.011*** 
          (4.519) (4.524) 
LN_LENDER_AT         0.004 0.005 
          (0.813) (0.954) 
BIG3_LENDER         0.006 0.002 
          (0.468) (0.201) 
MS_NONBANK         -0.506 -0.697** 
          (-1.537) (-2.032) 
NONBANK_LENDER         0.062*** 0.066*** 
          (2.913) (2.937) 
              
Observations 11,635 11,635 11,635 11,635 11,635 11,635 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.242 0.243 0.244 0.259 0.263 0.264 










Table 2.9: Factors Affecting CAR following Clean Loan Announcement 
 
This table presents the regression estimates of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) following clean loan announcements on a variety of determinants, 
including market and banking crisis, as well as borrowing firm, loan, and lender characteristics. The dependent variable in column (1)-(4) is CAR[0,+1], and 
CAR[0,+2] in column (5)-(7). Regression coefficients in column (1) are estimated using OLS without correcting for the sample selection bias. The rest of the 
columns are estimated using the Heckman selection model, which are based on Heckman (1979) using a maximum-likelihood procedure (Maddala, 1983). Ross 
(2010) advocates this procedure to address the heteroscedasticity in abnormal returns. As further robustness checks, I compare the results of CARs following 
loan announcements using three different estimation models: market model, Fama-French 3 factors, and Fama-French 5 factors model. RUNUP is the cumulative 
abnormal returns using each of the estimation models over the interval [-12,-3], a proxy for the stock price runup pre a loan announcement. All columns control 
for Industry and Year Fixed Effects. All borrowing firm and lender characteristics are lagged one fiscal year. Standard errors are clustered at the borrowing firm 
level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
 
 OLS Heckman Models 
 Dependent Variable: CAR[0,+1] Dependent Variable: CAR[0,+2] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Independent Variable Market Model Market Model FF 3 Factors FF 5 Factors Market Model FF 3 Factors FF 5 Factors 
                
RUNUP 0.018 0.007 -0.000 0.005 0.037 0.028 0.031 
  (0.694) (0.353) (-0.025) (0.288) (1.608) (1.296) (1.214) 
MCRISIS -0.009 -0.016 -0.015 -0.019 -0.018 -0.019 -0.024 
  (-0.645) (-1.158) (-1.111) (-1.255) (-1.095) (-1.148) (-1.300) 
BCRISIS 0.013** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.015** 0.014** 0.012* 
  (2.532) (2.893) (3.039) (2.662) (2.351) (2.328) (1.942) 
INVERSE MILLS (𝜆)   0.071*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 









Table 2.9: Factors Affecting CAR following Clean Loan Announcement 
 
 OLS Heckman Models 
 Dependent Variable: CAR[0,+1] Dependent Variable: CAR[0,+2] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Independent Variable Market Model Market Model FF 3 Factors FF 5 Factors Market Model FF 3 Factors FF 5 Factors 
BORROWING FIRM CHARACTERISTICS: 
NEVER_ISSUE_BOND 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 
  (2.851) (2.588) (2.529) (2.640) (2.391) (2.398) (2.458) 
SMALL_BORROWER 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 
  (0.206) (0.425) (0.452) (0.393) (0.816) (0.695) (0.616) 
LN_TOBIN_Q 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.971) (-0.291) (-0.241) (-0.171) (-0.222) (-0.085) (-0.056) 
LEVERAGE 0.014 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.010 
  (1.274) (0.553) (0.631) (0.741) (0.517) (0.534) (0.723) 
EBITDAR -0.022 -0.027 -0.019 -0.020 -0.041** -0.035* -0.031 
  (-1.360) (-1.597) (-1.154) (-1.189) (-2.056) (-1.702) (-1.511) 
                
LOAN CHARACTERISTICS: 
LN_DSIZE_MIL 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.351) (0.710) (0.781) (0.740) (0.955) (1.047) (1.089) 
N_LOAN_FINCOV -0.001 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
  (-0.988) (3.328) (3.445) (3.626) (2.936) (3.080) (3.366) 
REVOLVER_DEAL 0.001 0.008** 0.007* 0.007* 0.007 0.007* 0.008* 
  (0.342) (1.972) (1.788) (1.812) (1.629) (1.663) (1.825) 
TERM_LOAN_DEAL 0.012 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.003 
  (1.320) (0.896) (1.096) (0.908) (0.368) (0.611) (0.377) 
LN_MATURITY -0.000 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.005 0.006* 0.005 








Table 2.9: Factors Affecting CAR following Clean Loan Announcement 
 
 OLS Heckman Models 
 Dependent Variable: CAR[0,+1] Dependent Variable: CAR[0,+2] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Independent Variable Market Model Market Model FF 3 Factors FF 5 Factors Market Model FF 3 Factors FF 5 Factors 
D_LOAN_SECURED -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (-0.522) (1.472) (1.286) (1.450) (1.006) (1.067) (1.226) 
                
LENDER CHARACTERISTICS: 
RL_IND 0.002 0.005* 0.005* 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 
  (0.762) (1.682) (1.714) (1.549) (0.944) (0.955) (0.794) 
LENDER_EQTA -0.145 -0.037 -0.038 -0.023 -0.139 -0.122 -0.107 
  (-1.439) (-0.323) (-0.345) (-0.205) (-1.051) (-0.923) (-0.807) 
LN_LENDER_AT 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 
  (0.155) (0.949) (0.517) (0.714) (0.361) (0.087) (0.198) 
BIG3_LENDER -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.750) (-0.677) (-0.377) (-0.384) (-0.234) (-0.070) (-0.006) 
MS_NONBANK 1.894 -7.563*** -8.151*** -8.140*** -10.880*** -10.680*** -10.607*** 
  (1.220) (-3.458) (-3.619) (-3.627) (-4.271) (-4.111) (-4.089) 
NONBANK_LENDER -0.000 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.004 0.004 0.005 
  (-0.009) (1.085) (1.032) (0.962) (0.278) (0.282) (0.337) 
        
Constant 0.035 -0.117** -0.102** -0.111** -0.079 -0.075 -0.083 
  (0.833) (-2.255) (-2.033) (-2.116) (-1.334) (-1.280) (-1.370) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
                
Observations 2,172 11,635 11,635 11,635 11,635 11,635 11,635 
R-squared 0.037 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.020 0.016 0.016 
Number of clusters 1345 3730 3730 3730 3730 3730 3730 
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Table 2.10: Additional Robustness Checks—BHAR and Raw Return 
 
This table presents the regression estimates of Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) and Cumulative 
Raw Return (CRET) following Loan Announcements on a variety of determinants, including market and 
banking crisis, as well as borrowing firm, loan, and lender characteristics. The dependent variable in 
column (1)-(3) is BHAR[0,+2], and CRET[0,+2] in column (4). All regression coefficients are estimated 
using the Heckman selection model, which are based on Heckman (1979) using a maximum-likelihood 
procedure (Maddala, 1983). Ross (2010) advocates this procedure to address the heteroscedasticity in 
abnormal returns. For the BHAR regressions, three different estimation models are used: market model, 
Fama-French 3 factors, and Fama-French 5 factors model. RUNUP is the cumulative abnormal returns 
using each of the estimation models over the interval [-12,-3], a proxy for the stock price runup pre a loan 
announcement. All columns control for Industry and Year Fixed Effects. All borrowing firm and lender 
characteristics are lagged one fiscal year. Standard errors are clustered at the borrowing firm level. ***, **, 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 BHAR[0,+2] CRET[0,+2] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent Variable Market Model FF 3 Factors FF 5 Factors Raw Return 
          
RUNUP 0.041* 0.031 0.033 0.036 
  (1.908) (1.530) (1.495) (1.513) 
MCRISIS -0.018 -0.019 -0.023 -0.033** 
  (-1.090) (-1.158) (-1.289) (-1.965) 
BCRISIS 0.015** 0.014** 0.012** 0.012* 
  (2.407) (2.356) (1.962) (1.877) 
INVERSE MILLS (𝜆) 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.083*** 
  (8.93) (9.15) (9.29) (9.12) 
     
BORROWING FIRM CHARACTERISTICS: 
NEVER_ISSUE_BOND 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 
  (2.378) (2.397) (2.466) (2.128) 
SMALL_BORROWER 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006 
  (0.889) (0.765) (0.688) (1.146) 
LN_TOBIN_Q -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
  (-0.271) (-0.126) (-0.108) (-0.465) 
LEVERAGE 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.003 
  (0.560) (0.574) (0.749) (0.224) 
EBITDAR -0.039** -0.033 -0.029 -0.034* 






Table 2.10: Additional Robustness Checks—BHAR and Raw Return 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 BHAR[0,+2] CRET[0,+2] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent Variable Market Model FF 3 Factors FF 5 Factors Raw Return 
          
LOAN CHARACTERISTICS: 
LN_DSIZE_MIL 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (1.021) (1.116) (1.167) (0.852) 
N_LOAN_FINCOV 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
  (3.108) (3.253) (3.536) (2.987) 
REVOLVER_DEAL 0.007* 0.007* 0.008* 0.007 
  (1.714) (1.749) (1.917) (1.452) 
TERM_LOAN_DEAL 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.000 
  (0.224) (0.497) (0.270) (0.045) 
LN_MATURITY 0.006* 0.006* 0.005* 0.007** 
  (1.755) (1.903) (1.667) (1.989) 
D_LOAN_SECURED 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
  (1.065) (1.113) (1.270) (1.353) 
     
LENDER CHARACTERISTICS: 
RL_IND 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
  (0.925) (0.937) (0.766) (0.748) 
LENDER_EQTA -0.133 -0.115 -0.100 -0.127 
  (-1.020) (-0.882) (-0.762) (-0.893) 
LN_LENDER_AT 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.463) (0.177) (0.277) (0.220) 
BIG3_LENDER -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
  (-0.284) (-0.125) (-0.058) (0.018) 
MS_NONBANK -11.086*** -10.899*** -10.819*** -14.134*** 
  (-4.699) (-4.517) (-4.473) (-5.792) 
NONBANK_LENDER 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 
  (0.299) (0.303) (0.358) (0.302) 
     
Constant -0.088 -0.084 -0.091 -0.091 
  (-1.552) (-1.484) (-1.560) (-1.537) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
          
Observations 11,635 11,635 11,635 11,635 
R-squared 0.017 0.012 0.011 0.017 






DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE, OWNERSHIP, AND  





As one primary component of financial safety nets, deposit insurance (DI) aims to 
protect small depositors, promote public confidence, and enhance banking system 
stability (BCBS and IADI, 2009). This objective aligns with Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983)’s study that theorizes the risk of self-fulfilling or information-driven bank runs 
can be mitigated by providing an insurance scheme to depositors that guarantees their 
deposits money (full or partially) in case of bank defaults. Believing that DI can achieve 
this objective, the number of countries around the world that implement DI explicitly has 
been growing substantially.
22
 During the recent 2008 financial crisis, many of these 
countries relied on their DIs (along with other bailouts and liquidity provision) to restore 
public confidence and prevent systemic bank runs. In particular, there were 19 countries  
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provided full depositors guarantee, 22 countries increased their DI statutory coverage 
limit (hereafter will be shortly referred as “coverage”) permanently, and 7 countries 
increased their DI coverage limit temporarily (IADI and IMF, 2010). Anginer, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Zhu (2014) show that these countries’ decisions were reasonable as the study 
finds that countries with DI tend to have lower bank risk and more systemic stability 
during the crisis. 
Despite of its increasing popularity, a large strand of previous literature shows 
that DI may induce a moral hazard problem. The problem arises since DI acts like a put 
option that limits banks’ downside risk and reduces incentives for depositors to discipline 
their banks (e.g. Merton, 1977; Marcus and Shaked, 1984; Duan, Moreau, and Sealey, 
1992; Allen and Saunders, 1993). Hence, DI creates incentives for banks to expropriate 
the government or tax payers by taking excessive risk (e.g. Bhattacharya and Thakor, 
1993; Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2004). The moral hazard problem reduces the 
effectiveness of DI and harms banking system stability.
23
 Therefore, whether DI can 
really benefit the banking system stability remains an open empirical question. 
Moreover, whether banks will take advantage on the DI generosity in terms of 
risk taking might be affected by their ownership structure. First, there is a principal-agent 
problem between bank managers and shareholders. On the one hand, bank shareholders 
aim to maximize their shares value and therefore prefer higher risk-taking. Bank 
managers, on the other hand, might concern more on their job security and therefore tend 
to be more risk averse. Some empirical studies show that higher stock holdings by bank 
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 For example in 1980, shortly before the U.S. Saving and Loans crisis, the FDIC had increased its 
coverage limit from $40,000 to $100,000 per depositor per bank or approximately nine times per capita 
GDP. This generous coverage policy together with financial liberalization and regulatory failure are 
believed as the main triggers of the Saving and Loans crisis (Kane, 1992). Kane analogues the generous 
deposit insurance as feeding off the “zombie” S&Ls using taxpayers’ money. 
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managers can alleviate this principal-agent problem (Saunders, Strock, and Travlos, 
1990; Berger and Imbierowich, 2014). Second, there is a large strand of literatures in 
corporate finance showing that not all of firms’ shareholders aim to maximize the market 
value of equity. For example, the owners of a family firm may have a longer investment 
time horizon and concern more on their heirs’ control to the firm (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003). This means that the basic assumption of the Merton’s model (1977) for DI may 
not be relevant for banks with different ownership structure. Surprisingly, the empirical 
studies that relate different kind of ownership structure and bank-risk taking are still 
relatively sparse. 
In terms of empirical research design, the causality between DI coverage and 
bank risk taking is challenging to test because there is a potential reverse causality 
problem between these two variables. On the one hand, an increase in DI coverage could 
induce more bank risk taking as it provides banks with more protection from downside 
risk, as well as erodes incentives for depositors to monitor their banks’ risk (the moral 
hazard hypothesis). On the other hand, in a harsh time when bank risk is high such as the 
recent 2008 financial crisis, the government may react to increase DI coverage to enhance 
depositors’ confidence to the banking system, which results in lower bank risk and 
greater systemic stability (the safety net hypothesis). Therefore, in a regression of bank 
risk taking on DI coverage, it is important to find an exogenous source of variation in DI 
coverage that is not affected by bank risk. Otherwise, the regression estimates will be 
biased. 
In this paper, I examine how DI coverage affects bank risk taking and how 
different kinds of bank ownership structures influence this relation using a natural 
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experiment of exogenous variation in DI coverage in the Indonesian commercial banking 
industry over 2002Q1-2011Q4.
24
 During this period, Indonesia has experienced several 
changes in DI coverage, both decrease and increase. Indonesia also has not imposed any 
coinsurance requirement and still relies on the flat rate pricing (non-risk-sensitive 
premium) for the DI service provided during this period.
25
 Therefore, Indonesia provides 
a unique empirical setting that can address the reverse causality problem between DI 
coverage and bank risk taking. In addition, focusing on a panel of banks within a single 
country will be able to mitigate heterogeneity bias that complicates most of empirical 
studies using cross-countries data. 
Since January 1998, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) had provided a blanket 
guarantee (BG) program that insured all bank liabilities (deposits and nondeposit funding, 
including off balance sheet activities such as derivatives) in order to restore public 
confidence and tame the impact of the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis (Enoch, Baldwin, 
Frecaut, and Kovanen, 2001). In September 2004, the GOI enacted Law Number 24 Year 
2004 to establish an explicit DI program by the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(IDIC). The law mandated to end the BG regime and start a limited DI program 
gradually. In the law, the GOI explicitly states that a full guarantee (FG) program will be 
in place of the BG from September 2005 until March 2006. Different than BG, FG did 
not insure bank liabilities other than deposits, but insured bank deposits fully. After 
March 2006, the law explicitly mandates a limit to DI coverage that will gradually 
decrease from IDR 5 billion (until September 2006), 1 billion (until March 2007), and 
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 The DI coverage, coinsurance requirement, and risk-based premium pricing are primary tools for DI to 





 Since these gradual decreases in DI coverage were stated 
explicitly in the law, all Indonesian banks became effectively aware of this policy since 
the law was enacted in September 2004. More importantly, the decreases in DI coverage 
were predetermined in the law and therefore they are not affected by bank risk taking 
during the implementation period of the law. 
The other exogenous variation in DI coverage starts from October 2008, when the 
GOI decided to increase DI coverage, following similar policy by the US government and 
neighboring countries around the subprime mortgage crisis period. Despite that none of 
Indonesian banks has direct exposure to subprime mortgage, the GOI decided to increase 
the DI coverage from IDR 100 million to 2 billion in October 2008. The GOI reasoned 
that they took the policy along with a bailout decision of PT Bank Century on November 
2008 in order to prevent the subprime crisis to precipitate into the Indonesian economy 
by eroding market and public confidence psychologically (The Indonesia Ministry of 
Finance, 2010). Since the crisis was originated from the subprime mortgage problem in 
the US while Indonesian banks had no direct exposures on the subprime mortgage 
instruments, the increase in DI coverage was exogenous. 
By way of preview, I find a significant positive relation between explicit deposit 
insurance coverage and bank risk-taking, consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis. 
More specifically, controlling for various bank-specific and macroeconomic variables, as 
well as bank regulations, I find that Indonesian banks’ Z-score, an inverse measure of 
bank risk taking, increases on average about 18% when the government switched from 
the blanket guarantee era to the limited guarantee era administered by the Indonesian 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC). In terms of mechanisms in which explicit DI 
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coverage influences bank risk taking, I find that a lower explicit DI coverage is 
associated with lower standard deviation of profitability and higher capitalization, though 
it is also associated with lower bank profitability. Furthermore, I find some evidence that 
the relation is non-monotonic at the low level of explicit DI coverage, in line with the 
safety net hypothesis. This finding suggests that there is an optimum range of explicit DI 
coverage. Finally, I find significant evidence that the impact of explicit DI coverage on 
bank risk is different across different kinds of ultimate owners. In particular, family 
banks and politically connected banks are those that are most affected when the 
government switched from the blanket guarantee era to the limited guarantee era, 
suggesting that the moral hazard problem in these banks are more prominent compared to 
foreign banks and nonpolitically connected banks. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several areas. First, this paper 
complements existing literature on deposit insurance and bank risk-taking in developing 
countries. Next, this paper provides unique empirical settings that isolate the impact of 
deposit insurance coverage changes on bank risk-taking. Finally, this paper extends the 
existing literature by examining the degree of bank risk-taking for different types of bank 
ownership. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides some 
institutional backgrounds on the Indonesia banking industry. Section 3.3 reviews the 
previous literature and hypothesis development. Section 3.4 describes the data and 
methodology. Section 3.5 presents the main empirical finding and robustness checks. 




3.2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
In response to the 1997/1998 financial crisis, the Indonesian government provided 
a blanket guarantee (BG) for its domestic banks in order to restore public confidence 
toward Indonesian banking system and mitigate bank runs.
27
 The BG guaranteed all 
commercial banks’ liabilities, excluding loan capital, subordinated debt, illegal liabilities, 
liabilities to the banks’ related parties, and derivative transactions.
28
 The BG program 
was funded from the government fiscal budget and from the fixed-rate premium paid by 
each participating bank for 0.25% of deposits per year. However, the BG was not 
applicable to branch offices of foreign banks and none of joint venture banks were 
willing to join the BG program. Therefore, none of the branch office of foreign banks and 
joint-venture bank was insured by the BG program. 
In September 2004, the Indonesian government enacted Law Number 24 Year 
2004 to establish the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC) which officially 
began its operation on September 2005. According to the Law, the membership of the 
IDIC’s deposit insurance program is compulsory for all banks in Indonesia, including 
branch office of foreign banks and joint-venture banks. The Law mandates the end of the 
BG program and gradually decreases the deposit insurance coverage within 18 months 
from its effective enforcement date as follows: 
a. Period 9/22/2005 to 3/21/2006: Full Guarantee (FG) 
b. Period 3/22/2006 to 9/21/2006: IDR 5 billion (USD 500,000) 
c. Period 9/22/2006 to 3/21/2007: IDR 1 billion (USD 100,000) 
                                                 
27
 The BG program was officially administered by an institution called the Indonesian Bank Restructuring 
Agency (IBRA).  
28
 The BG also guaranteed for off-balance sheet items and currency swap transactions. For further details 
see Kusumaningtuti (1998). 
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d. Period 3/22/2007 and after: IDR 100 million (USD 10,000) 
As the main source of funding, the IDIC charges a fixed-rate premium amounting 0.20% 
of deposits per year. 
In response to the recent 2008 global financial crisis, the Indonesian government 
enacted the Government Regulation Number 66 Year 2008 to increase the deposit 
maximum coverage from IDR 100 million (USD 10,000) to IDR 2 billion (USD 
200,000). Different than other countries that increase their deposit insurance coverage 
temporarily (e.g. Australia, Brazil, Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, Ukraine, and 
United States
29
), the Indonesian government does not specify an exit strategy for this pre-
emptive policy when the crisis is over. Though the increase of deposit insurance coverage 
was considered as one of the Indonesian government’s public policies which has 
successfully restored the Indonesian banking stability during the crisis (Basri and 
Raharja, 2010), the amount of optimal deposit insurance coverage which minimizes 
Indonesian banks’ risk-taking still remains unanswered. 
 
3.3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.3.1 DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE AND BANK RISK-TAKING 
A large body of literature in deposit insurance contends that a generous explicit 
deposit insurance coverage may induce bank instability due to higher moral hazard 
problem (the Moral Hazard hypothesis). Early interest in the deposit insurance was 
initiated by the seminal article by Merton (1977), who viewed the deposit insurance as a 
put option issued by the government on the banks’ assets. From the viewpoint of banks 
                                                 
29
 In response to the 2008 global financial crisis, the U.S. government had increased their deposit insurance 
cap temporarily from USD100,000 to USD250,000. However, by the Dodd-Frank law in July 2010, the 
temporary increase was made permanent.  
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holding the put option, there is an incentive to increase the value of the option by surging 
the volatility of banks’ assets and shift the losses incurred to the government or 
taxpayers, creating a moral hazard problem. Kane (1992) shows how a generous deposit 
insurance coverage may become one of primary triggers of the 1980s U.S. Savings and 
Loans (S&Ls) crisis. Kane blames the deposit insurance for breaking the link between 
what the S&Ls’ assets could earn and what depositors could expect to be repaid. Cebula 
and Belton (1997) study the impact of federal deposit insurance coverage on the failure 
rate of commercial banks in the U.S. during the 1963-1991 periods and find that the 
higher extent of explicit deposit insurance coverage is associated with higher bank failure 
rate. Based on cross-section data from 61 countries in 1980-1997, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002) find that explicit deposit insurance tends to have adverse impact on 
bank stability and the impact is stronger as the coverage level becomes more extensive 
and where it is run by the government instead of the private sector. Cull, Senbet, and 
Sorge (2005) examine the relation between the explicit deposit insurance generosities and 
financial development using the data from 37 countries between 1960 and 2001. They 
show that generous government-funded deposit insurance has an adverse impact on 
financial development and growth in the long run, except in countries whose strong rule 
of laws and bank supervisors. By utilizing contingency table analysis to 52 countries over 
the period 1996-2007, Chu (2011) finds that low deposit insurance coverage beats both 
high and full coverage in sustaining bank stability due to better market discipline and 
lower moral hazard problem. Using the U.S. and 21 countries data during the pre-crisis 
period in 1997-2007 and the crisis and post-crisis period in 2008-2010, Berger and Turk-
Ariss (2013) find that depositors’ discipline decline during and after the crisis as a result 
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of the government actions to expand the deposit insurance coverage and rescue troubled 
financial institutions. Still in line with the findings of the mainstream literature, Lambert, 
Noth, and Schüwer (2013) provide within-country evidence from the U.S. data around 
the introduction of the Emergency Stabilization Act in Q4 2008, that an increase in the 
amount of insured deposits triggers higher investments in risky loans, suggesting riskier 
behavior on affected banks. Therefore, according to the Moral Hazard Hypothesis, the 
first hypothesis to test in this paper is: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: All else equal, lower deposit insurance coverage is associated 
with lower bank-risk taking. 
On the flip side of literature, there is a Safety-Net Hypothesis, which contends 
that a low deposit insurance coverage is associated with higher bank-risk taking, and 
hence, lower bank stability. Dreyfus, Saunders, and Allen (1994) develop a theoretical 
model to examine the optimal caps on the scope of insured deposits given the deposit 
insurer adopts a flat-rate premium system.
30
 They posit that uninsured depositors tend to 
require higher interest rate or risk premium to their banks if the deposit insurance 
coverage level is too low. This may make some banks unable to retain their depositors or 
reduce their profit margin, and therefore, it will either increase the banks’ likelihood of 
being insolvent or induce the banks to conduct riskier assets substitution. Based on the 
data of 128 banks in EU during 1991-1998, Gropp and Vesala (2004) find some 
evidences that high explicit deposit insurance coverage is associated with lower banks’ 
risk-taking and that implicit guarantee of banks’ creditors is relatively high when there is 
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 Theory suggests that a flat deposit insurance premium rate does not provide incentive to reduce the moral 
hazard problem caused by excessive bank risk taking (De Long and Saunders, 2011). Hence, we may 
expect that under a flat premium rate regime, banks’ risk-taking will change when the government alters 
the deposit insurance coverage. 
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low explicit protection. Meanwhile, Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu (2012) examine 
the data from 96 countries during 2004-2009 and find that the stabilization effect tends to 
dominate the moral hazard effect of deposit insurance during a financial crisis, though the 
overall effect over the full sample remains negative. Therefore, according to the Safety-
Net Hypothesis, the first hypothesis to test in this paper is: 
HYPOTHESIS 2: All else equal, lower deposit insurance coverage is associated 
with higher bank-risk taking. 
More recent literature in deposit insurance suggests a non-monotonic relationship 
between deposit insurance coverage and bank stability, as pioneered by Angkinand and 
Wihlborg (2006; 2010). Their model assumes that every country having explicit deposit 
insurance also provides implicit guarantee. The reason why every country tends to 
provide implicit guarantee is that during banking crises, the pressures to the government 
to bail out troubled banks or to provide blanket guarantees are very intense (Demirgüç-
Kunt, Kane, and Laeven, 2008). Angkinand and Wihlborg propose that the degree of 
implicit guarantee will depend on the level of explicit deposit insurance coverage. When 
the explicit coverage is low, uninsured depositors and creditors tend to have stronger 
expectation that the government will respond banking crises by issuing blanket 
guarantees or bailing out distressed banks and hence, it may lead to higher bank risk-
taking or lower bank stability due to higher implicit protection. On the contrary, when the 
explicit deposit insurance coverage is high, the credibility of non-insurance increases as 
well. However, as the mainstream literature noted, higher explicit deposit insurance 
coverage is generally associated with higher risk-taking or lower bank stability. 
Therefore, the total effects of explicit deposit insurance coverage on bank risk-taking 
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might follow a U-shaped curve. With respect to this strands of literature, our third 
hypothesis to test in this paper is: 
HYPOTHESIS 3: All else equal, there is a non-monotonic relation between bank-
risk taking and the level of explicit deposit insurance coverage. 
 
3.3.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Strands of literature suggest that corporate governance has important 
consequences to bank stability.
31
 Among the most recent literatures, Laeven and Levine 
(2009) examine the relation between bank governance, regulation, and risk taking using 
the data of 10 largest publicly listed banks from 48 countries. Consistent with the 
previous literature (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; John, Litov, and Yeung, 2008), they 
find that banks having large owners with substantial cash flow (CF) rights exhibit higher 
risk taking behavior. They argue that by focusing on the large shareholders’ CF rights, 
instead of voting rights, they capture directly both the incentives of owners toward risk 
and the ability of owners to influence banks’ risk. Further, they find that given banks 
having large equity owner, the presence of explicit deposit insurance is associated with 
higher risk taking. 
Regarding the effect of managerial ownership on risk-taking behavior, several 
studies have shown the importance of managerial ownership in determining bank 
stability. For example Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990), Gorton and Rosen (1995), 
Anderson and Fraser (2000), and Sullivan and Spong (2007) find that higher 
shareholdings of officers and directors induces a higher bank risk-taking behavior due to 
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 We suggest to see Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2013) for a comprehensive literature review on the 
influences of corporate governance to bank stability.  
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lesser degree of agency problem between banks’ managers and shareholders. More 
specific, Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch (2013) find that high shareholding by lower-
level management (e.g. vice presidents) is associated with significant increase in default 
risk. However, they do not find direct impact of the shareholdings by outside directors 
and chief officers on banks’ probability of failure. 
Other aspects of corporate governance may impact on bank stability are foreign, 
government, and family ownership, as well as listing status. The presence of foreign 
ownership in the banks tend to be associated with better performance (e.g. Claessens, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2001) and less risk taking (e.g. Laeven, 1999), especially 
in developing countries. Foreign banks are also supervised both by the home and host 
regulators. Next, listed banks are expected to be more transparent and have greater 
market monitoring (Hadad, Agusman, Monroe, Gasbarro, and Zumwalt, 2011). 
Therefore, we may expect that foreign banks and listed banks have better governance and 
hence become more stable than domestic banks and unlisted banks. Concerning 
government ownership, most of the existing literature finds negative influence on bank 
stability. Using the sample of European commercial banks, Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi 
(2007) find that government- owned banks tend to have poorer loan quality and higher 
insolvency risk than other type of banks. Still using the sample of European banks, 
Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi (2013) find further that government-owned banks have 
lower credit risk but higher operating risk, indicating the presence of governmental 
protection that induces risk taking, and also find that the government-owned banks may 
serve certain political goals. However, Hossain, Jain, and Mitra (2013) find that partial 
state ownership of banks, specifically in the Asia-Pacific regions, helps avoid sharp 
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losses during financial crises by restricting risky-business activities. Meanwhile, the 
impact of family ownership on banks’ risk taking may vary. For example, Morck, Yavuz, 
and Yeung (2011) find that banking systems which are thoroughly controlled by tycoons 
or families have less efficient capital allocation, slower economic growth, and greater 
financial instability which may imply greater risk taking by the banks in such banking 
systems. The higher risk may result from higher incentives to expropriate non-family 
shareholders via tunneling or lack pools of talents (e.g. Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 
2000; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2006). On the other hand, there are strands of literature 
find that family firms are more conservative, have superior monitoring abilities compared 
to widely-held firms, have longer investment horizons, and hence tends to be more stable 
(e.g. Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; James, 1999; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Barry, Lepetit, 
and Tarazi, 2011). Furthermore, Angkinand and Wihlborg (2010) assert that banks’ 
quality of governance may affect the relation between explicit deposit insurance coverage 
and banks’ risk-taking. In particular, the U-shaped curvature becomes more pronounced 
when the quality of banks’ governance is more aligned with shareholders’ wealth 
maximization objective (good governance). 
Therefore, the next hypotheses to test in this paper are: 
HYPOTHESIS 4A: Banks having more alignment of interest with shareholder 
maximization objective have higher sensitivity of risk to deposit insurance coverage 
changes. 
HYPOTHESIS 4B: Banks having less alignment of interest with shareholder 




3.4 DATA AND VARIABLES 
3.4.1 THE SAMPLE 
We test the impact of deposit insurance coverage and ownership structure on the 
Indonesian bank risk-taking using bank-level data from Indonesian commercial banking 
industry. The sample starts from Q1:2002, the earliest data available publicly from the 
bank regulator’s website, until Q4:2011.
32
 I end the sample in 2011:Q4 as the regulator 
implements the IFRS accounting for all banks starting from 2012:Q1 onward.
33
 In our 
sample, we exclude all Islamic banks from the analysis since they have substantial 
differences in business characteristics from conventional banks. We obtain all the 
financial information from the quarterly financial reports which are mandatorily 
submitted by all commercial banks in Indonesia to the bank regulator.  All financial 
information is inflation-adjusted using the GDP deflator index with the year 2000 as its 
base year. Meanwhile, the ownership database is constructed from the annual-bank 
management and ownership structure reports which are also available in the bank 
regulator’s website. We complement the ownership database with the information from 
the banks’ websites, magazines, and other information sources, in case if there is less 
complete information about a bank’s ownership structure on its annual report. The 
macroeconomic indicators including real GDP growth, GDP deflator index, and deposit 
insurance rate are gathered from the Indonesian Economic and Financial Statistics 
(SEKI) published by the Bank of Indonesia and the Indonesian Central Statistical Bureau 
(BPS). 
                                                 
32
 These data are available online via Bank of Indonesia’s website, http://www.bi.go.id, the former bank 
regulator, or from the Indonesian Financial Service Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan)’s website 
http://www.ojk.go.id, the new bank regulator starting on 2013 onward.  
33
 Bank of Indonesia’s Circulation Letter No. 11/4/DPNP.  
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I conduct standard filtering procedure by excluding all commercial banks with 
negative, zero and missing gross-total assets and loan composition since these data are 
likely subject to errors, leaving 3,971 bank-quarter observations in the final sample.
34
 In 
order to mitigate the impact of outliers on our analysis, income statement and balance 
sheet-related variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution, unless 
mentioned otherwise.  
 
3.4.2 BANK-RISK TAKING MEASURE 
Following Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009), we use the Z-score (ZSCORE) 
as the main inverse measure of bank-risk taking. The time-varying Z-score is calculated 















 , and 
iROA
 are the four quarters period-average return on gross-total 
assets, -average equity to gross-total assets, and –standard deviation of return on gross-
total assets. Using the common definition of z-score, a bank is defined as insolvent when 
its   0i iEQTA ROA  . This means that at this state, the bank does not have enough 
capital to absorb its losses. Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt 
(1993) show that if ROA is a random variable with mean roa  and finite variance 
2
roa , 
then the upper bound of the probability of insolvency is as follows: 
 2( )i ip ROA EQTA Z
    (2) 
                                                 
34
 Following Berger and Bouwman (2013), we use gross total assets (GTA) instead of total assets, which 
equals to total assets plus the allowance for loan and lease losses and the allocated transfer risk reserve. The 
purpose of the reversal is to measure the full value of the loans financed. Helwege (1996) suggests similar 
measure of gross assets instead of net assets for the S&Ls.  
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As the Z-SCORE commonly has a highly skewed distribution, I follow Laeven and 
Levine (2009) to use the natural logarithm of the Z-SCORE instead (LN ZSCORE). To 
avoid truncation of data observations due to negative ZSCOREs, I use the following log 
transformation: 
 𝐿𝑁𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 = ln⁡(1 + |min(𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸)| + 𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸 (3) 
Lower ZSCORE and LNZSCORE implies higher bank-risk taking. 
 
3.4.3 EXPLICIT DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE 
To measure the different regime of deposit insurance coverage, I use six different 
indicator variables that capture the transition era (DCOV_TR), the full deposits guarantee 
era (DCOV_FG), the IDR 5 billion deposit insurance coverage era (DCOV_5B), the IDR 
1 billion deposit insurance coverage era (DCOV_1B), the IDR 100 million deposit 
insurance coverage era (DCOV_100M), and the IDR 2 billion deposit insurance coverage 
era (DCOV_2B). The base indicator variable that is omitted in the main regressions is the 
blanket guarantee era (DCOV_BG), so that the regression estimates of the other indicator 




We use several proxies to measure different type of bank ownership. First, we use 
the percentage of the manager’s cash flow rights (MANCF), i.e. the cash flow right of 
bank manager if the manager is one of the ultimate owners. Ultimate owners are defined 
as the top owners in the bank’s  ownership structure that have at least 10% voting rights, 
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following Laeven and Levine (2009) and Carney and Child (2013). Next, we measure the 
largest ultimate owner's cash flow right (UCASH) and the wedge between cash flow right 
and voting right of the largest ultimate owner (WEDGE). 
For different type of ownerships, we use indicator variables for foreign, family, 
government, and private-politically connected banks. A foreign bank is defined as a bank 
that has foreign institutions as the largest ultimate owners. By this definition, all branches 
of foreign banks are defined as foreign banks, including joint-venture banks which satisfy 
this definition. A bank is defined as a family bank if the largest ultimate shareholder is a 
family or a family-based business group. There are two kinds of state-owned banks in 
Indonesia: central-government owned banks (Bank Persero) and regional-government 
owned banks (Bank Pembangunan Daerah). This separation follows the banks’ 
classification by the Bank of Indonesia. Also, after the enactment of Law Number 22 and 
Number 25 Year 1999 concerning the local government decentralization, we may expect 
that the dependency of local government’s budget to the local-government owned banks’ 
incomes are higher.  A central-government owned bank is defined as a bank that has the 
central government as the largest ultimate owner. Similarly, a local-government owned 
bank is defined as a bank that has the regional government as the largest ultimate owner. 
Finally, a private-politically connected bank is defined as a private bank with at least one 
of the commissioners, directors, or controlling shareholders is a current of former 
political party member, parliament member, or government official, following Nys, 
Tarazi, and Trinugroho (2015).
35
 
                                                 
35
 Different than the organizational structure in most of the U.S. firms, Indonesia embraces a two-tier 
system, where the executives (led by a CEO) conduct the operational business activities and the Board of 
Commissioner (led by a President Commissioner) is responsible to monitor the executives on behalf of the 
firm’s shareholders.  
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3.4.5 CONTROL VARIABLES 
We use various control variables consist of bank-level and macroeconomic-level 
variables. For the bank-level variables, I use the log natural of gross-total assets (LNGTA) 
and its square term (LNGTA_SQ) to account for economies of scale in managing risk 
(Enkhbold and Otgonshar, 2013), the assets composition (the ratio of loans to gross-total 
assets, LOANGTA, and the ratio of fixed assets to gross-total assets, FAGTA). We also 
control for the role of nondeposit funding as theory suggests that nondeposit funding and 
subordinated debts’ investors may impose more market discipline on banks compared to 
depositors, and hence, increase the banks’ stability (e.g. Berger and Turk-Ariss, 2013). 
To do so, we use the ratio of Nondeposits funding-to-GTA ratio (NDEPGTA) as a proxy. 
Following Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009), we use the Lerner index as a 
proxy for market power. The Lerner Index measures the mark-up of price over marginal 




i t i t i tit GTA GTA GTA
Lerner P MC P   (4) 
where 
,i tGTA
P is the price of gross-total assets proxied by the ratio of total interest and non-
interest income to gross-total assets for bank i at time t, and  
,i tGTA
MC is the marginal cost 
of gross-total assets for bank i at time t. The 
,i tGTA
MC is estimated using the following 
translog cost function: 
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where itQ  represents a proxy for bank output, i.e. the gross-total assets of bank i at time t, 
and ,k itW are three input prices of labor (the ratio of personnel expenses to gross-total 
assets), funds (the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits), and fixed capital (the ratio 
of other operating and  administrative expenses to gross total assets). Year fixed effects 
are also added in the estimation process of the equation (5) above with robust standard 
errors. I winsorize 𝑊1,2,3 at 3% level on top and bottom instead of 1% level as the latter 
still leave considerable numbers of outliers. Next, the 
,i tGTA

















   
 
  (6) 
Finally, for the macroeconomic variables, we control for the real GDP growth 
(EGROWTH), crisis dummy (CRISIS), and the deposit insurance rate (DI_RATE).
36
 The 
details of all variables used in this paper, their definition, and summary statistics are 
shown in Table 3.1. 
 
3.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.5.1 CORRELATION STRUCTURE BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Table 3.2 presents the pairwise correlation coefficients among independent 
variables used in this paper. As shown by the correlation coefficients on the table, there 
are no pairs of independent variables which have strong linear correlations with the 
                                                 
36
 The CRISIS is a dummy variable equals to 1 during the 2008 global financial crisis and 0 otherwise. 
Following Berger and Bouwman (2013), we define the 2008 global financial crisis period during the period 
of 2007:Q3 until 2009:Q4. The deposit insurance rate is the ceiling rate of deposits’ interest rate which is 
set by the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC) every quarter and is evaluated on monthly basis. 
Any deposits receive interest rate above this rate is not guaranteed by the IDIC. Hence, we may expect that 




absolute value above 0.70. This means that our independent variables may not suffer 
from serious multicollinearity problems. (Gujarati, 2004). 
 
3.5.2 DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE AND BANK RISK-TAKING 
Table 3.3 presents the OLS regression results of deposit insurance coverage on 
bank-risk taking. We can see from the table that DCOV_TR is not statistically significant, 
which suggests that there is no change in bank-risk taking in the transition period 
compared to the blanket guarantee era. DCOV_FG and DCOV_5B are statistically 
significant on several specifications, but they become not statistically significant as we 
control more variables. This suggests that controlling all set of control variables, there are 
still no change in bank-risk taking during the full deposit guarantee and the IDR 5 billion 
deposit insurance coverage era that attributable to the reduction in deposit insurance 
coverage. DCOV_1B is statistically significant at 99% confidence level in all regression 
specifications, with the coefficient magnitude about 0.209. This means that compared to 
the blanket guarantee era, on average banks have about 23% higher ZSCORE during the 
IDR 1 billion deposit insurance coverage era.
37
 DCOV_100M is statistically significant at 
99% confidence level in all regression specifications, with the coefficient magnitude 
about 0.196. This means that compared to the blanket guarantee era, on average banks 
have about 22% higher ZSCORE during the IDR 100 million deposit insurance coverage 
era. DCOV_2B is also statistically significant at 99% confidence level in most of the 
regression specification and at 95% when we control for macroeconomic conditions and 
bank regulation. The coefficient estimate is about 0.131, which means that compared to 
                                                 
37
 Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) show that the coefficient of a dummy variable (𝛽𝑗) in a semilogarithmic 
regression equation should be interpreted as the 100(exp{𝛽𝑗} − 1) percentage change in 𝑌 for a discrete 
change in the dummy from 0 to 1.  
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the blanket guarantee era, on average banks have about 14% higher ZSCORE during the 
IDR 2 billion deposit insurance coverage era. Compared to DCOV_1B and DCOV_100M, 
the coefficient estimate on DCOV_2B is lower, which is consistent with the moral hazard 
hypothesis. 
 
3.5.3 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Table 3.4 presents a variety of robustness checks on our main results. Panel A 
shows that our main results from Table 4 are robust to the exclusion of Too-Big-To-Fail 
banks, two-way cluster standard errors, using bank random effects instead of bank fixed 
effects, and controlling for time trend and its squared term.
38
 Interestingly, when we 
exclude central-government owned and regional-government owned banks, DCOV_2B 
becomes not statistically significant. This suggests that controlling for bank-specific and 
macroeconomic variables, as well as bank regulation, private banks’ ZSCOREs during the 
IDR 2 billion deposit insurance coverage era are not statistically different than the 
blanket guarantee era. In other words, there is some evidence of material increase in 
bank-risk taking by private banks when the government increases the deposit insurance 
coverage from IDR 100 million to IDR 2 billion. 
Column (1) of Panel B shows the regression results if we use the IDR 5 billion 
deposit insurance coverage era as the base instead of the blanket guarantee era. The 
results show that DCOV_1B, DCOV_100M, and DCOV_2B are still positive and 
statistically significant, which suggest that compared to the IDR 5 billion deposit 
insurance coverage era, ZSCOREs in these eras with lower deposit insurance coverage 
are higher. This finding is still consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis. We are aware 
                                                 
38
 Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) banks defined as 15 largest banks by GTA. 
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of a concern that the deposit insurance coverage indicators capture some variations in 
bank regulation. To address this concern, we run regressions on a subsample period when 
there are no material changes in bank regulation (2006:Q1-2010:Q4), based on the World 
Bank surveys on bank regulation (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2013). The results are 
shown in column (2) of Panel B, and they are still consistent with our main findings. 
Next, we run placebo regressions by forwarding all deposit insurance coverage era time 
period by 3 years, as shown in column (3), and backwarding all deposit insurance 
coverage era time period by 3 years, as shown in column (4). The results show that none 
of the deposit insurance coverage era indicators are statistically significant, which 
confirms further the internal validity of our deposit insurance coverage measures. 
Panel C shows the robustness check results by substituting LNZSCORE with 
alternative measures of bank-risk taking. We use three different measures of bank-risk, 
i.e. Standard Deviation of ROE (SDROE), Nonperforming Loans ratio (NPL/TL), and 
Nonperforming Assets ratio (NPA/GTA). The higher values of these ratios indicate higher 
bank risk. As we can see from the table, compared to the blanket guarantee era, we 
observe significant evidence that SDROE, NPL/TL, and NPA/GTA are lower during the 
limited deposit insurance coverage eras. 
Finally, Panel D shows the robustness check results by expanding the transition 
period era to become 2003:Q1-2005:Q2.
39
 I choose 2003:Q1 as the beginning of the 
extended transition period as the earliest news I find from Factiva about the phasing out 
of deposit insurance coverage up to IDR 100 million dated at January 30, 2003. As LN 
ZSCORE and SD ROE are calculated over 4 quarters, these measures start in 2002:Q4 
and therefore, cannot be used in this extended transition regression setting. Therefore, we 
                                                 
39
 The formal transition era according to the Law No. 24/2004 is from 2004:Q3 - 2005:Q2.  
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use NPL/TL and NPA/GTA as the bank risk measures. This setting aims to address the 
concern that banks might anticipate the phasing out of deposit insurance coverage 
enacted in Law No. 24/2004. If this concern is valid, we would observe changes in bank-
risk taking over this extended transition period, compared to the blanket guarantee era. 
Our results show that none of the DCOV_TR_E is statistically significant, suggesting that 
the concern on early anticipation by banks does not confound our main findings. 
 
3.5.4 CHANNELS IN WHICH COVERAGE AFFECTS BANK RISK-TAKING 
Table 3.5 presents the regression results of deposit insurance coverage indicators 
on LNZSCORE’s components. The table shows that compared to the blanket guarantee 
era, bank profitability (MU ROA) is lower. However, this impact is countered by the 
increase in bank capitalization (MU EQ/GTA) and decrease in standard deviation of 
profitability (SD ROA). 
 
3.5.5 OPTIMAL RANGE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE 
Table 3.6 presents the regression estimates of LN ZSCORE, SD ROE, NPL/Tl, and 
NPA/GTA on deposit insurance coverage indicator variables, controlling for bank-
specific, macroeconomic, and bank regulation variables, using the IDR 1 billion coverage 
period (DCOV_1B) as the base. This strategy enables us to estimate the coefficient of 
deposit insurance coverage that is lower or higher than the base’s coverage. The results 
show that compared to the IDR 1 billion coverage period, deposit insurance coverage at 
IDR 5 billion or more generous are associated with lower LNZSCORE, higher SDROE, 
higher NPL/TL, and higher NPA/GTA. This is in line with the moral hazard hypothesis. 
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Meanwhile, at the IDR 2 billion coverage era, none of the LNZSCORE, SD ROE, 
NPL/TL, or NPA/GTA is statistically different than the IDR 1 billion coverage era. 
However, at the IDR 100 million coverage era, NPA/GTA becomes statistically higher 
than at the IDR 1 billion coverage era. This finding aligns with the safety net hypothesis. 
Therefore, the results show some evidence that the relation between deposit insurance 
coverage and bank-risk taking might be non-monotonic, suggesting that there is an 
optimum range of explicit deposit insurance coverage that sufficiently protects the 
depositors while curbing the banks’ moral hazard problem (e.g. Angkinand and 
Wihlborg, 2010). In the case of Indonesia, this range might occur between IDR 1 billion 
– 2 billion. 
 
3.5.6 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, COVERAGE, AND BANK RISK-TAKING 
Table 3.7 presents the regression results of LN ZSCORE on deposit insurance 
coverage indicators and ownership variables for different type of ultimate shareholders, 
controlling for bank-specific, macroeconomic, and bank regulation variables. In general, 
Panel A and B show some evidence that the impact of explicit deposit insurance coverage 
on bank risk is different across different kinds of ultimate owners. In particular, family 
banks and politically connected banks are those that are most affected when the 
government switched from the blanket guarantee era to the limited guarantee era, 
suggesting that the moral hazard problem in these banks are more prominent compared to 





This paper examines the impact of deposit insurance coverage on bank risk taking 
and how ownership structure affects this relation. Using a natural experiment of deposit 
insurance coverage changes in Indonesia from 2002:Q1-2011:Q4, I find a significant 
positive relation between explicit Deposit Insurance coverage and bank risk-taking, 
consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis. More specifically, controlling for various 
bank-specific and macroeconomic variables, as well as bank regulations, I find that 
Indonesian banks’ Z-SCORE, an inverse measure of bank risk taking, increases on 
average about 18% when the government switched from the blanket guarantee era to the 
limited guarantee era. The reduction in bank risk taking is mainly due to lower standard 
deviation of profitability and higher capitalization. 
Next, I find some evidence that the relation is non-monotonic at the low level of 
explicit DI coverage, in line with the safety net hypothesis. This finding suggests that 
there is an optimum range of explicit DI coverage that sufficiently protects the depositors 
while curbing the banks’ moral hazard problem. Finally, I find significant evidence that 
the impact of explicit deposit insurance coverage on bank risk is different across different 
kinds of ultimate owners. In particular, family banks and politically connected banks are 
those that are most affected when the government switched from the blanket guarantee 
era to the limited guarantee era, suggesting that the moral hazard problem in these banks 






Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents the variable names, definitions, and summary statistics of all variables used in this paper. The sample covers all Indonesian commercial banks 
from 2002:Q1-2011:Q4. All financial ratios are winsorized at 1% level at the top and bottom, unless specified differently. All level financial variables are 
denominated in billions of Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), deflated using the year 2000 implicit GDP price deflator.  
 
Variable Definition N Mean St. Dev P25 P50 P75 
Main Bank Risk Measure:            
LN ZSCORE A log inverse measure of bank Z-score. Calculated as Ln 
(1+abs(minZscore)+Zscore).  
3971 3.575 0.617 3.114 3.472 3.933 




where mean (𝜇) and standard deviation (𝜎) are calculated over 4 
quarters from time 𝑡 − 3 to time 𝑡. Gross Total Assets (GTA) are 
defined as bank total assets plus allowance for loans losses, following 
Berger and Bouwman (2013). 
3971 31.635 47.759 8.921 18.610 37.456 
Components of the Main Bank Risk Measure:            
MU ROA(%) Mean of Return on Assets (Net Income/GTA), calculated from time 
𝑡 − 3 to time 𝑡. 
3971 1.733 1.557 0.822 1.626 2.664 
SD ROA(%) Standard deviation of ROA, calculated from time 𝑡 − 3 to time 𝑡. 3971 1.119 1.071 0.383 0.760 1.466 
MU EQ/GTA(%) Mean of Equity/GTA, calculated from time time 𝑡 − 3 to time 𝑡. 3971 13.591 8.860 8.187 10.872 16.565 
               
Alternative Bank Risk Measures            
SD ROE (%) Standard deviation of Return on Equity (Net Income/Total Equity), 
calculated over 4 quarters from time 𝑡 − 3 to time 𝑡. 
3971 11.629 14.924 2.916 6.230 13.673 
NPL/TL (%) Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans 4445 4.169 5.152 1.271 2.651 4.691 
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Variable Definition N Mean St. Dev P25 P50 P75 
Deposit Insurance Coverage:            
DCOV_TR An indicator variable equals to 1 from 2004:Q3 - 2005:Q2, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is an indicator of the transition period from the 
blanket guarantee era to the limited guarantee era, which started from 
the enactment date of an explicit deposit insurance (Law Number 24 
Year 2004) until the effective date.  
3971 0.122 0.327 0 0 0 
DCOV_FG An indicator variable equals to 1 from 2005:Q3 - 2005:Q4, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is an indicator of the full deposits guarantee 
period, when the government terminated the guarantee on bank 
liabilities other than deposits and off-balance sheet items. In this period, 
all deposits were still guaranteed by the government through the 
Indonesian Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC).   
3971 0.059 0.236 0 0 0 
DCOV_5B An indicator variable equals to 1 from 2006:Q1 – 2006:Q2, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is an indicator of the period when the 
government started to set a nominal maximum limit on deposit 
guarantee (an explicit deposit insurance coverage), which was IDR 5 
billion. 
3971 0.062 0.242 0 0 0 
DCOV_1B An indicator variable equals to 1 from 2006:Q3 - 2006:Q4, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is an indicator of the next phase out period 
when the government reduced the explicit deposit insurance coverage 
from IDR 5 billion to IDR 1 billion.   
3971 0.052 0.223 0 0 0 
DCOV_100M An indicator variable equals to 1 from 2007:Q1 - 2008:Q3, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is an indicator of the final phase out period, 
when the government reduced the explicit deposit insurance coverage 
from IDR 1 billion to IDR 100 million. 
3971 0.193 0.395 0 0 0 
DCOV_2B An indicator variable equals to 1 from 2008:Q4 - 2011:Q4, and 0 
otherwise. This variable is an indicator of the period when the 
government increases the explicit deposit insurance coverage from IDR 
100 million to IDR 2 billion, following many other countries’ responses 
to the recent global financial crisis.  
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Variable Definition N Mean St. Dev P25 P50 P75 
Bank Ownership Structure:            
MANCF (%) The cash flow right of bank manager if the manager is one of the 
ultimate owners. Ultimate owners are defined as the top owners in the 
bank’s  ownership structure that have at least 10% voting rights, 
following Laeven and Levine (2009).  
3927 6.210 19.185 0 0 0 
UCASH (%) The largest ultimate owner's cash flow right.  3927 72.255 28.240 48.53 80 99.8 
WEDGE (%) The wedge between cash flow right and voting right of the largest 
ultimate owner. 
3927 0.447 2.822 0 0 0 
Bank Ownership Types:            
UFAMILY An indicator variable equals to 1 if the largest ultimate shareholder is a 
family or a family-based business group, and 0 otherwise. 
3927 0.315 0.464 0 0 1 
UFOREIGN An indicator variable equals to 1 if the largest ultimate shareholder is a 
foreign institution, and 0 otherwise. 
3927 0.326 0.469 0 0 1 
POLCON An indicator variable equals to 1 if the bank is a private politically 
connected bank, and 0 otherwise. I follow Nys, Tarazi, and Trinugroho 
(2015) to define a politically connected bank as a bank with at least one 
of the commissioners, directors, or controlling shareholders is a current 
of former political party member, parliament member, or government 
official.  
3927 0.280 0.449 0 0 1 
CSOB An indicator variable equals to 1 if the bank is ultimately owned by the 
central (national) government, and 0 otherwise. 
3927 0.036 0.187 0 0 0 
RSOB An indicator variable equals to 1 if the bank is ultimately owned by the 
regional (province) government, and 0 otherwise. 














Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Definition N Mean St. Dev P25 P50 P75 
Bank Nonfinancial Controls:            
LISTED An indicator variable equals to 1 if a bank is publicly listed in a stock 
exchange, or is owned by a Bank Holding Company that is publicly 
listed in a stock exchange, and 0 otherwise. 
3971 0.374 0.484 0 0 1 
BHC An indicator variable equals to 1 if a bank is a part of a Bank Holding 
Company, and 0 otherwise. 
3971 0.077 0.266 0 0 0 
BIGAUD An indicator variable equals to 1 if a bank’s auditor is one of the big 
four accounting firms, and 0 otherwise. The big four accounting firms 
are Ernst and Young (EY), Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), KPMG, 
and Deloitte.  
3971 0.154 0.361 0 0 0 
Bank Financial Controls:            
OHRGTA (%) Overhead ratio/GTA. 3971 4.801 4.972 3.080 4.269 5.718 
NDEPGTA (%) Nondeposits funding/GTA. 3971 1.389 3.317 0.000 0.000 1.089 




|, following Laeven and Levine 
(2007) 
3971 18.653 24.053 1.845 7.466 27.509 
FAGTA (%) Fixed assets/GTA 3971 3.484 3.375 1.518 2.562 4.116 
LOANGTA (%) Total Loans/GTA 3971 51.710 18.566 39.533 53.757 66.650 
LRGTA (%) Log natural of real Gross Total Assets 3971 7.279 1.802 5.948 7.173 8.536 
RGTA (bil. IDR) Real Gross Total Assets, calculated as bank total assets plus allowance 
for loans losses, following Berger and Bouwman (2013). 
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Variable Definition N Mean St. Dev P25 P50 P75 
Bank Competition Control:            
LERNER Lerner Index, a measure of bank market power, calculated as 
(𝑃𝐺𝑇𝐴 −𝑀𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐴) 𝑃𝐺𝑇𝐴⁄ , where 𝑃𝐺𝑇𝐴 is the price of GTA proxied by the 
ratio of total revenues to GTA, and 𝑀𝐶𝐺𝑇𝐴 is the marginal cost of GTA 
measured as the first derivative of the following translog cost function 
(Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss, 2009): 















where 𝑄𝑖𝑡 is bank output proxied by GTA, 𝑊1is the input price of labor 
(the ratio of personnel expense to GTA), 𝑊2 is the input price of fund 
(the ratio of interest expense to total deposits), 𝑊3 is the input price of 
fixed capital (the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to 
total assets), and  is the error term. I winsorize 𝑊1,2,3 at 3% level on 
top and bottom instead of 1% level as the latter still leave considerable 
numbers of outliers. 
 
3971 0.542 0.149 0.471 0.551 0.627 
Macroeconomic Controls:            
EGROWTH (%) Quarterly GDP growth 3971 5.394 0.909 4.560 5.551 6.055 
DIRATE (%) Deposit insurance rate  3971 9.735 3.052 7.187 8.538 11.667 
Bank Regulation Controls:            
LN NBREG Log natural of new bank regulations 3971 1.468 0.735 0.693 1.386 2.079 
NBREG Number of new bank regulations 3971 4.507 3.549 1 3 7 
CRBREG Equals to 1 on 2011:Q1 onward, and 0 otherwise. This is an indicator 
variable of the period when the government enacts a new package of 
monetary and bank regulations post the global financial crisis. This new 
regulation package is the largest since the 1998 Asian financial crisis.  









Table 3.2: Correlation between Independent Variables 
 
This table presents the pairwise correlation between independent variables in each group of variable used in this paper as the right-hand side variables. The 
sample covers all Indonesian commercial banks from 2002:Q1-2011:Q4. All financial ratios are winsorized at 1% level at the top and bottom, unless specified 
differently. All level financial variables are denominated in billions of Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), deflated using the year 2000 implicit GDP price deflator.  
 
Panel A: Deposit Insurance Coverage Indicators 
 
  DCOV_TR DCOV_FG DCOV_5B DCOV_1B DCOV_100M DCOV_2B 
DCOV_TR 1           
DCOV_FG -0.094*** 1         
DCOV_5B -0.096*** -0.065*** 1       
DCOV_1B -0.088*** -0.059*** -0.061*** 1     
DCOV_100M -0.182*** -0.123*** -0.126*** -0.115*** 1   
DCOV_2B -0.253*** -0.171*** -0.175*** -0.160*** -0.332*** 1 
 
Panel B: Bank Nonfinancial and Financial Characteristics 
 
  LISTED BHC BIGAUD OHRGTA NDEPGTA IDIV FAGTA LOANGTA LRGTA LERNER 
LISTED 1                   
BHC 0.357*** 1                 
BIGAUD 0.421*** 0.112*** 1               
OHRGTA -0.078*** 0.003 -0.047*** 1             
NDEPGTA 0.105*** -0.021 0.110*** -0.051*** 1           
IDIV 0.325*** 0.325*** 0.181*** -0.064*** 0.060*** 1         
FAGTA -0.158*** -0.133*** -0.056*** 0.278*** -0.117*** -0.241*** 1       
LOANGTA -0.061*** -0.160*** -0.037** 0.059*** 0.030* -0.128*** 0.007 1     
LRGTA 0.526*** 0.299*** 0.470*** -0.135*** 0.236*** 0.358*** -0.432*** -0.047*** 1   











Table 3.2: Correlation between Independent Variables 
 
Panel C: Macroeconomic and Bank Regulation Variables 
 
  EGROWTH DIRATE LN NBREG CRBREG 
EGROWTH 1       
DIRATE -0.424*** 1     
LN NBREG 0.165*** -0.440*** 1   
CRBREG 0.308*** -0.301*** -0.198*** 1 
 
Panel D. Bank Ownership Structure Variables 
 
  MANCF UCASH WEDGE 
MANCF 1     
UCASH -0.138*** 1   





Table 3.3: Deposit Insurance Coverage and Bank Risk-Taking 
 
This table presents the OLS regression estimates of LN ZSCORE on deposit insurance coverage indicator 
variables, controlling for bank-specific, macroeconomic, and bank regulation variables. Columns (1) to (7) 
differ in the control variables included. All columns control for bank fixed effects except for column (1). 
The sample covers all Indonesian commercial banks from 2002:Q1-2011:Q4. All financial ratios are 
winsorized at 1% level at the top and bottom, unless specified differently. All level financial variables are 
denominated in billions of Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), deflated using the year 2000 implicit GDP price 
deflator. All control variables are lagged at time 𝑡 − 4. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics.  
 
  Dependent variable: LN ZSCORE 
Independent 
variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
DCOV_TR 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.015 0.010 0.023 
  (1.071) (0.978) (0.894) (0.891) (0.410) (0.200) (0.462) 
DCOV_FG 0.077* 0.071 0.069 0.079* 0.059 -0.023 0.022 
  (1.684) (1.544) (1.433) (1.682) (1.225) (-0.380) (0.381) 
DCOV_5B 0.094** 0.095** 0.090** 0.099** 0.083* -0.005 0.036 
  (2.175) (2.192) (1.999) (2.186) (1.772) (-0.083) (0.613) 
DCOV_1B 0.268*** 0.252*** 0.250*** 0.265*** 0.248*** 0.192*** 0.209*** 
  (5.123) (4.961) (4.782) (5.047) (4.772) (3.234) (3.484) 
DCOV_100M 0.272*** 0.262*** 0.250*** 0.254*** 0.242*** 0.160*** 0.196*** 
  (5.699) (5.454) (5.050) (5.055) (4.873) (2.772) (3.461) 
DCOV_2B 0.268*** 0.241*** 0.221*** 0.227*** 0.217*** 0.148** 0.131** 
  (5.648) (5.179) (4.592) (4.555) (4.354) (2.548) (2.150) 
LISTED     0.091 0.028 0.025 0.015 0.011 
      (0.691) (0.211) (0.190) (0.111) (0.077) 
BHC     0.109 0.126 0.113 0.109 0.086 
      (0.839) (0.970) (0.877) (0.857) (0.676) 
BIGAUD     0.150*** 0.162*** 0.169*** 0.164*** 0.172*** 
      (2.719) (2.634) (2.807) (2.712) (2.852) 
OHRGTA       -0.004** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
        (-2.341) (-1.083) (-1.332) (-1.241) 
NDEPGTA       -0.009* -0.009* -0.009* -0.008* 
        (-1.846) (-1.843) (-1.879) (-1.665) 
IDIV       -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
        (-3.290) (-3.541) (-3.564) (-4.007) 
FAGTA       0.014 0.017 0.018 0.022* 
        (1.205) (1.373) (1.436) (1.769) 
LOANGTA       -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
        (-0.533) (-0.507) (-0.534) (-0.434) 
LRGTA       0.507** 0.497** 0.497** 0.543*** 
        (2.561) (2.499) (2.477) (2.695) 
LRGTA SQ       -0.035** -0.034** -0.035** -0.038** 
        (-2.368) (-2.262) (-2.294) (-2.511) 
LERNER         0.250** 0.250*** 0.302*** 
          (2.565) (2.627) (3.066) 
EGROWTH           0.054*** 0.037** 
            (4.230) (2.602) 
DIRATE           -0.003 0.002 
            (-0.387) (0.303) 
LN NBREG             0.007 
              (0.817) 
CRBREG             0.176*** 






Table 3.3: Deposit Insurance Coverage and Bank Risk-Taking 
 
  Dependent variable: LN ZSCORE 
Independent 
variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant 3.403*** 3.415*** 3.364*** 1.731** 1.588** 1.413* 1.234* 
  (82.352) (119.401) (64.116) (2.560) (2.363) (1.945) (1.695) 
Bank Fixed 
Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,241 4,241 4,066 4,020 3,977 3,977 3,971 
R-squared 0.038 0.480 0.483 0.491 0.492 0.496 0.501 





Table 3.4: Robustness Checks 
 
This table presents a variety of robustness checks on how deposit insurance coverage affects bank risk-
taking, controlling for bank-specific, macroeconomic, and bank regulation variables. Panel A column (1) 
excludes all banks owned by the central (national) government, column (2) excludes all banks owned by 
central and regional (province) governments, column (3) excludes Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) banks defined 
as 15 largest banks by GTA, column (4) clusters standard errors in two-way at the bank and quarter levels, 
column (5) controls for bank random effects instead of fixed effects, and column (6) add time trend and its 
squared term as additional controls. Panel B column (1) starts the sample period in 2006:Q1, excluding the 
blanket guarantee, transition, and full deposits guarantee periods, column (2) estimates the regression on 
the subsample period when there are no material changes in bank regulation (2006:Q1-2010:Q4), based on 
the World Bank surveys on bank regulation (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2013), column (3) conducts a 
placebo test by using all deposit insurance coverage indicators forwarded by 3 years, and column (4) 
conducts a placebo test by using all deposit insurance coverage indicators backwarded  by 3 years. The 
base period used in Panel B is 2006:Q1 – 2006:Q2, i.e. when the government started to set a nominal 
maximum limit on deposit guarantee (an explicit deposit insurance coverage), which was IDR 5 billion. 
Panel C conduct robustness checks using alternative risk measures as follows: standard deviation of ROE 
over 4 quarters (SDROE), the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans (NPL/TL), and the ratio of 
nonperforming assets to GTA (NPA/GTA). Panel D conducts robustness checks by extending the transition 
period from 2003:Q1-2005:Q2. I choose 2003:Q1 as the beginning of the extended transition period as the 
earliest news I find from Factiva about the phasing out of deposit insurance coverage up to IDR 100 million 
dated at January 30, 2003. As LN ZSCORE and SD ROE are calculated over 4 quarters, these measures start 
in 2002:Q4 and therefore, cannot be used in this extended transition regression setting. The sample covers 
all Indonesian commercial banks for the sample period mentioned in each panel. All financial ratios are 
winsorized at 1% level at the top and bottom, unless specified differently. All level financial variables are 
denominated in billions of Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), deflated using the year 2000 implicit GDP price 
deflator. All control variables are lagged at time 𝑡 − 4 if the dependent variable is measured over 4 quarters 
from time 𝑡 − 3 to 𝑡, and lagged at time 𝑡 − 1 if the dependent variable is measured at time 𝑡. Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
Panel A: Robustness Checks  
 



















variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DCOV_TR 0.028 0.019 0.041 0.023 0.017 0.016 
  (0.562) (0.316) (0.762) (0.504) (0.338) (0.339) 
DCOV_FG 0.030 0.015 0.055 0.022 0.014 0.056 
  (0.530) (0.223) (0.911) (0.445) (0.256) (0.818) 
DCOV_5B 0.048 0.047 0.058 0.036 0.022 0.099 
  (0.834) (0.691) (0.940) (0.759) (0.387) (1.299) 
DCOV_1B 0.218*** 0.244*** 0.199*** 0.209*** 0.194*** 0.342*** 
  (3.552) (3.339) (3.108) (4.371) (3.319) (3.611) 
DCOV_100M 0.189*** 0.204*** 0.167*** 0.196*** 0.184*** 0.384*** 
  (3.262) (2.945) (2.718) (3.811) (3.328) (3.272) 
DCOV_2B 0.112* 0.099 0.139** 0.131** 0.127** 0.368*** 






Table 3.4: Robustness Checks 
 
Panel A: Robustness Checks  
 



















variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TIME TREND           -0.021 
            (-1.285) 
TIME TREND SQ           0.000 
            (0.677) 
Bank nonfinancial 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank financial 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank competition 
control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank regulation 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Bank Random 
Effects No No No No Yes No 
Observations 3,829 3,048 3,455 3,971 3,971 3,971 
R-squared 0.509 0.495 0.513 0.501 0.110 0.501 
N-clusters (bank) 130 105 122 134 134 134 







Table 3.4: Robustness Checks 
 
Panel B: Robustness Checks 
 





when no material 
changes in bank 
regulation: 
2006:Q1-2010:Q4 









variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
DCOV_1B 0.162*** 0.171*** -0.019 -0.021 
  (3.626) (3.738) (-0.459) (-0.308) 
DCOV_100M 0.113** 0.121** -0.050 -0.073 
  (2.180) (2.203) (-0.590) (-0.761) 
DCOV_2B 0.088* 0.109* -0.006 -0.059 
  (1.724) (1.954) (-0.068) (-0.340) 
Bank nonfinancial 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank financial 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank competition 
control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank regulation 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,479 2,076 1,145 1,492 
R-squared 0.541 0.577 0.609 0.621 







Table 3.4: Robustness Checks 
 
Panel C: Robustness Checks 
 
  Dependent variable: 
  LN ZSCORE SD ROE NPL/TL NPA/GTA 
Independent 
variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
DCOV_TR 0.023 -1.172 -0.308 -0.088 
  (0.462) (-0.794) (-0.957) (-0.608) 
DCOV_FG 0.022 -1.829 -0.615 -0.247 
  (0.381) (-1.117) (-1.323) (-1.046) 
DCOV_5B 0.036 -1.832 -1.437*** -0.605** 
  (0.613) (-1.303) (-2.669) (-2.315) 
DCOV_1B 0.209*** -3.067** -1.592*** -0.604** 
  (3.484) (-2.048) (-2.703) (-2.008) 
DCOV_100M 0.196*** -4.015** -1.425*** -0.058 
  (3.461) (-2.134) (-2.772) (-0.181) 
DCOV_2B 0.131** -3.007* -1.842*** -0.400 
  (2.150) (-1.721) (-3.106) (-1.086) 
Bank nonfinancial 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank financial 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank competition 
control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank regulation 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,971 3,971 4,445 4,445 
R-squared 0.501 0.514 0.490 0.524 







Table 3.4: Robustness Checks 
 
Panel D: Robustness Checks 
 
  Dependent variables: 
  NPL/TL NPA/GTA 
Independent variables: (1) (2) 
      
DCOV_TR_E -0.632 -0.266 
  (-1.601) (-1.261) 
DCOV_FG -1.069** -0.464* 
  (-2.368) (-1.813) 
DCOV_5B -1.749*** -0.747*** 
  (-3.353) (-2.725) 
DCOV_1B -1.957*** -0.771** 
  (-3.438) (-2.415) 
DCOV_100M -1.842*** -0.258 
  (-3.688) (-0.736) 
DCOV_2B -2.317*** -0.622 
  (-3.946) (-1.533) 
Bank nonfinancial controls Yes Yes 
Bank financial controls Yes Yes 
Bank competition control Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes 
Bank regulation controls Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes 
Observations 4,447 4,445 
R-squared 0.490 0.524 






Table 3.5: Channels in which Deposit Insurance Coverage affects Bank Risk-Taking  
 
This table presents the OLS regression estimates of LN ZSCORE’s components on deposit insurance 
coverage indicator variables, controlling for bank-specific, macroeconomic, and bank regulation variables. 
Column (1) is the baseline regression using LN ZSCORE as the dependent variable, the same with column 
(7) of Table 3. Column (2), (3), and (4) use the mean profitability (MU ROA), standard deviation of 
profitability (SD ROA), and mean capitalization (MU EQ/GTA) as the dependent variable respectively. 
The sample covers all Indonesian commercial banks from 2002:Q1-2011:Q4. All financial ratios are 
winsorized at 1% level at the top and bottom, unless specified differently. All level financial variables are 
denominated in billions of Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), deflated using the year 2000 implicit GDP price 
deflator. All control variables are lagged at time 𝑡 − 4. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics.  
 
  Dependent variables: 
  Baseline LN ZSCORE components: 
  LN ZSCORE MU ROA SD ROA MU EQ/GTA 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
DCOV_TR 0.023 0.107 -0.140 -0.475 
  (0.462) (0.853) (-1.304) (-1.594) 
DCOV_FG 0.022 -0.217* -0.252** -0.528 
  (0.381) (-1.657) (-1.998) (-1.247) 
DCOV_5B 0.036 -0.360** -0.380*** -0.300 
  (0.613) (-2.144) (-3.066) (-0.594) 
DCOV_1B 0.209*** -0.294* -0.481*** 1.046** 
  (3.484) (-1.894) (-3.974) (1.982) 
DCOV_100M 0.196*** -0.327*** -0.363*** 1.951*** 
  (3.461) (-2.781) (-2.740) (3.837) 
DCOV_2B 0.131** -0.445*** -0.209 3.576*** 
  (2.150) (-2.717) (-1.465) (4.752) 
Bank nonfinancial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank competition control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank regulation controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,971 3,971 3,971 3,971 
R-squared 0.501 0.666 0.451 0.844 





Table 3.6: Optimum Range of Deposit Insurance Coverage 
 
This table presents the OLS regression estimates of LN ZSCORE, SD ROE, NPL/Tl, and NPA/GTA on 
deposit insurance coverage indicator variables, controlling for bank-specific, macroeconomic, and bank 
regulation variables, using the IDR 1 billion coverage period (DCOV_1B) as the base. This strategy enables 
us to estimate the coefficient of deposit insurance coverage that is lower or higher than the base’s coverage. 
Panel A estimates the regressions on the full sample from 2002:Q1-2011:Q4. Panel B estimates the 
regressions on the subsample period when there are no material changes in bank regulation (2006:Q1-
2010:Q4), based on the World Bank surveys on bank regulation (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2013). All 
financial ratios are winsorized at 1% level at the top and bottom, unless specified differently. All level 
financial variables are denominated in billions of Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), deflated using the year 2000 
implicit GDP price deflator. All control variables are lagged at time 𝑡 − 4. Standard errors are clustered at 
the bank level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics.  
 
Panel A: Full Sample Regressions using DCOV_1B as the Base 
 
  Dependent variables: 
  LN ZSCORE SD ROE NPL/TL NPA/GTA 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
DCOV_BG -0.195*** 2.386** 1.492*** 0.575** 
  (-4.208) (2.273) (2.795) (2.064) 
DCOV_FG -0.191*** 1.453 1.065*** 0.381* 
  (-3.649) (1.631) (2.964) (1.739) 
DCOV_5B -0.178*** 1.513* 0.138 -0.007 
  (-3.943) (1.839) (0.668) (-0.057) 
DCOV_100M -0.011 -1.059 0.248 0.569** 
  (-0.306) (-1.103) (0.650) (2.167) 
DCOV_2B -0.081 0.230 -0.183 0.223 
  (-1.566) (0.230) (-0.351) (0.679) 
Bank nonfinancial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank competition control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank regulation controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,971 3,971 4,445 4,445 
R-squared 0.501 0.514 0.490 0.524 







Table 3.6: Optimum Range of Deposit Insurance Coverage 
 
Panel B: Regressions on the Subsample Period from 2006:Q1-2010:Q4 
 
  Dependent variables: 
  LN ZSCORE SD ROE NPL/TL NPA/GTA 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
DCOV_5B -0.171*** 2.153*** 0.054 -0.093 
  (-3.738) (3.241) (0.240) (-0.710) 
DCOV_100M -0.050 -0.004 -0.239 0.626** 
  (-1.385) (-0.004) (-0.783) (2.217) 
DCOV_2B -0.063 0.182 -0.513 0.414 
  (-1.209) (0.158) (-1.475) (1.397) 
Bank nonfinancial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank competition control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank regulation controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,076 2,076 2,202 2,202 
R-squared 0.577 0.599 0.634 0.660 





Table 3.7: Ownership Structure, Deposit Insurance Coverage, and Bank Risk-Taking  
 
This table presents the OLS regression estimates of LN ZSCORE on deposit insurance coverage indicators 
and ownership variables for different type of ultimate shareholders, controlling for bank-specific, 
macroeconomic, and bank regulation variables. Panel A estimates the regressions on the full sample from 
2002:Q1-2011:Q4. Panel B estimates the regressions on the subsample period from 2007:Q1-2011:Q4, so 
that we can focus on the impact of the latest increase in deposit insurance coverage from IDR 1 million to 
20 billion. The government advocated the policy as a precautionary measure against the global financial 
crisis, following many other countries’ similar responses. Column (1) shows the baseline regression 
estimates using all Indonesian commercial banks. Column (2) shows the regression estimates using the 
subsample of banks owned ultimately by foreign institutions. Column (3) shows the regression estimates 
using the subsample of banks owned ultimately by families or family-based business groups. Column (4) 
shows the regression estimates using the subsample of private banks with at least one of the commissioners, 
directors, or controlling shareholders is a current of former political party member, parliament member, or 
government official. Column (5) shows the regression estimates using the subsample of private banks that 
are not politically connected. Column (6) shows the regression estimates using the subsample of banks 
owned ultimately by foreign institutions that have political connections. Column (7) shows the regression 
estimates using the subsample of banks owned ultimately by families or family-based business groups that 
have political connections. All financial ratios are winsorized at 1% level at the top and bottom, unless 
specified differently. All level financial variables are denominated in billions of Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), 
deflated using the year 2000 implicit GDP price deflator. All control variables are lagged at time 𝑡 − 4. 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
 
Panel A: Regression Estimates on the Full Sample from 2002:Q1-2011:Q4 
 
  Dependent variable: LN ZSCORE 










variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
DCOV_TR 0.025 0.083 -0.014 -0.007 0.021 -0.002 0.129 
  (0.494) (0.854) (-0.146) (-0.075) (0.289) (-0.013) (1.023) 
DCOV_FG 0.027 -0.064 0.078 0.073 -0.014 -0.130 0.243 
  (0.455) (-0.659) (0.681) (0.557) (-0.176) (-0.614) (1.660) 
DCOV_5B 0.046 0.061 0.109 0.157 -0.004 0.096 0.377** 
  (0.774) (0.636) (1.076) (1.132) (-0.053) (0.415) (2.718) 
DCOV_1B 0.214*** 0.241** 0.340*** 0.374** 0.179** 0.647** 0.618** 
  (3.500) (2.333) (2.732) (2.333) (2.294) (2.588) (2.665) 
DCOV_100M 0.208*** 0.150 0.229** 0.351** 0.131* 0.515** 0.369** 
  (3.509) (1.541) (2.211) (2.500) (1.724) (2.294) (2.127) 
DCOV_2B 0.141** 0.017 0.211** 0.145 0.105 0.173 0.318** 
  (2.133) (0.143) (2.021) (1.009) (1.086) (0.617) (2.226) 
MANCF -0.002 -0.009*** -0.002 -0.005** 0.001 -0.006 -0.004 
  (-1.592) (-2.692) (-1.326) (-2.551) (0.335) (-1.076) (-1.624) 
UCASH -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003* 0.000 
  (-1.544) (-1.396) (-0.157) (-0.353) (-0.297) (-1.826) (0.154) 
WEDGE -0.008 -0.019 -0.012*** -0.010 -0.003 -0.051*** -0.021** 
  (-1.209) (-1.270) (-3.037) (-0.524) (-0.648) (-5.506) (-2.418) 
Bank 
nonfinancial 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank financial 






Table 3.7: Ownership Structure, Deposit Insurance Coverage, and Bank Risk-Taking  
 
Panel A: Regression Estimates on the Full Sample from 2002:Q1-2011:Q4 
 
  Dependent variable: LN ZSCORE 










variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Bank 
competition 
control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank regulation 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,927 1,279 1,238 1,101 1,942 342 539 
R-squared 0.502 0.572 0.473 0.395 0.575 0.422 0.523 
N-clusters (bank) 134 55 54 38 76 17 24 
 
Panel B: Regression Estimates on the Subsample Period from 2007:Q1-2011:Q4 
 
  Dependent variable: LN ZSCORE 










variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
DCOV_2B -0.048 -0.149* -0.042 -0.239*** 0.006 -0.406** -0.157 
  (-1.068) (-1.951) (-0.456) (-2.768) (0.085) (-2.759) (-1.544) 
MANCF -0.007** -0.011*** -0.004 -0.010 -0.004** -0.009 -0.003 
  (-2.597) (-2.732) (-1.187) (-1.677) (-2.162) (-1.337) (-0.617) 
UCASH -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.005* -0.001 0.001 0.005 
  (-0.473) (-0.515) (-0.315) (1.808) (-0.508) (0.373) (1.420) 
WEDGE -0.012 -0.023*** -0.017** -0.015 -0.015*** -0.032** -0.011 
  (-1.297) (-3.480) (-2.129) (-0.957) (-3.365) (-2.323) (-1.130) 
Bank 
nonfinancial 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank financial 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank 
competition 
control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macroeconomic 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank regulation 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,997 743 603 611 926 235 321 
R-squared 0.566 0.608 0.552 0.445 0.664 0.395 0.578 






COMPETITION DOES NOT KILL BANKS; IT MAKES THEM 





“… we have deregulated the financial services sector, and we face another crisis.” 
Barack Obama, the U.S. President 2009-2017, Renewing the American Economy, 
Presidential campaign speech at the Cooper Union, March 27, 2008, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=93292 
 
“More than 30 years of deregulation and reliance on self-regulation by financial institutions, … stripped 
away key safeguards, which could have helped avoid catastrophe.” 
The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Final Report of the National Commission on the 
Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, January 2011, p. xviii. 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Bank deregulation is a very controversial subject, particularly since the recent 
financial crisis. The traditional economic literature suggests that competition benefits the 
society by encouraging firms to provide better service, lower price, and promote more 
innovation (e.g. Kovacic and Saphiro, 2000; Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and 
Howitt, 2005). Motivated by this view, during 1970s-1980s and in the first half of the 
1990s, U.S. states relaxed restrictions on the geographic expansion of banks gradually. 
This geographic deregulation, in which banks have been allowed to offer services on an 
expanded basis within and across states, started the deregulation era in the U.S. banking  
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industry after the Great Depression and play major roles in the changing structure of the 
U.S. banking industry, leading to the next era of nationwide banking (Berger, Kashyap, 
Scalise, Gertler, and Friedman, 1995; Jeon and Miller, 2003; Stiroh and Strahan, 2003; 
Strahan, 2003). For this reason, among others, this deregulation is popular in finance 
research. Moreover, the timing of the deregulation between each state is different and 
therefore, it provides a unique setting to conduct a quasi-natural experiment study. 
Most of the empirical studies suggest positive effects of the deregulation on bank 
customers and the real economy. For example, the deregulation is found to be associated 
with higher real per capita income growth (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Clarke, 2004; 
Huang, 2008), higher entrepreneurial activity (Black and Strahan, 2002; Strahan, 2003), 
greater real investments (Zarutskie, 2006), more start-up firms (Kerr and Nanda, 2009), 
increased credit supply to businesses (Rice and Strahan, 2010; Chu, 2016) and to 
households (Dick and Lehnert, 2010), more efficient resource allocation (Bai, Carvalho, 
and Phillips, 2015), higher externally-financed firm growth (Berger, Chen, El Ghoul, and 
Guedhami, 2016), greater firm productivity (e.g., Krishnan, Nandy, and Puri, 2014), more 
home ownership (e.g., Tewari, 2014), and reduction of income inequality (Beck, Levine, 
and Levkov, 2010). The only research area in which the results are mixed is innovations 
by nonfinancial firms, for which most of the research suggests favorable results from 
interstate deregulation in which banks are allowed to cross state lines (e.g., Amore, 
Schneider, and Žaldokas, 2013; Chava, Oettl, Subramanian, and Subramanian, 2013; 
Cornaggia, Mao, Tian, Wolfe, 2015), and mostly unfavorable results from intrastate 
deregulation in which banks are allowed more freedom to locate offices within states 




2015; Hombert and Matray, 2016). A more limited amount of research suggests customer 
benefits from deregulation that allowed commercial banking organizations to enter 
investment banking (e.g., Drucker and Puri, 2005).
42
 
However, doubts remain about the risks created by bank deregulation. As seen in 
the quotes above, policymakers and politicians, as well as much of the public, believe 
that deregulation increases bank risk to the point of being largely responsible for the 
recent financial crisis. Moreover, small banks opposed the deregulation with the fear that 
an increase in competition from large banks could reduce their survival probability (e.g. 
Economides, Hubbard, and Palia, 1996; Kroszner and Strahan, 1999). Surprisingly, there 
are still limited research efforts on this aspect of deregulation. Moreover, to our 
knowledge, no complete picture yet has emerged from the literature on how bank 
deregulation affects risk and this paper aims to begin filling this hole. We examine the 
intrastate branching and interstate banking deregulation by the U.S. states from 1984:Q1-
1994:Q3, as well as the deregulation from 1994:Q4-2013:Q4 of the remaining state 
restrictions allowed by the 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act (IBBEA), which allowed interstate branch banking for the first time since 
the 1927 McFadden Act. Further, we examine different channels in which the 
deregulation affects bank risk and analyze whether the impacts are different on small 
banks compared to medium and large banks to shed light on whether the small banks’ 
early fear on the deregulation materializes. 
We start our main analysis using all U.S. commercial banks between 1984:Q1 and 
1994:Q3, when most of the intrastate branching and interstate banking deregulation 
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occurred at the state level. Intrastate branching deregulation allows banks to open 
branches statewide, while interstate banking deregulation permits bank acquisition by 
out-of-state banks. We stop the sample period in 1994:Q3 to avoid any confounding 
effect of the Riegle-Neal Act that was signed by President Bill Clinton on September 29, 
1994. Then, we study the interstate branching deregulation, in which banks are allowed to 
have interstate branches, from 1994:Q4-2013:Q4. To test the relation between bank 
deregulation and risk pre-the Riegle-Neal Act, we run panel regression models with the 
generalized Difference-in-Difference (DID) specification. The main dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of bank Z-Score (Ln Z-Score), an inverse indicator of bank 
insolvency risk. The explanatory variables are two indicator variables of the intrastate 
branching and interstate banking deregulation. Post-the Riegle-Neal Act, we regress Ln 
Z-Score on the interstate branching restriction index developed by Rice and Strahan 
(2010). 
In summary, we find strong evidence that the interstate banking deregulation is 
associated with lower bank risk. The regression coefficient on Ln Z-Score is about 0.237, 
which means that on average, banks in states allowing bank acquisition by out-of-state 
banks have 26.7% higher Z-score than banks in states prohibiting it. However, we do not 
find significant evidence that the interstate branching deregulation affects bank risk, 
suggesting that interstate merger and acquisition activities provide stronger incentives to 
alter bank risk compared to the interstate branching. Meanwhile, we find mixed evidence 
on the impact of intrastate branching activities on bank risk. These results are robust to 
various sensitivity checks, including analyses to address reverse causality, omitted 




To mitigate an endogeneity problem due to the possible reverse causality between 
deregulation and bank risk, we run instrumental variables (IV) regressions using 
deregulation variables of adjoining states as the instruments. To address a possible 
omitted variable bias, first, we control for lagged state population density, bank size, 
Bank Holding Company (BHC) membership, publicly listed status, local market 
concentration, asset diversification, overhead costs ratio, internationalization activities, as 
well as time (quarter) and bank fixed effects in our main specification. Then, we conduct 
a contiguous-county matching following Huang (2008). This contiguous-county 
matching also addresses the sample selection concern. As all our analyses suggest that 
interstate branching deregulation has no impact on bank risk, we focus the rest of our 
analyses on the intrastate branching and interstate banking deregulation. 
To mitigate the concern that the dynamics of the U.S. banks’ entry and exit may 
confound our main results, we run a further robustness check using a balanced sample 
that excludes new entrant banks and banks that exit the industry during the sample 
period. In addition, we run other robustness checks including regressions using two-way 
cluster standard errors and bootstrapped standard errors, placebo test, as well as 
regressions that exclude two states with very different banking regulations (Delaware and 
South Dakota), too-big-too-fail banks, and regression at the BHC level. Finally, we run 
our regressions using alternative risk measures. Our main results continue to hold to all 
these sensitivity analyses. 
To test the channels that can explain our main findings, we firstly run our main 
regressions in densely and sparsely populated states. We construct a population density 




Whyte (2003), Deng and Elyasiani (2008), and Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2016) show 
that banks benefit from diversification as they expand their market geographically. We 
find that intrastate branching reduces bank risk in densely populated states. As these 
states are mainly served by large banks that have more diversification capacity than small 
banks, this finding sheds light on the Diversification-Stability Channel. On the other 
hand, in sparsely populated states where small banks play more important role than in 
densely populated states, statewide branching expansion is associated with higher risk. 
This finding sheds light on the Diversification Monitoring Channel as small banks 
might face greater difficulties in monitoring their expanded number of intrastate branches 
compared to large banks. Meanwhile, our finding on interstate banking deregulation 
shows that this reform is associated with risk reduction in sparsely populated states but 
not in densely populated states. As allowing bank acquisitions by out-of-state banks 
increases the local market contestability by increasing takeover threats (Dick and 
Lehnert, 2010), this threat pushes banks in sparsely populated states, that are dominated 
by small banks, to operate more efficiently and therefore, reduces their insolvency risk. 
This finding is consistent with the Competition-Stability Channel. Meanwhile, in densely 
populated states that have more large banks, this takeover threat is less effective as 
acquiring them is costlier than small banks. Besides, as the intrastate branching had 
mostly occurred before the interstate banking deregulation, large banks might have 
utilized the statewide branching expansion to increase their size to defend themselves 
from takeover by out-of-state banks. The results are consistent when we run our 




We organize the remainder of this paper as follow. Section 4.2 provides a 
literature review. Section 4.3 describes the data, variables, and summary statistics. 
Section 4.4 presents the main empirical results. Section 4.5 presents endogeneity checks. 
Section 4.6 provides robustness checks of the main empirical results. Section 4.7 presents 
analysis on the competition channel to explain the main results. Section 4.8 concludes the 
paper. 
 
4.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
From the end of the Great Depression, which caused thousands of bank defaults, 
until the early 1970s, most states in the U.S. imposed restrictions on statewide branching 
(either full “unit banking” or partial “limited branching”) ostensibly to protect local and 
small banks from the threat of competition from large banks. In addition to the intrastate 
(statewide) branching restriction, the Douglas Amendment to the 1956 Bank Holding 
Company Act prohibited a BHC from acquiring banks outside the state where it was 
headquartered unless the target bank’s state permitted such actions. Though the states 
could allow out-of-state BHCs to enter, all states chose to prohibit the interstate bank 
expansion until 1978 when Maine became the first to allow acquisitions of its in-state 
banks by out-of-state BHCs. During the next two decades (the 1970s and 1980s), many 
states relaxed the restrictions on intrastate branching and interstate banking activities. By 
1993, only Arkansas and Iowa still DID not fully allow intrastate branching activities, 
and only Hawaii still prohibited interstate banking activities.
43
 The next and final era of 
deregulation on bank geographic expansion started in 1994 when the U.S. government 
                                                 
43
 Arkansas lifted fully the interstate branching restriction in 1994 and Iowa in 1999. Hawaii allowed 
interstate banking activities in 1997. See Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and Francis, Hasan, and Wang 




passed the Riegle-Neal IBBEA. The Riegle-Niel Act allowed unrestricted interstate 
banking (effective in 1995) and legalized interstate branching in all U.S. states (effective 
in 1997).
44
 After this law was enacted, banks or BHCs could either open new branches in 
other states or convert their subsidiaries in other states into operational branches. 
Therefore, this deregulation is mainly a more advanced step of the interstate banking 
deregulation. 
A few papers have studied the impact of the geographic expansion deregulation 
on bank risk and the empirical results found are mixed. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) 
study state-level data of all commercial banks from 1976 to 1992 and find that the 
intrastate branching deregulation is associated with lower credit risk. Using the same 
state-level data, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) find similar results for the interstate 
banking deregulation, but to a lesser extent than the impact of the intrastate branching 
deregulation. Rose (1996) examines a sample of 84 large U.S. BHCs from 1980–1992 
and find some evidence that interstate banking expansion leads to higher risk. However, 
Rose shows that some diversification gains emerge when banks expand to at least four 
states. Rivard and Thomas (1997) study 218 BHCs’ data from 1988–1991 and find that 
interstate BHCs have higher profitability, lower earnings volatility, and lower insolvency 
risk compared to strictly intrastate banks. Carlson and Mitchener (2006) examine earlier 
state-level national banks’ data from 1922–1930 (the Great Depression era) and find that 
intrastate branching activities lead to tougher competition, which results in improvement 
of the banking system stability by removing weak and inefficient banks. Dick (2006) 
study the impacts of the Riegle-Niel interstate branching deregulation from 1993–1999 
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and finds that the deregulation leads to higher credit portfolio risk. Subramanian and 
Yadav (2012) examine the impact of the intrastate branching and the interstate banking 
deregulation on bank failures from 1976–1994. They find that intrastate branching 
deregulation leads to fewer bank failures (especially in the unit banking states) due to 
more portfolio diversification, operating efficiencies, and reduced loan losses. However, 
they find no evidence that interstate banking deregulation affects bank failures. Goetz, 
Laeven, and Levine (2016) develop a new instrument to identify exogenous sources of 
variation in geographic diversity at the BHC level and use it to examine the impact of 
BHC geographic expansion (in response to interstate banking deregulation) on BHC risk. 
Using the data of listed BHCs from 1986:Q2-1997:Q4, they find that BHC geographic 
expansion is associated with lower BHC risk. However, BHC geographic diversification 
has no significant impact on BHC loan quality. 
Theoretically, there are at least three channels through which geographic 
deregulation may increase risk and at least two channels through which risk may reduce, 
making the net effect an empirical question. Turning to the first risk-increasing channel, 
the Hubris Channel, deregulation provides opportunities for bank managers to expand 
their businesses geographically and gain higher salaries and/or more resources under their 
control to extract for their private benefits (e.g. Jensen, 1986; Berger and Ofek, 1995; 
Servaes, 1996; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997; Laeven and Levine, 2007, Berger, El 
Ghoul, Guedhami, and Roman, forthcoming). Under the Diversification Monitoring 
Channel, the geographic diversification raises more difficulty for the banks in monitoring 
their loans and managing their risks because of both increased complexity and distances 




Brickley, Linck, and Smith, 2003; Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein, 2005). 
Finally, under the traditional Competition-Fragility Channel, bank deregulation that 
leads to more competition in the local market, which may increase bank risk. 
Specifically, tougher competition erodes banks’ profit margins and results in reduced 
franchise values, reducing incentives for the banks to control their risks to protect these 
values (e.g. Keeley, 1990; Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000; Repullo, 2004). 
Under the first risk-reducing channels, under the Diversification-Stability 
Channel, bank deregulation provides an opportunity for banks to diversify their assets 
and widen their depositor bases, thereby reducing bank risk (e.g. Gart, 1994; Hubbard, 
1994; Meslier-Crouzille, Morgan, Samolyk, and Tarazi, 2015; Goetz, Laeven, and 
Levine, 2016). Such diversification is an important part of the risk-transformation 
function of banks under modern portfolio theory (e.g., Diamond, 1984; Boyd and 
Prescott, 1986). Under the second risk-reduction channel, the Competition-Stability 
Channel, bank deregulation intensifies competition in local markets (e.g. Jayaratne and 
Strahan, 1996; Carlson and Mitchener, 2006; Kerr and Nanda, 2009; Beck, Levine, and 
Levkov, 2010). More competition in the loan market reduces loan interest rates, which 
reduces borrower moral hazard and adverse selection problems (e.g. Boyd and De 
Nicolo, 2005; Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal, 2006; Akins, Li, Ng, and Rusticus, 2016). 
 
4.3 DATA, VARIABLES, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS  
4.3.1 DATA AND SAMPLE 
Our bank-level financial datasets are from the quarterly Call Reports (Reports of 




2013:Q4. The Call Reports start with 1976:Q1, but we choose the sample from 1984:Q1 
since many banks prior to this have semiannual reports rather than quarterly. In 
particular, we observe there are 205,034 from 485,140 bank-quarter observations 
(42.26%) with missing net income (RIAD4340) in either Q1 or Q3 but not in Q2 and 
Q4.
45
 Due to the lag structure of our baseline model, our main measure of bank risk starts 
from 1986:Q4. We divide our sample period into two subsamples. The first subsample 
period is from 1984:Q1 – 1994:Q3. This is the period when most of the intrastate 
branching and interstate banking deregulation occurred at the state level. We stop at 
1994:Q3 for this subsample to avoid any confounding effect from the Riegle-Neal Act 
that was enacted in the fourth quarter of 1994 (September 29). The second subsample 
period is from 1994:Q4 – 2013:Q4. In this period, we focus the analysis only on the 
interstate branching deregulation. 
The sample starts with 364,812 bank-quarter observations from the first 
subsample and 604,334 bank-quarter observations from the second subsample. We 
exclude non-commercial banks (RSSD9331 not equal to 1) as well as observations with 
zero or negative gross total assets (GTA),
46
 total loans and leases, and total deposits. 
These filters leave us with 303,207 bank-quarter observations for 12,987 commercial 
banks for the first subsample, and 519,817 bank-quarter observations for 11,964 
commercial banks across 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia (DC). We deflate all 
U.S. dollars nominated variables using the 2010:Q4 GDP implicit price deflator
47
 and 
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winsorize all financial ratios at the 1% level on the top and bottom of their distributions 




4.3.2 BANK RISK MEASURES 
Our main measure of bank risk is Z-Score, which is an inverse measure of a 
bank’s insolvency probability (e.g. Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Laeven and Levine, 
2009; Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma, 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012).
49
 We calculate a 






where 𝜇𝑡−𝑘+1,𝑡(𝑅𝑂𝐴) is the bank 𝑖’s mean return on assets, calculated as net income over 
GTA, 𝜇𝑡−𝑘+1,𝑡(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦/𝐺𝑇𝐴) is the bank 𝑖’s mean capitalization ratio, and 
𝜎𝑡−𝑘+1,𝑡(𝑅𝑂𝐴) is the bank 𝑖’s standard deviation of ROA. The mean and standard 
deviation are computed from time 𝑡 − 𝑘 + 1 to time 𝑡. Following a methodology similar 
to Berger, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Roman (2016), we use 𝑘 = 12 quarters. A higher Z-
score indicates that the bank has lower insolvency risk. 
Rather than using the level of Z-Score, we follow Laeven and Levine (2009), 
Houston, Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010), and Beck, Jonghe, and Schepens (2013) and use the 
natural logarithm of Z-Score to reduce skewness in the distribution.
50
 Since the Z-Score 
can take negative values, we employ the following Ln transformation to avoid truncations 
on negative values: 
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Ln⁡Z-Score𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+1,𝑡 = ln {1 + |min
∀i,t
𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+1,𝑡| + 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+1,𝑡}⁡⁡⁡ (2) 
 
where |min∀i,t 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑘+1,𝑡| is the global minimum of Z-Score from all bank-quarter 
observations over the sample period. This transformation will convert the global 
minimum (negative) value of Z-Score to zero. 
We also conduct robustness checks using alternative measures of risk including 
the ratio of Commercial and Real Estate Loans to Total Loans (CREL/TL), Loan Portfolio 
Concentration (LPC), NPL ratio (NPL/TL), Cost-Income Ratio (CIR), and standard 
deviation of ROA (SDROA). CRE loans are considered to be the riskiest loan category 
and had a substantial contribution to the previous banking crisis (Cole and White, 2012). 
LPC is measured as ∑ 𝐿𝑆𝑛𝑖𝑡
25
𝑛=1 , following Demsetz and Strahan (1997) and Berger, 
Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck (2016), where 𝐿𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of loan category 𝑛 of bank 
𝑖 at time 𝑡 to total loans. There are five loan categories (𝑘) included, i.e. commercial and 
industrial loans, personal loans, commercial real estate loans, residential real estate loans, 
and other loans. This measures lies between 0 and 1, in which higher value indicates 
higher loan concentration. The more concentrated loans portfolio implies less 
diversification and is associated with higher bank risk. NPL/TL measures a bank’s credit 
risk, calculated as the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans.
51
 CIR is calculated as 
the ratio of overhead expenses to gross revenues, following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine (2010). This variable measures how efficient a bank can manage its cost. The 
higher value of CIR indicates lower cost efficiency, which can lead to a higher likelihood 
of bank insolvency. SDROA is calculated as the standard deviation of bank ROA. This 
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variable captures the volatility of bank profitability. The higher value of SDROA implies 
higher risk. Similar with the Ln Z-Score, we measure this variable over 12 quarters. 
 
4.3.3 BANK DEREGULATION 
Our key variables of interest in the first subsample period from 1984:Q1 – 
1994:Q3 are two indicator variables of intrastate branching deregulation (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑡) and 
interstate banking deregulation (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡). 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑗𝑡 equals one if a bank is headquartered in 
a state 𝑗 that has passed an intrastate branching deregulation by time 𝑡, and zero 
otherwise. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡 equals one if a bank is headquartered in state 𝑗 that has passed an 
interstate banking deregulation by time 𝑡, and zero otherwise. We include all 50 U.S. 
states and DC in our analysis.
52
 The deregulation years of the intrastate branching and 
interstate banking activities are from Amel (1993), Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995), 
and Francis, Hasan, and Wang (2014). 
In the second subsample period from 1994:Q4 – 2013:Q4, our variable of interest 
is the interstate branching restrictiveness index (RSI) that is constructed based on Rice 
and Strahan (2010). This index lies ranges from 0 (no restriction) to 4 (fully restricted), 
and therefore, is an inverse measure of bank deregulation. This index is a sum of 
indicator variables on state restrictions on minimum bank age, de novo branching, branch 
acquisition, and deposit cap related to interstate branching. In particular, each of the 
indicator variables is equal to 1 if a state imposes a minimum age of 3 or more years on 
target banks of interstate acquirers, does not permit de novo interstate branching, does not 
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permit the acquisition of individual branches or portions of banks by an out-of-state bank, 
or if the state imposes a deposit cap less than 30 percent, and 0 otherwise. We update the 
data from Rice and Strahan (2010) using the Profile of State-Chartered Banking (PSCB) 
and State Banking Laws.
53
 We also update the index following the Section 613 of the 





4.3.4 CONTROL VARIABLES 
In order to mitigate a potential omitted variable bias, we control for various bank-
specific and state economic condition variables, as well as bank fixed effects and time 
(quarters) fixed effects.
55
 First, we control for state population density, which is measured 
by the ratio of each state’s population to each state’s area. Both of the U.S. state 
population and area datasets are from the U.S. Census Bureau. The economic literature 
shows a positive relation between population density and economic potentials (e.g. 
McGranahan and Beale, 2002; Walser and Anderlik, 2005). Accordingly, we may expect 
that banks having main businesses in sparsely populated areas are riskier for at least three 
reasons. First, it is difficult for the banks to achieve economies of scale due to limited 
bank customers. Second, the banks face more severe adverse selection problem due to the 
limited pools of potential borrowers. Finally, banks might find it difficult to diversify 
their loan portfolios due to lack of business diversity in the areas.  
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Second, we control for Housing Price Index (HPI) measured by Ln HPI, which 
proxies the state economic condition. Third, we control for bank size. Prior studies show 
that bank size can affect risk. On the one hand, larger banks have more ability to diversify 
risks (e.g. Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008) and have more stable 
earnings (De Haan and Poghosyan, 2012a, b), and therefore, are more financially stable. 
On the other hand, larger banks may take more risks to benefit from the “too-big-to-fail” 
subsidies (e.g. O’Hara and Shaw, 1990; Boyd and Gertler, 1994; Laeven, Ratnovski, and 
Tong, 2014). To capture a possible nonlinear relation between bank size and risk (De 
Haan and Poghosyan, 2012a), we employ both Ln GTA and its squared term as proxies 
for bank size. 
Fourth, we control for membership of a Bank Holding Company (BHC). Several 
studies show that banks benefit from the support provided by their parent BHCs via 
internal capital markets (e.g. Houston, James, and Marcus, 1997; Ashcraft, 2008; Haas 
and Lelyveld, 2010). Other studies show that BHCs are associated with lower risk due to 
diversification (e.g. Deng and Elyasiani, 2008). However, there is a strand of literature 
that shows BHCs are associated with an increase in risk. For example, Demsetz and 
Strahan (1997) documents that the diversification benefit in large U.S. BHCs is offset by 
lower capitals and riskier loan portfolios. Similarly, Laeven and Levine (2007) shows that 
BHCs suffer from a diversification discount, which is related to intensified agency 
problems within the conglomerates. Following Berger, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Roman 
(2016), we use a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is part of a BHC, and zero 




Fifth, we control for publicly Listed banks. On the one hand, publicly listed banks 
might be relatively safer than privately owned banks due to the greater degree of market 
discipline (Barry, Lepetit, and Tarazi, 2011). In particular, listed banks are subject to 
monitoring by capital market participants and capital market regulators, in addition to 
bank regulators. On the other hand, listed banks are generally larger and might be more 
likely to be bailed out due to their importance to financial markets. This provides 
incentives for listed banks to take more risk. We employ a dummy variable that equals 
one if a bank is publicly listed or is part of a publicly listed BHC and zero otherwise. 
Sixth, we control for local market concentration. The literature shows that 
concentration can affect bank risk negatively or positively, depending on whether 
concentration-stability (e.g. Allen and Gale, 2000, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine, 2006; Craig and Dinger, 2013) or concentration-fragility (e.g. Boyd and De 
Nicolo, 2005; Boyd, De Nicolo, and Jalal, 2006) nexus holds.
56
 Following prior studies 
(e.g. Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006), we use the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of deposits as the proxy for local market 
concentration.
57
 Following Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009), we also include the 
squared term of HHI of deposits to capture a possible nonlinear relation between local 
market concentration and bank risk. We define a local banking market at Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) or New England County Metropolitan Area (NECMA) level and 
at the county level for non-MSA/NECMA rural counties. For each MSA/NECMA and 
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 Recent studies on bank competition such as Berger, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, and Haubrich (2004), 
Claessens and Laeven (2004), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006), and Schaeck, Cihak, and Wolfe 
(2009) show that market concentration and competition are two different measures of banking market 
characteristics.  
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 For many years, the U.S. Department of Justice has been relying on the HHI measure as one of the main 
ways to evaluate each bank merger proposal. For more details see Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) and 




non-MSA/NECMA rural county, we calculate HHI as the sum of squared-deposit shares 
of all banks and bank branches within the area for each period. We use bank deposits data 
from the FDIC Summary of Deposits (SOD).
58
 To obtain HHI at the bank level, we 
calculate a bank’s HHI as the deposit-weighted average of HHIs in all markets where the 
bank operates. For example, if a bank operates in five different MSAs and five non-MSA 
rural counties, then the bank’s HHI is the sum of weighted HHIs for all of these ten local 
markets. The weight factor used for each local market is the bank’s deposit in each 
market divided by the bank’s total deposits in all of the ten local markets. 
Seventh, we control for diversification in banking activities. The literature 
provides conflicting predictions on how diversification of business activities can affect 
bank risk. On the one hand, having two or more business activities that are not perfectly 
correlated may reduce the variability of a bank’s cash flows. As such, the bank can still 
fund a positive NPV project regardless of the general condition of the economy and, 
therefore, has a lower financial risk (e.g. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993; Froot and 
Stein, 1998). On the other side, more exposure to activities that generate noninterest 
income may potentially increase the bank risk due to monitoring complexity or 
intensified agency problems (e.g. Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders, 2006; Stiroh, 2006; 
Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2007). Following Laeven and Levine 
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 The Summary of Deposits (SOD) data from 1994 onward are available from the FDIC’s website at 
https://www5.fdic.gov/sod/dynaDownload.asp?barItem=6. We thank Christa Bouwman and Raluca Roman 
for sharing the SOD data prior to 1994. The FDIC gathers the data once a year through an annual survey of 




(2007), we measure diversification in banking activities using the asset diversification 
ratio, which is calculated as 1- |
Net loans-Other earning assets
Total Earning Assets
|.59 
Eighth, we control for overhead cost ratio, which measures a bank’s operating 
cost structure. DeYoung and Roland (2001) show that reliance on noninterest income is 
associated with an increase in a bank’s degree of operating leverage, which transforms 
revenue volatility into higher earnings volatility. Similarly, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2010) find that banks with high overhead costs tend to have higher insolvency risks. We 
measure the overhead cost ratio as the ratio f total overhead expenses to GTA, following 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010). Total overhead expenses (RIAD4093) consist of 
personnel expenses (RIAD4135) and nonpersonnel expenses (RIAD4217 and 
RIAD4092). 
Finally, we control for bank internationalization that is proxied by the ratio of a 
bank’s foreign assets to GTA, following Berger, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Roman 
(2016). On the one hand, an expansion of banking activities internationally might reduce 
bank risk due to the greater asset portfolio diversification (e.g. Laeven and Levine, 2007). 
However, the internationalization of banking activities can also increase bank risk due to 
market-specific factors (Berger, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and Roman, 2016), difference in 
local culture (Li and Guisinger, 1992; Berger, Li, Morris, and Roman, 2017), and 
difficulties in monitoring (Berger, De Young, Genay, and Udell, 2000). 
 
                                                 
59
 The main results are robust when we replace the asset diversification ratio with income diversification 
ratio, which is calculated as 1- |






4.3.5 SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Tables 4.1 presents definitions (Panel A) and summary statistics of our variables 
(Panel B and C). In the first subsample period, the U.S. commercial banks have a mean 
Ln Z-Score of 3.0 and Z-Score of 26.3, indicating that on average the banks are fairly 
stable. In the second subsample period after the Riegle-Neal Act, the mean Ln Z-Score 
increases to 3.4 (Z-Score increases to 39.7), which implies that on average, U.S. banks 
have become relatively more stable. Similarly, the mean of NPL/TL and SDROA 
decreases from 2.3 percent to 1.1 percent and from 0.8 percent to 0.6 percent respectively 
in the second subsample period compared to the first subsample period. In terms of loan 
concentration, the mean of LPC before and after the Riegle-Neal Act are relatively stable, 
with the mean of about 0.3. However, the concentration of CRE loans increases almost 
two folds after the Riegle-Neal Act, from 12.2 percent to 21 percent. Moreover, the mean 
of banking cost efficiency, CIR, increases from 35 percent to 46.1 percent. 
Meanwhile, in terms of bank characteristics, pre-the Riegle-Neal Act, U.S. banks 
have a mean size (Gross Total Assets) of $441 million, HHI of deposits of 0.08, Asset 
Diversification ratio of 28.3 percent, Overhead Cost ratio of 3.3 percent, and Foreign 
Assets to GTA ratio of 0.08 percent. Moreover, about 68 percent of the banks are part of 
Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) and 6.9 percent are listed or part of listed BHCs. Post-
the Riegle-Neal Act, the banks have a mean size of $1 billion, HHI of deposits of 0.09, 
Asset Diversification ratio of 54.6 percent, Overhead Cost ratio of 3.2 percent, and 
Foreign Assets to GTA ratio of 0.06 percent. Furthermore, about 79 percent of the banks 
are part of BHCs and 12 percent are listed or part of listed BHCs. These imply that post 




assets, and slightly better in overhead cost management as well as reduced international 
banking activities. The banking market is also more consolidated as the number of BHCs 
largely increases and more banks participation in the stock market. However, the local 
market concentration as measured by the HHI does not seem changed substantially after 
the Riegle-Neal Act. This finding extends the result in Black and Strahan (2002), which 
shows that HHI in local banking markets remains relatively constant despite the 
deregulation in geographic expansion in banking activities during 1976-1994. This is also 
in line with the result in Dick (2006) that finds no evidence that the interstate branching 
deregulation is associated with a change of HHI in the MSA level. The state population 
density is also relatively constant before and after the Riegle-Neal Act with a mean 
around 134 persons per square miles. 
 
4.4 MAIN REGRESSION RESULTS 
4.4.1 INTRASTATE BRANCHING AND INTERSTATE BANKING 
To test the relation between intrastate branching, interstate banking, and bank 
risk, we estimate the following empirical specification using the sample period from 
1984:Q1 to 1994:Q3. 




where Risk is (inverse) bank risk as measured by Ln Z-Score, Intra is an indicator 
variable of intrastate branching deregulation, Inter is an indicator variable of interstate 




Sub-Section 3.2, 𝛾 and 𝛿 represent bank and time (quarter) fixed effects respectively,60 
while  denotes an error term. 𝑖, 𝑗, and 𝑡 are indexes for bank, state, and time respectively. 
The risk variables are measured over k quarters from time 1t k   to 𝑡, while the control 
variables are measured at time t k  to ensure that they are predetermined relative to the 
risk variables.
61
 Meanwhile, the indicator variables of bank deregulation are measured at 
time t so that our coefficients of interest, 1  and 2 , can be interpreted as the treatment 
effects of a generalized Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation.
62
 Since risk 
variables are likely correlated within a bank over time, we use cluster-robust standard 
errors (Rogers, 1993) at the bank level in the estimation. 
Table 4.2, Panel A, presents our main results from the multivariate analysis. In all 
columns, except for column (1) and (2) when we put no control variable other than bank 
and time fixed effects, Intra is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
This finding suggests that the intrastate branching deregulation increased banks’ overall 
risk. Meanwhile, Inter is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all 
of the regression specifications. This finding shows that the interstate banking 
deregulation decreased banks’ overall risk. In terms of the economic importance of our 
results, Intra’s coefficient is about -0.03, which means that the level of Z-score of banks 
in states allowing intrastate branching is lower by 2.96 percent than those in states 
prohibiting it, holding all other variables constant. Inter’s coefficient is about 0.20, which 
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 As one of the robustness checks, we control for state fixed effects instead of bank fixed effects and our 
main results are still robust. 
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 Several researchers argue that the simultaneity concern between a dependent variable and an endogenous 
independent variable can be mitigated by replacing the independent variable with its lagged value, for 
example see Gupta (2005), Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), and Buch, Koch, and Koetter (2013).  
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 Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) drop observations in year of deregulation in their DID specification. Our 




suggests that the level of Z-score of banks in states allowing interstate banking is higher 
by 22.14 percent than those in states prohibiting it, holding all other variables constant.
63
 
As the intrastate branching increased the market power of local banks, while the 
interstate banking deregulation decreased it (Chava, Oettl, Subramanian, Krisnamurthy, 
and Subramanian, 2013), our main results support the Competition-Stability Hypothesis. 
However, the coefficient magnitudes suggest that the interstate banking impact on bank 
risk is much more material than the intrastate branching. Our findings are in line with the 
previous studies such as Rivard and Thomas (1997) and Goetz, Laeven, and Levine 
(2016) that find BHCs had lower risk following the interstate banking deregulation. 
However, their studies have focused only on BHCs, while our study cover all commercial 
banks, BHCs and nonBHCs, from small to large money center banks. 
 
4.4.2 INTERSTATE BRANCHING 
To test the relation between interstate branching and bank risk, we estimate the 
following empirical specification using the sample period post the Riegle-Neal Act from 
1994:Q4 to 2013:Q4. 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−𝑘+1,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−𝑘+1,𝑡 (4) 
 
where RSI is the interstate branching restrictiveness index based on Rice and Strahan 
(2010). All control variables and standard errors adjustment are the same as in equation 
(3). Note that as RSI is not an indicator variable, and therefore, equation (4) is not a DID 
estimation. 
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 Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) show that the coefficient of a dummy variable (𝛽𝑗) in a semilogarithmic 
regression equation should be interpreted as the 100(exp{𝛽𝑗} − 1) percentage change in 𝑌 for a discrete 




Table 4.2, Panel B, presents our results from the multivariate analysis. In all 
columns, we find positive coefficients on RSI. Except for column (1), the coefficients are 
statistically significant only at the 10 percent level. This result implies that the interstate 
branching deregulation (less restrictions on interstate branching) increased banks’ overall 
risk. However, similar with intrastate branching, the impact of interstate branching on 
bank risk is much weaker compared to the interstate banking. In particular, the RSI’s 
coefficient magnitude is about 0.006, which means that the level of Z-score of banks in 
states having no restrictions on intrastate branching (RSI equals to 0) is lower by 2.4 
percent than those in states having maximum restrictions (RSI equals to 4), holding all 
other variables constant. This finding is consistent with Dick (2006) that documents an 
increase in loan charge-offs following the interstate branching deregulation. However, 
Dick’s paper does not consider the variation on each state’s provision to defense from the 
nationwide branching expansion. Our paper is the first that considers this state provision 




We are aware that there might be a reverse causality between bank risk and 
deregulation. For example, a state with relatively risky banks could have incentives to 
allow bank deregulation so that the banks can reduce their risk through diversification by 
opening new branches within the state, acquiring out-of-state banks, or opening out-of-
state branches. Alternatively, a state might wait until its banks are strong enough 




tougher competition post the deregulation. We address this concern by using the 
Instrumental Variable (IV) regression that can isolate the exogenous component of bank 
deregulation. Following Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009), we use an IV technique 
with a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator to mitigate a potential 
heteroscedasticity problem. Furthermore, consistent with our OLS models, we employ 
the clustered standard errors at the bank level for the IV estimation. 
 
4.5.1 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE REGRESSION 
We use deregulation variables of adjoining states as our instruments.
64
 There is a 
large strand of literature on state policy diffusion related to federalism in the U.S., which 
contends that there is an interdependent regional effect on public policy making at the 
state level (e.g. Berry and Berry, 1990; Mooney, 2001; Shipan and Volden, 2008; 
Gillardi, 2010). In general, these studies show that a U.S. state tends to follow its 
adjoining states to adopt a law. There are at least two reasons through which a state may 
follow its adjoining states’ policies for its own public policy making. First, adopting a 
public policy that has been adopted by adjoining states attenuates the political risk 
associated with the policy. If the policy fails, the state’s politicians will not take the full 
blame for it and instead, they can blame on the systematic factors affecting states in the 
same region. Second, states in the same geographic region might compete for each other 
to attract new investments. Accordingly, a state will closely observe its adjoining states in 
terms of laws adoption to make sure that the state can compete with its adjoining states to 
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 For Alaska and Hawaii, we follow Berger and Sedunov (2016) to determine these states’ adjoining states. 
Alaska’s adjoining states are Hawaii, Oregon, Washington, and California. Meanwhile, the adjoining states 






 Since our analysis is at the bank level for each state, we do not 
expect that the deregulation of adjoining states directly affects our dependent variable. 
The IV regression results are reported in Table 4.3. Panel A shows the first and 
second stage IV regression estimates on the first subsample prior to the Riegle-Neal Act. 
Since there are two endogenous variables estimated in the second stage, Intra and Inter, 
we use two instruments on the first stage. The instrument for Intra is the average of Intra 
indicator variables from adjoining states, weighted by each of the adjoining state’s area. 
Similarly, the instrument for Inter is the area-weighted-average of Inter indicator 
variables from adjoining states. Column (2) and (3) of Panel A show the F-statistics for 
each of our instrument in the first stage IV estimation, which are all statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level and far beyond 10, suggesting that our instruments have 
strong correlations with both of the deregulation variables.
66
 We also compute the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic for both instruments that rejects the null hypothesis at 1 
percent level, suggesting that our IV regression is well identified. Moreover, the columns 
show that all of our instruments’ coefficients are positive and statistically significant at 1 
percent level, which is consistent with the state policy diffusion literature. In particular, 
our results show evidence that a state is more likely to allow intrastate branching or 
interstate banking activities if its adjoining states have already done so, holding all other 
else constant. Finally, column (4) shows the second stage estimation results of our IV 
regression. Both of the Intra and Inter coefficients from the IV regression have the 
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 For a more literature review on state policy diffusion, see for example, Mooney (2001).  
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 Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest that a problem of weak instruments is less likely if the F-statistics on 
the excluded instruments is greater than 10. As further robustness tests, we also check the Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistics, Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistics, Anderson-Rubin Wald statistics, and Stock-Wright 
LM S statistics. Almost all of these tests in models (1)-(7) reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are 




consistent sign and statistical significance with the OLS estimates that are reported in 
column (1), i.e. the OLS results from the model (9) of Panel A in Table 4.2.
67
 
Panel B of Table 4.3 shows the IV regression results in the second subsample 
post-the Riegle-Neal Act. Similar with Intra and Inter, we instrument RSI with the area-
weighted-average of RSI from adjoining states. Column (2) presents the estimation results 
from the first stage regression. Both of the F and Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics for the 
instrument are statistically significant at 1 percent level, which suggests that the 
instrument is relevant and the IV model is well-identified. Still consistent with the state 
policy diffusion literature, the coefficient estimate of the instrument is positive and 
statistically significant at 1 percent level, which suggests that a state is more likely to 
relax restrictions on interstate branching by out-of-state banks if its adjoining states have 
already done so, holding all other else constant. In column (3), we do not find significant 
evidence that interstate branching is associated with bank risk. This result is consistent 
with our finding from the OLS model. 
 
4.5.2 CONTIGUOUS COUNTY MATCHING 
Other potential source of endogeneity is the omitted variable bias. To address this 
concern, first, we control for state and bank-specific variables that can affect bank risk 
based on the previous literature, as we have discussed in subsection 4.3.4. Next, we run 
OLS regressions on contiguous county matching (CCM) samples, following Huang 
(2008). In particular, we run OLS regressions as specified in equation (3) and (4) only on 
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 The finding with larger coefficient estimates from the IV compared to the OLS regression is consistent 
with for example, Levitt (1996), Berger and Bouwman (2009), and Berger, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and 




banks that are located in contiguous counties separated by state borders.
68
 As contiguous 
counties are more likely to have similar characteristics, we may expect that this strategy 
is able to address the bias from factors that we cannot observe to control (e.g. economic 
potentials or growth opportunities).  
The results are shown in Panel C of Table 4.3. Pre-the Riegle-Neal Act, we find a 
consistent result with the OLS and IV results in which Inter is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient’s magnitude is about 0.15, which is 
economically material. The coefficient for Intra is not statistically significant. Post-the 
Riegle-Neal Act, the coefficient estimate of RSI is also not statistically significant, 
consistent with the results of the previous endogeneity analyses.  
Since the OLS results show negligible evidence that interstate branching affects 
bank risk, and no significant evidence of this relation using IV, as well as CCM sample 
analysis, we will focus the analyses on the rest of this paper only on the intrastate 
branching and interstate banking deregulation. 
 
4.5.3 PLACEBO REGRESSION 
Panel D of Table 4.3 shows the placebo (falsification) test on the impact of 
intrastate branching and interstate banking deregulation on bank risk. This analysis aims 
to test the internal validity of our research design, i.e. whether our main analysis as in 
equation (3) indeed captures the effect of intrastate branching and interstate banking 
deregulation on bank risk. We start with generating 500 random sets of Intrastate 
Branching and Interstate Banking deregulation years for each state using a uniform 
distribution. The random years generated for Intrastate Branching are between 1970 (the 
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earliest year of intrastate branching permitted) and 1999 (the latest year of intrastate 
branching permitted). We follow Kroszner and Strahan (1999) and Francis, Hasan, and 
Wang (2014) to use 1970 as the year of intrastate branching permitted if a state has 
permitted the deregulation before 1970. Meanwhile, the random years generated for 
Interstate Banking are between 1978 (the earliest year of interstate banking permitted) 
and 1997 (the latest year of interstate banking permitted). Then, we run 500 different 
OLS regressions as in equation (3), with standard errors that are clustered at the bank 
level using Intra and Inter that are generated using the random deregulation years. 
Finally, we calculate the mean of the Intra and Inter coefficient estimates from the 500 
placebo regressions and test whether they are significantly different than zero. The results 
in Panel D of Table 4.3, show that none of the mean of the Intra and Inter coefficient 
estimates from the placebo regressions is statistically significant. This suggests that our 
main research design is less likely to suffer from a weak internal validity. 
 
4.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
4.6.1 ALTERNATIVE BANK RISK MEASURES 
Firstly, we conduct robustness tests using several alternative risk measures in 
Panel A of Table 4.4. Column (1) shows the baseline result using Ln Z-Score as the risk 
measure. We find consistent results for Inter using all alternative risk measures. In 
particular, the interstate banking deregulation is associated with higher Ln Sharpe, lower 
SDROE, lower SDROA, higher capitalization (EQTA), lower loan concentration (LPC), 




higher SDROA, and lower capitalization EQTA. These results are consistent with our 
main findings. 
 
4.6.2 OTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We continue our robustness tests using several alternative samples in Panel B of 
Table 4.4. In column (1), we run our main regression by excluding banks in South Dakota 
and Delaware. Previous bank deregulation studies often exclude South Dakota and 
Delaware from their samples because in the 1980s these states passed unique usury laws 
providing great incentives for the credit card industry. This resulted in both states having 
a significant presence of credit card banks in their banking systems (Jayaratne and 
Strahan, 1996; Black and Strahan, 2002; Beck, Levine, and Levkov, 2010; Subramanian 
and Yadav, 2012; Francis, Hasan, and Wang, 2014; Goetz, Laeven, and Levine, 2016). In 
column (2) to (3), we exclude very large banks that might be Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) 
using different threshold definitions, including the Dodd-Frank Act’s definition (banks 
with total assets larger than $50 billion), as well as banks that are subject to the 
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) and Comprehensive Capital Analysis 
and Review (CCAR). Next, we run our main multivariate analysis using a block 
bootstrap technique in column (4), which aims to address a potential concern of 
inconsistent standard errors from the DID regression, as suggested by Bertrand, Duflo, 
and Mullainathan (2004).
69
 To account for the possible serial correlation in the data, we 
use bank level blocks (clusters). Our results for these specifications are consistent with 
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the main findings. In particular, interstate banking is associated with higher Ln Z-Score, 
while intrastate branching is associated with lower Ln Z-Score. 
We are aware that our results might be affected by the dynamics of the U.S. 
banks’ entry and exit during our main sample period. In particular, it could be that after 
bank deregulation opens up the market, bad banks are acquired by good banks, which 
leaves the industry with relatively more stable banks. Stiroh and Strahan (2003) show that 
after intrastate branching and interstate banking deregulation, there is a substantial 
reallocation of market share toward better banks. We address this concern by running 
OLS regressions using a balanced panel of banks in column (5). Specifically, we run the 
regressions after excluding all banks that partially exist during our main sample period 
and, therefore, restrict the analysis to banks that are fully operational during the main 
sample period.
70
 Next, in column (6) we run our main OLS analysis with two-way cluster 
standard errors at the bank and quarter levels to test whether there is a potential 
heteroscedasticity problem in smaller clusters that may affect our main results. Finally, in 
column (7), we conduct our analysis at the BHC level instead of bank level. The results 
on all of the specifications in column (5)-(7) are consistently showing that interstate 
banking is positively associated with Ln Z-Score. However, intrastate branching 
coefficient becomes statistically insignificant. 
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4.7 COMPETITION, DEREGULATION, AND BANK RISK 
4.7.1 REGRESSION RESULTS BASED ON STATE POPULATION DENSITY 
Bank deregulation that allows banks to expand their markets may enable them to 
gain lower-cost funds, increase investment opportunities, and promote productive 
efficiency due to takeover threats. The previous literature shows that banks might benefit 
from diversification as they expand their market geographically (e.g. Akhigbe and Whyte 
(2003), Deng and Elyasiani (2008), and Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2016)). Statewide 
(intrastate) branching deregulation enables banks to expand their deposits base and 
diversify their loans portfolio within the state. Therefore, we may expect that this 
deregulation is more beneficial for states with relatively dense population. On the 
contrary, we may expect that interstate banking is more crucial for states where the 
population is sparse and banks have less opportunity to diversify geographically within 
the states. Table 4.5 shows the regression estimates based on state population density 
grouping. A state is defined as “sparsely populated” if its population density is below the 
25th percentile. Meanwhile, if the state has population density between the 25th and 75th 
percentiles, we define it as a “fairly populated” state. Finally, the state is defined as 
“densely populated” if its population density is above the 75th percentile. The results 
confirm or prediction that intrastate branching is associated with higher Ln Z-Score for 
banks in densely populated states, but associated with lower Ln Z-Score for banks in 
fairly and sparsely populated states. Meanwhile, interstate banking is associated with 





4.7.2 REGRESSION RESULTS BASED ON BANK SIZE  
Table 4.6 reports regression estimates of the impact of Intrastate Branching and 
Interstate Banking deregulation on bank risk based on bank size. Following Berger and 
Bouwman (2013), small banks are defined as commercial banks having real GTA up to 
$1 billion, medium banks are those having real GTA between $1 billion and $3 billion, 
and large banks are those having real GTA greater than $3 billion. The results show that 
the positive impact of interstate banking on Ln Z-Score is driven by small banks. This 
finding is different than the previous literature that mainly attributes the positive impact 
of interstate banking on bank stability to large banks due to their ability to take advantage 
on interstate diversification. Meanwhile, intrastate branching has significantly positive 
impact on large banks, but negative on small and medium banks. 
In Table 4.7, we conduct a further investigation by running regressions of Ln Z-
score to intrastate branching and interstate banking using a subsample of small banks that 
stay to be unit banks and are not part of any BHC between 1984:Q1-1994:Q3. We would 
expect that these banks have less ability to benefit from the diversification channel. 
Therefore, if we observe any positive impact of intrastate branching and interstate 
banking on these banks, we might attribute specifically this to the Competition-Stability 
channel. The results on Panel A show statistically significant evidence on this. 
Furthermore, Panel B shows that the results in Panel A are driven by “strong” small unit 
banks, which suggest that these banks are forced to improve by the increase of 
competition due to geographic deregulations, especially the interstate banking.
71
 On the 
flip side, Panel C shows that “weak” small unit banks become riskier post the 
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deregulation. These results might suggest that the increase in competition due to the 
geographic bank deregulation affects small banks in in two ways: the deregulation 
encourages the strong small banks to be better, but kills the weak small banks resulting in 
creative destruction as in Schumpeter (1942).  
 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
There has been a long-standing debate among economists, regulators, politicians, 
and policymakers about the impact of geographic deregulation on bank risk. Deregulation 
presents an opportunity for banks to diversify their assets and extend their depositor 
bases, and it increases competition level in local markets. The literature shows that an 
increase in either diversification or competition has an ambiguous impact on bank risk. 
Therefore, whether bank deregulation increases or reduces risk is still an open empirical 
question. 
In this paper, we study two major geographic deregulations of banking activities 
in the 1970s and 1980s—intrastate branching and interstate banking deregulation. We 
find strong evidence that interstate banking deregulation is associated with lower bank 
risk, but no evidence that intrastate branching deregulation affects bank risk. These 
findings are robust to a variety of robustness checks, including endogeneity (reverse 
causality) and sample selection bias. Moreover, the data persistently suggest that the 
Diversification-Stability Channel dominates the Competition-Stability Channel as the 
mechanism by which deregulation reduces bank risk. We also document that the impact 
of deregulation on bank risk is stronger in the long term. Finally, though we find some 




lowers risk, the magnitude is negligible, suggesting that its impact is subsumed by 





Table 4.1: Variable Definition and Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents the definition of all variables analyzed and their respective summary statistics. Panel A 
presents the definition of all variables in the analysis. Panel B reports summary statistics for all U.S. 
commercial banks before the Riegle-Neal Act (1984:Q1-1994:Q3). Panel C reports summary statistics for 
all U.S. commercial banks after the Riegle-Neal Act (1994:Q4-2013:Q4). We use 1994:Q4 as the start of 
the latter sample period as the former U.S. President, Bill Clinton, enacted and signed the Riegle-Neal Act 
on September 29, 1994. All variables in dollar amounts are expressed in real terms using the 2010:Q4 
implicit GDP price deflator. All financial ratios are winsorized at 1% level on top and bottom of the 
distribution. 
 
Panel A: Variable Definition 
 
Variable Definition 
Bank Risk Measures: 
Ln Z-Score The main measure of bank risk calculated as 




)) /σ(ROA). A lower value indicates a higher financial 
risk. The mean (𝜇) and standard deviation (𝜎) are calculated over 12 
quarters from time 𝑡 − 11 to time 𝑡. Return on Assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴)⁡is defined as 
the ratio of net income to Gross Total Assets (GTA). 𝐺𝑇𝐴 is defined as total 
assets + allowance for loan and lease losses + allocated transfer risk 
reserves. 
Ln Sharpe An alternative measure of bank risk calculated as 
ln (1+|min(Sharpe Ratio)|+Sharpe Ratio). The Sharpe Ratio is defined as 
μ(ROE)/σ(ROE). 𝑅𝑂𝐸 is defined as the ratio of net income to total equity. 
A lower value indicates a worse risk-adjusted return. The mean (𝜇) and 
standard deviation (𝜎) are calculated over 12 quarters from time 𝑡 − 11 to 
𝑡. 
SDROE A measure of bank profit’s volatility, defined as the standard deviation of 
Return on Equity (ROE). ROE is calculated as the ratio of net income to 
total equity. A higher value is associated with higher bank risk. This 
measure is calculated over 12 quarters from time 𝑡 − 11 to time 𝑡. 
SDROA A measure of bank profit’s volatility, defined as the standard deviation of 
ROA. A higher value is associated with higher bank risk. This measure is 
calculated over 12 quarters from time 𝑡 − 11 to time 𝑡. 
EQTA A measure of bank capitalization that is calculated as Total Equity/GTA. 
This measure is averaged over 12 quarters from time 𝑡 − 11 to 𝑡. 
LPC A measure of bank loan portfolio concentration that is calculated as 
∑ 𝐿𝑆𝑛𝑖𝑡
25
𝑛=1 , following Demsetz and Strahan (1997) and Berger, Bouwman, 
Kick, and Schaeck (2016). This measure lies between 0 and 1, where 
higher number shows higher concentration (lower diversification) in a 
bank’s loans portfolio. 𝐿𝑆𝑛𝑖𝑡  is the ratio of loan category 𝑛 of bank 𝑖 at time 
𝑡 to total loans. There are five loan categories (𝑛) included, i.e. commercial 
and industrial loans, personal loans, commercial real estate loans, 
residential real estate loans, and other loans. This measure is averaged over 
12 quarters from time 𝑡 − 11 to 𝑡. 
NPL/TL A measure of credit risk defined as the mean of nonperforming loans (past 
due at least 90 days or in nonaccrual status) to total loans. A higher value 
indicates a riskier loan portfolio. This measure is averaged over 12 quarters 






Table 4.1: Variable Definition and Summary Statistics 
 






An indicator variable equals to 1 in a year when a state allows statewide 
branching via mergers and acquisitions and the years after; 0 otherwise. 
The timing of the intrastate branching is based on Amel (1993) and 
Kroszner and Strahan (1999).  
Interstate Banking (Inter) An indicator variable equals to 1 in a year when a state allows bank 
acquisition by out-of-state banks and the years after; 0 otherwise. The 
timing of the interstate banking is based on Amel (1993) and Kroszner and 
Strahan (1999).  
Interstate Branching 
(RSI) 
An index measuring the degree of interstate branching restriction by state 
that ranges from 0 (no restriction) to 4 (fully restricted), based on Rice and 
Strahan (2010). This index is a sum of indicator variables on Minimum Age 
Restriction, De Novo Branching Restriction, Branch Acquisition 
Restriction, and Deposit Cap Restriction that will be explained below. We 
update the data using the Profile of State-Chartered Banking (PSCB) and 
State Banking Laws. If there is any difference on interstate branching 
restriction between the PSCB and Rice and Strahan (2010), we follow Rice 
and Strahan.  
Minimum Age Restriction An indicator variable equals to 1 if a state imposes a minimum age of 3 or 
more years on target banks of interstate acquirers, and 0 otherwise, 
following Rice and Strahan (2010). 
De Novo Branching 
Restriction 
An indicator variable equals to 1 if a state does not permit de novo 
interstate branching, and 0 otherwise, following Rice and Strahan (2010). 
Branch Acquisition 
Restriction 
An indicator variable equals to 1 if a state does not permit the acquisition 
of individual branches or portions of banks by an out-of-state bank, and 0 
otherwise, following Rice and Strahan (2010). 
Deposit Cap Restriction An indicator variable equals to 1 if a state imposes a deposit cap less than 
30%, and 0 otherwise, following Rice and Strahan (2010). 
Control Variables:  
Ln Gross Total Assets 
(GTA) 
A measure of bank size calculated as the natural logarithm of Gross Total 
Assets (GTA).  
Population Density A measure of a state population density that is calculated as the state’s total 
population (in 1,000 persons) divided by the state’s area (in square miles). 
Ln Housing Price Index The log natural of Housing Price Index of each state. The index is available 
from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)’s website. Following 
Klarner (2013), we divide the index by 100. 
BHC An indicator variable equals to 1 if the bank is part of a bank holding 
company, and 0 otherwise.  
Listed An indicator variable equals to 1 if the bank is listed on a stock exchange 
or is part of a Bank Holding Company that is listed on a stock exchange, 
and 0 otherwise.  
Asset Diversification 
Ratio 
A measure of diversification across different types of earning assets, 
calculated as 1- |




following Laeven and Levine 
(2007). This measure takes values between 0 and 1 with higher values 







Table 4.1: Variable Definition and Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Variable Definition 
 
Variable Definition 
Overhead Costs Ratio A measure of bank overhead cost structure calculated as the ratio of 
overhead expenses to GTA.  
Foreign Assets Ratio A measure of bank internationalization defined as the ratio of foreign total 
assets to GTA of the bank, following Berger, El Ghoul, Guedhami, and 
Roman (2016); a larger value indicates a higher degree of 
internationalization and a ratio of 0 refers to purely domestic banks.  
 
HHI of Deposits The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of bank deposits, which measures 
the degree of concentration of commercial banks at the local market level. 
This measure is defined as the weighted average of HHI at 
MSA/NECMA/county level where each bank operates. The HHI at 
MSA/NECMA/county level is calculated as the sum of squared market 
share of deposits for all commercial banks in the MSA/NECMA/county.  
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics Pre-the Riegle-Neal Act (1984:Q1-1994:Q3) 
 
Variables N Mean St. Dev Skewness P25 P50 P75 
Bank Risk 
Measures:               
Ln Z-Score 303,207 3.003 0.873 -0.389 2.448 3.102 3.634 
Z-Score 303,207 26.349 22.937 1.687 9.754 20.420 36.048 
Ln Sharpe 303,212 1.356 0.611 0.085 0.914 1.357 1.784 
Sharpe 303,212 2.928 3.053 1.601 0.741 2.130 4.203 
SDROE (%) 303,212 13.196 23.624 3.879 3.094 5.445 11.369 
SDROA(%) 303,207 0.840 1.017 2.865 0.270 0.473 0.941 
EQTA (%) 303,207 8.621 2.634 1.863 6.944 8.080 9.682 
LPC 303,099 0.310 0.092 1.961 0.249 0.282 0.340 
NPL/TL (%) 303,099 2.278 2.032 1.621 0.856 1.643 3.023 
Bank Deregulation:               
Intrastate Branching 303,207 0.776 0.417 -1.323 1 1 1 
Interstate Banking 303,207 0.908 0.289 -2.818 1 1 1 
Control Variables:               
Ln Gross Total 
Assets (Ln GTA) 303,207 11.512 1.101 1.831 10.749 11.290 11.959 
Gross Total Assets 
(GTA), in billion $ 303,207 0.441 4.301 34.629 0.047 0.080 0.156 
Population Density 
(1,000 persons/sq. 
miles) 303,207 0.134 0.412 20.209 0.049 0.074 0.168 
Ln Housing Price 
Index (Ln HPI) 303,207 0.271 0.203 1.499 0.144 0.236 0.356 
Housing Price Index 
(HPI) 303,207 1.342 0.324 2.439 1.155 1.266 1.428 
Bank Holding 






Table 4.1: Variable Definition and Summary Statistics 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics Pre-the Riegle-Neal Act (1984:Q1-1994:Q3) 
 
Variables N Mean St. Dev Skewness P25 P50 P75 
Listed 303,207 0.069 0.254 3.388 0 0 0 
Assets 
Diversification 
Ratio (%) 303,207 28.329 21.743 1.037 11.881 23.310 39.728 
Overhead Cost 
Ratio (%) 303,207 3.268 1.262 2.024 2.467 3.030 3.773 
Foreign Assets 
Ratio (%) 303,207 0.075 0.594 8.098 0.000 0.000 0.000 
HHI of Deposits 303,207 0.080 0.080 1.671 0.018 0.051 0.118 
 
Panel C: Summary Statistics Post the Riegle-Neal Act (1994:Q4-2013:Q4) 
 
Variables N Mean St. Dev Skewness P25 P50 P75 
Bank Risk 
Measures:               
Ln Z-Score 519,817 3.447 0.804 -0.575 2.971 3.532 4.018 
Z-Score 519,817 39.676 29.898 1.284 17.700 32.384 53.765 
Ln Sharpe 519,840 1.576 0.618 -0.243 1.175 1.608 2.013 
Sharpe 519,840 4.040 3.503 1.203 1.485 3.240 5.730 
SDROE (%) 519,840 6.770 12.859 6.600 2.096 3.481 6.317 
SDROA (%) 519,817 0.590 0.798 4.018 0.205 0.338 0.618 
EQTA (%) 519,829 10.214 3.161 2.018 8.165 9.431 11.360 
LPC 519,411 0.320 0.094 1.918 0.256 0.293 0.353 
NPL/TL (%) 519,363 1.167 1.303 2.772 0.360 0.772 1.482 
Bank Deregulation:               
Interstate Branching 
(RS index) 519,817 2.456 1.470 -0.481 1 3 4 
Control Variables:               
Ln Gross Total 
Assets (Ln GTA) 519,817 11.791 1.189 1.714 10.966 11.585 12.327 
Gross Total Assets 
(GTA), in billion $ 519,817 1.019 19.267 55.838 0.058 0.107 0.226 
Population Density 
(1,000 persons/sq. 
miles) 519,817 0.134 0.275 24.111 0.052 0.083 0.189 
Ln Housing Price 
Index (Ln HPI) 519,817 0.781 0.333 0.487 0.544 0.757 0.988 
Housing Price Index 
(HPI) 519,817 2.315 0.863 1.700 1.722 2.131 2.686 
Bank Holding 
Company 519,817 0.791 0.407 -1.432 1 1 1 








Table 4.1: Variable Definition and Summary Statistics 
 
Panel C: Summary Statistics Post the Riegle-Neal Act (1994:Q4-2013:Q4) 
 
Variables N Mean St. Dev Skewness P25 P50 P75 
Assets 
Diversification 
Ratio (%) 519,817 54.577 26.340 -0.186 34.815 55.731 76.120 
Overhead Cost 
Ratio (%) 519,817 3.212 1.282 2.710 2.476 2.990 3.626 
Foreign Assets 
Ratio (%) 519,817 0.061 0.531 9.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 





Table 4.2: Main Regression Results 
 
This table reports our main results using OLS regressions. Panel A reports the impact of Intrastate 
Branching and Interstate Banking deregulation on bank risk pre the Riegle-Neal Act from 1984:Q1-
1994:Q3. Panel B reports the impact of Interstate Branching deregulation on bank risk post the Riegle-Neal 
Act from 1994:Q4-2013:Q4. The dependent variable for all panel is Ln Z-Score, an inverse measure of 
bank risk. A higher value indicates lower bank overall risk. The main explanatory variables in Panel A are 
Intra (an indicator variable equals to 1 in a year when a state allows statewide branching via mergers and 
acquisitions and the years after, and 0 otherwise) and Inter (an indicator variable equals to 1 in a year when 
a state allows bank acquisition by out-of-state banks and the years after, and 0 otherwise). The main 
explanatory variable in Panel B is RSI, an index measuring the degree of interstate branching restriction by 
state that ranges from 0 (no restriction) to 4 (fully restricted), based on Rice and Strahan (2010). All 
regressions include bank and time (quarter) fixed effects (FE). All right-hand-side control variables are 
lagged 12 quarters. All financial variables in dollar amounts are expressed in real terms using the 2010:Q4 
implicit GDP price deflator. All financial ratios are winsorized at 1% level on top and bottom of the 
distribution. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank level. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
Panel A: Intrastate Branching, Interstate Banking, and Bank Risk 
 
 Dependent Variables: Ln Z-Score 
 Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Intrastate Branching (Intra) -0.003 
 




(-2.810) (-2.826) (-2.982) (-2.939) 
Interstate Banking (Inter) 
 
0.292*** 0.201*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 0.201*** 
  
(19.355) (13.513) (13.437) (13.476) (13.566) 
Ln Gross Total Assets (Ln GTA) 
  
0.435* 0.391 0.347 0.350 
   
(1.719) (1.543) (1.351) (1.369) 
Ln GTA Squared 
  
-0.034*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
   
(-3.056) (-2.880) (-2.735) (-2.780) 
Inflection point of Ln GTA 6.397 6.109 5.597 5.645 
       
Population Density 
  
0.115 0.106 0.126 0.132 
   
(0.227) (0.209) (0.251) (0.263) 
Ln Housing Price Index (Ln HPI) 
  
-0.533*** -0.531*** -0.484*** -0.470*** 
   
(-11.242) (-11.171) (-10.120) (-9.850) 
BHC 
   
0.016 0.022 0.021 
    
(1.131) (1.499) (1.485) 
Listed 
   
-0.038** -0.036** -0.035** 
    
(-2.167) (-2.013) (-1.973) 
Asset Diversification Ratio 
    
0.002*** 0.002*** 
     
(13.681) (13.624) 
Overhead Cost Ratio 
    
-0.018*** -0.018*** 
     
(-5.000) (-5.014) 
Foreign Assets Ratio 
    
0.035* 0.035* 
     
(1.943) (1.940) 
HHI of Deposits 
     
1.307*** 
      
(2.898) 
HHI of Deposits-Squared 
     
-3.404*** 
      
(-2.623) 
Inflection point of HHI      0.192 








Table 4.2: Main Regression Results 
 
Panel A: Intrastate Branching, Interstate Banking, and Bank Risk 
 
 Dependent Variables: Ln Z-Score 
 Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 2.814*** 2.589*** 2.215 2.459* 2.789* 2.736* 
 
(353.420) (193.582) (1.535) (1.700) (1.903) (1.870) 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time (Quarter) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 304,133 304,133 304,129 304,129 303,777 303,207 
N-cluster 13,021 13,021 13,020 13,020 12,994 12,987 
R-squared 0.701 0.705 0.715 0.716 0.717 0.717 
 
Panel B: Interstate Branching and Bank Risk 
 
  Dependent Variable: Ln Z-Score 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Interstate Branching (RSI) 0.003 0.007* 0.007* 0.006* 0.006* 
 
(0.792) (1.855) (1.827) (1.654) (1.669) 
Ln Gross Total Assets (Ln GTA) 
 
0.477*** 0.485*** 0.388*** 0.380*** 
  
(4.581) (4.606) (3.711) (3.633) 
Ln GTA Squared 
 
-0.022*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 
  
(-5.117) (-5.173) (-4.663) (-4.602) 
Inflection point of Ln GTA 
 
10.841 11.023 9.700 10.000 
     
Population Density 
 
-0.073 -0.073 -0.074 -0.074 
  
(-1.247) (-1.266) (-1.287) (-1.283) 
Ln Housing Price Index (Ln HPI) 
 
-0.272*** -0.274*** -0.295*** -0.299*** 
  
(-5.310) (-5.337) (-5.817) (-5.892) 
BHC 
  
-0.016 -0.009 -0.009 
   
(-0.988) (-0.575) (-0.574) 
Listed 
  
0.093*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 
   
(2.705) (2.746) (2.750) 
Asset Diversification Ratio 
   
0.001*** 0.001*** 
    
(8.589) (8.592) 
Overhead Cost Ratio 
   
-0.061*** -0.061*** 
    
(-16.510) (-16.376) 
Foreign Assets Ratio 
   
-0.013 -0.012 
    
(-0.740) (-0.708) 
HHI of Deposits 
    
0.370 
     
(1.635) 
HHI of Deposits-Squared 
    
-1.142* 
     
(-1.827) 
Inflection point of HHI 
    
0.162 
     
Constant 3.322*** 0.817 0.791 1.759*** 1.801*** 
 
(190.031) (1.278) (1.226) (2.713) (2.773) 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time (Quarter) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 520,669 520,667 520,667 520,110 519,817 
N-cluster 11,983 11,983 11,983 11,974 11,964 








Table 4.3: Endogeneity 
 
This table reports endogeneity checks of the impact of bank deregulation on bank risk. The dependent variable for all panel is Ln Z-Score, an inverse measure of 
bank risk. A higher value indicates lower bank overall risk. Panel A reports the Instrumental Variable (IV) regression estimates of the impact of Intrastate 
Branching and Interstate Banking deregulation on bank risk pre the Riegle-Neal Act from 1984:Q1-1994:Q3. The main explanatory variables in Panel A are Intra 
(an indicator variable equals to 1 in a year when a state allows statewide branching via mergers and acquisitions and the years after, and 0 otherwise) and Inter 
(an indicator variable equals to 1 in a year when a state allows bank acquisition by out-of-state banks and the years after, and 0 otherwise). The instrument 
variables in Panel A are Intrastate Branching and Interstate Banking indicators of Adjoining States, weighted averaged by the adjoining states’ areas. Panel B 
reports the IV regression estimates of the impact of Interstate Branching deregulation on bank risk post the Riegle-Neal Act from 1994:Q4-2013:Q4. The main 
explanatory variable in Panel B is Interstate Branching Index (RSI), which measures the degree of interstate branching restriction by state that ranges from 0 (no 
restriction) to 4 (fully restricted), based on Rice and Strahan (2010). The instrument variable in Panel B is Interstate Branching Index (RSI) of Adjoining States, 
weighted averaged by the adjoining states’ areas. Panel C presents the OLS regression estimates of banks that are headquartered in contiguous counties separated 
by state borders, closely follow Huang (2008). Column 1 shows the results for the first sub-sample period before the Riegle-Neal Act (1984:Q1-1994:Q3), and 
Column 2 shows the sub-sample period afterward (1994:Q4-2013:Q4). Panel D shows the Placebo regression result of the impact of Intrastate Branching and 
Interstate Banking on bank risk from 1984:Q1-1994:Q3. The procedures of the placebo test are as follow. First, we generate 500 random sets of Intrastate 
Branching and Interstate Banking deregulation years for each U.S. state using a uniform distribution. The random years generated for Intrastate Branching lies 
between 1970 (the earliest year of intrastate branching permitted) and 1999 (the latest year of intrastate branching permitted). We follow Kroszner and Strahan 
(1999) and Francis, Hasan, and Wang (2014) to use 1970 as the year of intrastate branching permitted if a state has permitted the deregulation before 1970. The 
random years generated for Interstate Banking lies between 1978 (the earliest year of interstate banking permitted) and 1997 (the latest year of interstate banking 
permitted). Then, we run 500 different OLS regressions using Intrastate Branching and Interstate Banking indicators that are generated using the random 
deregulation years. Finally, we average the coefficient estimates for Intrastate Branching and Interstate Banking and test whether they are significantly different 
than zero using t-tests. The average coefficient estimates, t-statistics from the t-tests, as well as the average number of observations, number of clusters, and R-
squared across are shown in the table. All regressions include bank and time (quarter) fixed effects (FE). All right-hand-side control variables are lagged 12 
quarters. Nonfinancial controls include Population Density, Ln HPI, BHC, Listed, HHI, and squared HHI. Financial controls include Ln GTA, Ln GTA squared, 
Asset Diversification Ratio, Overhead Cost Ratio, and Foreign Assets Ratio. All financial variables in dollar amounts are expressed in real terms using the 
2010:Q4 implicit GDP price deflator. All financial ratios are winsorized at 1% level on top and bottom of the distribution. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 















Table 4.3: Endogeneity 
 
Panel A: IV Regression—Intrastate Branching, Interstate Banking, and Bank Risk 
 
Dependent Variables: Ln Z-Score Intrastate Branching Interstate Banking Ln Z-Score 
  OLS (Baseline) IV GMM 1st stage IV GMM 2nd stage 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Intrastate Branching (Intra) -0.032***     -0.276*** 
  (-2.939)     (-5.178) 
Interstate Banking (Inter) 0.201***     0.653*** 
  (13.566)     (5.797) 
Intrastate Branching of Adjoining States   0.017*** 0.183***   
    (2.678) (22.17)   
Interstate Banking of Adjoining States   0.429*** 0.0480***   
    (34.40) (6.317)   
Nonfinancial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time (Quarter) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 303,207 302,905 302,905 302,905 
N-cluster 12,987 12,685 12,685 12,685 
R-squared (centered) 0.111 0.375 0.199 0.061 
F-statistic of excluded instruments   670.25*** 263.36***   










Table 4.3: Endogeneity 
 
Panel B: IV Regression—Interstate Branching and Bank Risk 
 
Dependent Variables: Ln Z-Score Interstate Branching (RSI) Ln Z-Score 
  OLS (Baseline) IV GMM 1st stage IV GMM 2nd stage 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) 
        
Interstate Branching (RSI) 0.006*   -0.0323 
  (1.669)   (-1.271) 
Interstate Branching (RSI) of Adjoining States  0.276***  
    (26.18)   
Nonfinancial controls Yes Yes Yes 
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time (Quarter) FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 519,817 509,276 509,276 
N-cluster 11,964 11,581 11,581 
R-squared (centered) 0.116 0.474 0.114 
F-statistic of excluded instruments   685.25***   






Table 4.3: Endogeneity 
 
Panel C: Contiguous County Matching 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln Z-Score 
Sub-sample Period: 
Pre the Riegle-Neal Act 
(1984:Q1-1994:Q3) 
Post the Riegle-Neal Act 
1994:Q4-2013:Q4 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) 
      
Intrastate Branching (Intra) 0.011   
  (0.602)   
Interstate Banking (Inter) 0.148***   
  (6.277)   
Interstate Branching (RSI)   -0.002 
    (-0.266) 
Nonfinancial controls Yes Yes 
Financial controls Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes 
Time (Quarter) FE Yes Yes 
N 112,662 191,305 
N-cluster 4,678 4,534 
R-squared 0.688 0.542 
 
Panel D: Placebo Regressions 
 
 
The Average Regression Coefficients of  
Ln Z-Score on: 
Independent Variables: (1) 
    
Placebo Intrastate Branching (Intra) 0.006 
  (1.488) 
Placebo Interstate Banking (Inter) -0.005 
  (-1.437) 
Nonfinancial controls Yes 
Financial controls Yes 
Bank FE Yes 
Time (Quarter) FE Yes 
Average N 303,207 
Average N-cluster 12,987 










Table 4.4: Robustness Checks 
 
This table reports robustness checks of the impact of Intrastate Branching and Interstate Banking deregulation on bank risk between 1984:Q1-1994:Q3. Panel A 
reports robustness checks using alternative risk measures as follows. Column 1 (baseline) uses Ln Z-Score as the dependent variable. A higher value indicates 
lower bank overall risk. Column 2 uses Ln Sharpe. A higher value indicates a better risk-adjusted return. Column 3 uses the standard deviation of Return on 
Equity (SDROE). A lower value indicates lower bank risk. Column 4 uses the standard deviation of Return on Assets (SDROA). A lower value indicates lower 
bank risk. Column 5 uses the mean of Equity to GTA ratio (EQTA). A higher value indicates lower bank risk. Column 6 uses the mean of Loan Portfolio 
Concentration measure (LPC). This measure lies between 0 and 1, where lower number shows less concentration in a bank’s loans portfolio. Column 7 uses the 
mean of Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans ratio (NPL/TL), which measures a bank’s exposure to credit risk. All dependent variables are calculated over 12 
quarters from time 𝑡 − 11 to 𝑡. Panel B shows other robustness checks as follows. Column 1 reports the OLS regression estimate that excludes all banks located 
in South Dakota and Delaware as these states have special laws on credit card banking. Column 2 excludes too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks that are defined as all 
banks with real GTA above $50 billion, consistent with the Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 definition of 
systemically-important banks. Similar to column 2, in column 3 we exclude TBTF banks with alternative definition, i.e. 19 largest banks. We refer this definition 
to the U.S. government actions in 2009 that required 19 largest banks to conduct stress tests. These banks were promised of government assistance if they failed 
to increase capital on their own during the crisis. In column 4, we present the OLS regression estimate using the block bootstrap resampling technique, following 
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). In column 5, we present the OLS regression estimate that includes all banks that exist from the beginning until the end 
of the sample period, resulting in a balanced panel subsample. Column 6 reports the OLS regression estimates in which the standard errors are clustered two-way 
at the bank and quarter level. Finally, in column 7 we report the OLS regression estimate if we aggregate banks at the BHC level instead of bank level. All right-
hand-side control variables are lagged 12 quarters. Nonfinancial controls include Population Density, Ln HPI, BHC, Listed, HHI, and squared HHI. Financial 
controls include Ln GTA, Ln GTA squared, Asset Diversification Ratio, Overhead Cost Ratio, and Foreign Assets Ratio. All regressions include bank and time 
(quarter) fixed effects (FE). All financial variables in dollar amounts are expressed in real terms using the 2010:Q4 implicit GDP price deflator. All financial 
ratios are winsorized at 1% level on top and bottom of the distribution. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level unless stated otherwise. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 




(Baseline) Ln Sharpe 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐸 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴(%) 𝐿𝑃𝐶(%) 𝑁𝑃𝐿/𝑇𝐿(%) 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intrastate Branching (Intra) -0.032*** -0.009 2.366*** 0.096*** -0.074*** 0.001 0.023 
  (-2.939) (-1.139) (7.834) (7.387) (-3.871) (1.475) (0.899) 
Interstate Banking (Inter) 0.201*** 0.126*** -1.863*** -0.122*** 0.223*** -0.004*** -0.521*** 









Table 4.4: Robustness Checks 
 




(Baseline) Ln Sharpe 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐸 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝐸𝑄𝑇𝐴(%) 𝐿𝑃𝐶(%) 𝑁𝑃𝐿/𝑇𝐿(%) 
Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Nonfinancial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time (Quarter) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 303,207 303,212 303,212 303,207 303,207 303,099 303,099 
N-cluster 12,987 12,987 12,987 12,987 12,987 12,980 12,980 
R-squared 0.717 0.712 0.667 0.661 0.899 0.905 0.739 
 
Panel B: Other Robustness Checks 
 



















Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intrastate Branching (Intra) -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.014 -0.032 -0.009 
  (-2.864) (-2.913) (-2.895) (-3.052) (-1.137) (-1.287) (-0.687) 
Interstate Banking (Inter) 0.203*** 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.201*** 0.214*** 0.201*** 0.202*** 
  (13.356) (13.586) (13.602) (13.833) (13.734) (6.938) (11.683) 
Nonfinancial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time (Quarter) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 299,409 302,885 302,637 303,207 240,845 302,905 194,750 
N-cluster (Bank or BHC) 12,824 12,978 12,972 12,987 8,250 12,685 10,215 
N-cluster (Quarter)      31  




Table 4.5: Regression Results based on State Population Density Grouping 
 
This table reports regression estimates of the impact of Intrastate Branching and Interstate Banking 
deregulation on bank risk between 1984:Q1-1994:Q3 based on state population density grouping. A state is 
defined as “sparsely populated” if its population density is below the 25
th
 percentile. Meanwhile, if the state 




 percentiles, we define it as a “fairly populated” state. 
Finally, the state is defined as “densely populated” if its population density is above the 75
th
 percentile. The 
dependent variable for all panel is Ln Z-Score, an inverse measure of bank risk. A higher value indicates 
lower bank overall risk All regressions include bank and time (quarter) fixed effects (FE). All right-hand-
side control variables are lagged 12 quarters. Nonfinancial controls include Population Density, Ln HPI, 
BHC, Listed, HHI, and squared HHI. Financial controls include Ln GTA, Ln GTA squared, Asset 
Diversification Ratio, Overhead Cost Ratio, and Foreign Assets Ratio. All financial variables in dollar 
amounts are expressed in real terms using the 2010:Q4 implicit GDP price deflator. All financial ratios are 
winsorized at 1% level on top and bottom of the distribution. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Numbers in parentheses are 
t-statistics. 
 












Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Intrastate Branching (Intra) -0.032*** -0.183*** -0.052*** 0.096*** 
  (-2.939) (-7.298) (-3.825) (3.875) 
Interstate Banking (Inter) 0.201*** 0.047** 0.191*** 0.119 
  (13.566) (2.269) (7.842) (0.908) 
Nonfinancial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time (Quarter) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 303,207 64,207 158,455 80,545 
N-cluster 12,987 3096 6950 3404 





Table 4.6: Regression Results based on Bank Size Grouping 
 
This table reports regression estimates of the impact of Intrastate Branching and Interstate Banking 
deregulation on bank risk between 1984:Q1-1994:Q3 based on bank size. Following Berger and Bouwman 
(2013), small banks are defined as commercial banks having real GTA up to $1 billion, medium banks are 
those having real GTA between $1 billion and $3 billion, and large banks are those having real GTA 
greater than $3 billion. The dependent variable for all panel is Ln Z-Score, an inverse measure of bank risk. 
A higher value indicates lower bank overall risk. All regressions include bank and time (quarter) fixed 
effects (FE). All right-hand-side control variables are lagged 12 quarters. Nonfinancial controls include 
Population Density, Ln HPI, BHC, Listed, HHI, and squared HHI. Financial controls include Ln GTA, Ln 
GTA squared, Asset Diversification Ratio, Overhead Cost Ratio, and Foreign Assets Ratio. All financial 
variables in dollar amounts are expressed in real terms using the 2010:Q4 implicit GDP price deflator. All 
financial ratios are winsorized at 1% level on top and bottom of the distribution. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 









Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
       
Intrastate Branching (Intra) -0.032*** -0.045*** -0.323*** 0.261** 
  (-2.939) (-4.172) (-2.978) (2.152) 
Interstate Banking (Inter) 0.201*** 0.190*** -0.047 0.083 
  (13.566) (12.901) (-0.335) (0.500) 
Nonfinancial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time (Quarter) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 303,207 288,515 7,842 6,850 
N-cluster 12,987 12,521 533 324 








Table 4.7: The Competition Channel—Regression Results on Small Unit Banks that Are Not Part of BHC  
 
Panel A reports regression estimates of the impact of Intrastate Branching and Interstate Banking deregulation on bank risk using a sample of small banks that 
stay to be unit banks between 1984:Q1-1994:Q3 and are not part of any BHC. Panel B reports similar regression estimates as Panel A, but for “strong” small unit 
banks that are not part of any BHC. Panel C reports similar results for “weak” small unit banks that are not part of any BHC. “Weak” small unit banks are 
defined as small unit banks that will be listed on the FDIC list of failed banks. The dependent variable for column 1 and 2 is Ln Z-Score, an inverse measure of 
bank risk. A higher value indicates lower bank overall risk. Meanwhile, the dependent variables in the next four columns are mean Nonperforming loans ratio 
(NPL/TL), mean of Return on Assets (ROA), standard deviation of ROA (𝜎(ROA)), and mean of Equity/GTA ratio (EQTA) respectively. To be consistent with 
the Ln Z-Score, all of these alternative risk measures are calculated over 12 quarters. Higher values of NPL/TL or standard deviation of ROA indicate higher 
bank risk. Higher values of ROA and EQTA indicate lower bank risk. All regressions include bank and time (quarter) fixed effects (FE). All right-hand-side 
control variables are lagged 12 quarters. Nonfinancial controls include Population Density, Ln HPI, BHC, Listed, HHI, and squared HHI. Financial controls 
include Ln GTA, Ln GTA squared, Asset Diversification Ratio, Overhead Cost Ratio, and Foreign Assets Ratio. All financial variables in dollar amounts are 
expressed in real terms using the 2010:Q4 implicit GDP price deflator. All financial ratios are winsorized at 1% level on top and bottom of the distribution. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
Panel A: All Small Unit Banks that Are Not Part of BHC 
 
 
All Small  
Banks (Baseline) 
Small Unit Banks and  
Not part of BHC 
Dependent Variables: Ln Z-Score Ln Z-Score NPL/TL(%) ROA(%) 𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴) EQTA(%) 
 Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Intrastate Branching (Intra) -0.045*** -0.016 -0.100 -0.095*** 0.069 0.088 
 
(-4.172) (-0.567) (-1.128) (-2.933) (1.576) (1.401) 
Interstate Banking (Inter) 0.190*** 0.123** -0.544*** 0.019 -0.104 0.404*** 
 
(12.901) (2.861) (-3.514) (0.391) (-1.567) (3.759) 
Nonfinancial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time (Quarter) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 288,515 29,356 29,345 29,356 29,356 29,356 
N-cluster 12,521 1738 1736 1738 1738 1738 









Panel B: “Strong” Small Unit Banks that Are Not Part of BHC 
 
 
All Small  
Banks (Baseline) 
“Strong” Small Unit Banks and  
Not part of BHC 
Dependent Variables: Ln Z-Score Ln Z-Score NPL/TL(%) ROA(%) 𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴) EQTA(%) 
 Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Intrastate Branching (Intra) -0.045*** -0.010 -0.178* -0.084** 0.073* 0.149** 
 
(-4.172) (-0.318) (-1.945) (-2.541) (1.740) (2.353) 
Interstate Banking (Inter) 0.190*** 0.128*** -0.592*** 0.016 -0.110* 0.419*** 
 
(12.901) (2.979) (-3.857) (0.324) (-1.660) (3.905) 
Nonfinancial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time (Quarter) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 288,515 27,503 27,492 27,503 27,503 27,503 
N-cluster 12,521 1510 1508 1510 1510 1510 





















Panel C: “Weak” Small Unit Banks that Are Not Part of BHC 
 
 
All Small  
Banks (Baseline) 
“Weak” Small Unit Banks and  
Not part of BHC 
Dependent Variables: Ln Z-Score Ln Z-Score NPL/TL(%) ROA(%) 𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴) EQTA(%) 
 Independent Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Intrastate Branching (Intra) -0.045*** -0.043 1.023*** -0.175 -0.182 -0.642** 
 
(-4.172) (-0.388) (3.144) (-1.113) (-0.488) (-2.189) 
Interstate Banking (Inter) 0.190*** -0.260** 1.839** 0.062 0.582 -0.910 
 
(12.901) (-2.487) (2.320) (0.233) (1.436) (-1.635) 
Nonfinancial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time (Quarter) FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 288,515 1,853 1,853 1,853 1,853 1,853 
N-cluster 12,521 228 228 228 228 228 








This dissertation consists of three essays that contribute to the literature of bank 
loan specialness, deposit insurance, and deregulation. The first essay provides empirical 
evidence of the certification value of bank loans from the U.S. market in the last two 
decades, which has experienced both market crisis and banking crisis. Using a novel 
dataset that merges 11,635 loan deals from the LPC Dealscan database and form 8-Ks 
from the SEC EDGAR between 1994-2014, I find that on average, only about 31% of 
bank loans are announced by firms. Among those loans announced, about 60% are 
cleanly announced and 40% are announced together with other events. Next, I find 
statistically and economically significant three-days Cumulative Abnormal Stock Return 
(CAR) following a loan announcement, which on average about +39 b.p., in line with the 
theory of bank loan specialness. The positive CARs are driven mainly by bank-dependent 
firms, which have never issued public bonds. Meanwhile, as a comparison, I show that 
three-days CARs following public bond announcements by firms in the sample are 
negative and statistically significant. Then, using the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX) and the SEC Rule ##33-8400 of 2004 as exogenous shocks to loan 
announcements by firms, I show significant evidence of sample selection bias in the loan 






Being the first study that corrects the sample selection bias, using the Heckman 
selection method, I find that a loan is more likely to be announced during a market crisis, 
relative to normal times, but not during a banking crisis, consistent with the asymmetric 
information hypothesis. Moreover, a loan is more likely to be announced by small firms, 
firms with lower EBITDA, and when the loan has more financial covenants, is a revolver 
loan, has a longer maturity, secured, as well as when the firm has a previous relationship 
with the same lender in the past 5 years. Then, I find that the CARs are significantly 
higher during a banking crisis, compared to normal times, but not in a market crisis, in 
line with both the asymmetric information hypothesis and the institutional memory 
hypothesis. In terms of loan, firm, and lender characteristics, CAR is statistically higher 
for a loan announced by a bank-dependent firm, and for a loan that has more financial 
covenants, and is a revolver. I also find some evidence CAR is statistically higher for a 
loan that has a longer maturity as well as a loan made by the same lender that has lent the 
firm in the past 5 years. Finally, I find strong evidence that CAR is negatively associated 
with the market share of nonbank lenders, which aligns with the competition hypothesis 
that explains why CARs following loan announcements shown by the recent literature, 
including this paper, is not as high as the earlier studies have shown.  
The second essay provides empirical evidence on how deposit insurance affects 
bank risk-taking and how this relation works on banks with different types of ownership, 
by using a unique natural experiment data from Indonesia from 2002:Q1-2011:Q4. I find 
a significant positive relation between explicit Deposit Insurance (DI) coverage and bank 
risk-taking, consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis. More specifically, controlling 




find that Indonesian banks’ Z-score, an inverse measure of bank risk taking, increases on 
average about 18% when the government switched from the blanket guarantee era to the 
limited guarantee era administered by the IDIC. In terms of mechanisms in which explicit 
DI coverage influences bank risk taking, I find that a lower explicit DI coverage is 
associated with lower bank profitability, lower standard deviation of profitability, and 
higher capitalization. Furthermore, I find some evidence that the relation is non-
monotonic at the low level of explicit DI coverage, in line with the safety net hypothesis. 
This finding suggests that there is an optimum range of explicit DI coverage that 
sufficiently protects the depositors while curbing the banks’ moral hazard problem. 
Finally, I find significant evidence that the impact of explicit DI coverage on bank risk is 
different across different kinds of ultimate owners. In particular, family banks and 
politically connected banks are those that are most affected when the government 
switched from the blanket guarantee era to the limited guarantee era, suggesting that the 
moral hazard problem in these banks are more prominent compared to foreign banks and 
nonpolitically connected banks. 
The third essay (co-authored with Allen N. Berger, Sadok El Ghoul, and Omrane 
Guedhami) studies all three types of geographic deregulation in last three decades in the 
U.S. banking industry—intrastate branching, interstate banking, and interstate branching. 
These deregulations provide unique empirical settings to test the impact of competition 
and diversification on bank risk. We find statistically and economically significant 
evidence that on average, interstate banking deregulation is associated with about 22% 
increase in Z-score, an inverse indicator of overall bank risk. On the contrary, we find 




3%. Meanwhile, we find no evidence that interstate branching affects bank risk. These 
findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks, including those for endogeneity and 
sample selection bias, as well as alternative risk measures. Different than most of the 
previous studies that focus on large banks and Bank Holding Companies, our findings 
show that the favorable impact of interstate banking deregulation on bank risk are driven 
by small banks, which had opposed the deregulation with the fear that an increase in 
competition from large banks could reduce their survival probability. Meanwhile, 
intrastate branching is associated with higher risk for small and medium banks, but lower 
risk for large banks. These findings suggest that the competition-stability channel 
dominates for small and medium banks, while the diversification-stability channel 
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